Purpose: The subcommittee will meet to receive testimony on military operations in cyberspace and building cyber capabilities across the Department of Defense. The hearing will provide members an opportunity to examine the strategy, policy, and programs for operations in cyberspace and U.S. Cyber Command.
Additionally, the witnesses will provide testimony on major legislative initiatives and policy issues related to cyber. The hearing will allow members to assess and examine the policies, authorities, and guidance for the conduct of cyber operations in respective mission areas, as well as notifications to Congress, the establishment in Departmental policy of the Cyber Operational Forces, integration and coordination with Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, and any changes in cyber mission priorities over the past two years. Additionally, the subcommittee will hear about the implementation of additional authorities and responsibilities granted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).
Ms. Mieke Eoyang
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
General Paul M. Nakasone, U.S. Army
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command
Director, National Security Agency
Unofficial Hearing Rush Transcript
(with errors – first 40 minutes of the hearing)
Subcommittee will come to order. Before I begin my opening statement, welcome our witnesses. And I’m just going to read some, some technical information since this is a hybrid hearing, and some members will be joining us remotely.
Welcome to today’s hearing operations in cyberspace and building cyber cyber capabilities across the Department of Defence. We have convened this as a hybrid hearing, and we are joined by members who are participating remotely. members who are joining remotely, must be visible on screen for the purposes of identity verification, establishing maintaining a quorum participating in the proceeding and voting. Those members must continue to use the software platforms video function, while in attendance, unless they experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that render them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences difficulties, they should contact the committee staff for assistance. Video of members participation will be broadcast in the room and via the television internet feeds. Members participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking. members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep the software platforms video function on the entire time they attend the proceeding. members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members depart for a short while, for reasons other than joining a different proceeding. They should leave the video function on if members will be absent for a significant period or depart to join a different proceeding they should exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin it if the if they return. members may use the software platforms chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues only. I’ve designated the committee staff member to have necessary mute, unrecognised members microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
So I’d like to welcome our witnesses. General Paul Nakasone, the commander of us Cyber Command and the Director of National Security Agency, and McKay, Mieke Eoyang, the deputy assistant secretary of defence for cyber policy. Welcome to you both. In past hearings general Nakasone has been joined by Assistant Secretary of defence for Homeland defence and global security. However, with the challenges faced in that role, we are thankful that Ms. Mieke Eoyang, is able to step in, and the committee appreciates your cooperation and collaboration. So it’s truly incredible how much has changed since our last cyber posture hearing on March 4 2020. The world has been upended by a pandemic, changing the lives of literally every person on the planet. In the realm of cyber matters. The men and women of the Department of Defence including our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and guardians have had no respite, continuing to operate and defend Americans interest in American Americans interest in cyberspace. Despite the pandemic, our adversaries and competitors have not led up their cyber campaigns. In the last six months alone, the media has reported almost nonstop on in arguably some of the most significant cyber incidents ever to affect our nation from solar winds to hafnium. To just in the last week, the attack against coal to pipeline by the dark side criminal collective. So if there were any doubters that cyberspace is an active and contested a warfighting domain.
I would hope that that the last year has changed those perspectives, yet. Incredibly, it still appears that this committee that cyber does not always have the focus of much of the department, senior uniformed and civilian leadership that it requires, despite our forces engaging adversaries in this domain every single day. I point this out. Recently, the Air Force removed cyber from its mission statement, even though report from the Office of Secretary of defence concluded that the inclusion of cyber in the airforce mission statement is the single reason why Air Force personnel have had vastly outpaced other services in pursuing cyber related certifications. candidly, it’s frustrating that the people in this room both members of witnesses have seem to be fighting an uphill battle to Cyber front and centre in the department. out of five officially recognised warfighting domains, the senior civilian official for air, sea land and space domains, our military service secretaries, yet with all due respect to Miss Mieke Eoyang and her spectacularly overworked team to civilian, the senior civilian, for cyber is four rungs lower than our counterparts overseeing other domains. So we also have to account for the ways in which cyberspace operations occur within and affect the information environment. One of the most illustrative examples of how the department’s structure can hinder rather than enable operations is its own organisation chart. The dl DS joint publication 313 notes that cyberspace is one of many information related capabilities designed to affect the information domain alongside psychological operations, and electromagnetic spectrum operations. Yet each of the information related to capabilities is handled by a separate entity and siloed within the department, ensuring that we cannot leverage our capabilities to the maximum extent possible, this needs to change. In our current age of great power competition, conflict in the grey zone below the level of armed conflict has never been more relevant to our strategic thought, for numerous reasons, challenges with attribution, easily altered payloads and ease of proliferation. Cyber is the ideal tool for grey zone conflict. The information domain, including cyberspace is where our forces are engaged against our adversaries daily. As the nation comes to realise that this domain is as important as any other, we need that to the defence department to adapt to ensure that any conflict with adversaries remains in the information space as much as possible and never moves into the kinetic realm. As we push the department to adapt toward the information environment, congressional oversight has never been more necessary. It is the mechanism by which we monitor the activities of the executive branch and ensure compliance with relevant statute. While I understand that, that transitions can result in disconnects, and or misunderstandings, I anticipate hearing from the committee staff that any issues that may have arisen will quickly will be quickly resolved to our satisfaction. So I’m happy to add detail in private. But we’ll leave it at that for now. So with that, I now want to thank our witnesses again for appearing before us today. As a reminder, after this open session, we move to the CVC Ovid auditorium for a closed, member only session. With that I want to turn now to Ranking Member Gallagher for his remarks.
Mike Gallagher 12:56
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to general Nakasone and Ms. Mieke Eoyang for being here today. cyberspace is the ultimate grey zone in which operations often do not fit neatly into either traditional kinetic warfighting, or non traditional activities. So adversaries like China and Russia, as well as non state actors are continuously exploiting the grey zone and probing our networks and exploiting our vulnerabilities in cyberspace. I mean, just in recent months, we’ve had solar winds we’ve had Microsoft exchanged, we had Russian cyber actors last week shut down a major US pipeline, highlighting the cyber threat posed to our critical infrastructure, from actors anywhere in the world, and how actors all over the world can reach out and touch all of our constituents, no matter where and our districts are. I just would say, though, our cyber adversaries are diffused and evolving and they’ve proved time and again, that our, our cyber networks are only as strong as the weakest link. Our operations and capabilities have also evolved in large part due to the work of this subcommittee and the leadership of general Nakasone, at us Cyber Command and in particular general, the input that you provided to the cyberspace solarium commission over the last two years, which would took up a lot of work representative Landsman in my work over the last couple years. But as we continue to harden our networks and improve our capabilities, the President’s budget must focus on modernising duties platforms, we must consider cutting legacy platforms out of date for modern conflict and investing in emerging technologies in cyber and I believe I speak for everyone here when I say I hope to see a budget that recognises the importance of our cyber mission force invests in necessary cyber infrastructure, including technology and human capital, highlights necessary cyber authorities and really pushes the department out of that silos and into a streamline structure that prioritises cyber agility and responsiveness. Our cyber mission force has also matured, but we must continue to identify cyber talent and train equip and support our cyber force to improve our capabilities across the cyber continuum and maintain superiority over hostile cyber actors. So, we took a lot of pivotal steps in this direction last year’s NDA. And I know we will continue to make progress towards our cyber goals again this year. But the fundamental shift in thinking about cyber will take more than just directives in the NDA. It will require leaders at God and throughout the government and in Congress to think strategically and acknowledge that cyber is now the critical domain to every facet of our national security. With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and I yield back.
Jim Langevin 15:37
Thank you Ranking Member Gallagher for your remarks. With that. I’ll now turn it over to Mr. Yang, and Joe Nakasone for five minutes remarks each. Ms. O Yang, you are recognised, you may proceed.
Ms. Mieke Eoyang 15:50
Thank you, Chairman Lynch van representative Gallagher and members of the committee. I’m pleased to be here with general Nakasone, the commander of us Cyber Command to report the progress of the Department of Defence has made and achieving the department’s objectives in cyberspace. This afternoon, I’m testifying in my role as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of defence for cyber policy. In that role, I’m responsible for advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on cyberspace policy and the development of the department cyber strategy and other cyberspace policy. Congress has demonstrated that it views cyber defence as a priority through not only its legislative work, but through member service on the solarium commission. And for that, we are grateful for your ongoing support for this crucial issue in a broad and by partisan manner. To start, I would like to offer our perspective on the current global strategic context. As you know, 2020 was a year of turmoil with a global pandemic, drastically altering our day to day reality and increasing our dependence on the internet. our adversaries took notice of our growing reliance on technology cybercriminals, and nation state actors alike took advantage of COVID-19 by unleashing ransomware on healthcare facilities, targeting vaccines, production and supply chains, exploiting fears to spread disinformation, and even disrupting pipeline companies. As a result, the cyberspace domain is both more important and more contested than it has been in recent memory, enhancing the security of cyberspace both in the United States and around the world as a top priority as the present interim national security district strategic guidance prioritises cybersecurity and pledges to expand investments needed to defend the nation against malicious cyber activity and cyber attack. Our competitors are using their cyber capabilities to seek political economic information and military advantages and to undermine our security by engaging in malicious cyber activity. The DNI assesses that cyber threats from nation states particularly China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, and their surrogates will remain acute both in day to day competition and to seek advantage in armed conflict. As Secretary Austin said his confirmation hearing in January, China’s the pacing threat for the department, including in cyber operations, China uses cyber operations to erode US military overmatch and economic vitality, stealing us intellectual property and research. Chinese malicious cyber activity continues to this day. Russia also continues to be a highly sophisticated and capable adversary integrating malicious cyber activities, including espionage influence operations in mutually reinforcing ways to achieve its objectives. They engage in a wide range of malign cyber activities, including attempts to interfere with US elections, spreading ransomware, such as not Petya efforts to disrupt the postpone Tokyo Olympics and most the most recent solar winds attack. In addition to using cyberspace is an offensive tool. China and Russia view the internet as a mechanism to control and intimidate their own populations. While the United States advocates for an open interoperable, secure and reliable internet. China and Russia have created and employed a digital authoritarian model using their technological and cyberspace capabilities to manipulate narratives repress free speech surveil their citizens and quashed sent domestically. China’s seeks to export digital authoritarianism to other repressive regime regimes remaking the internet in its image. Beyond China and Russia, we remain concerned about the cyber threat posed by Iran and North Korea. And further nation state actors such as criminals, terrorist and violent extremists continue to leverage the Internet to advance their agendas. The line between nation state and criminal actors is increasingly blurry, as nation states turned to criminal proxies as a tool of state power, then turn a blind eye to the cybercrime perpetrated by the same malicious actors. This is a common practice for Russia whose security services leverage cyber criminals while shielding them from prosecution for crimes they commit for personal benefit. We have also seen some states allow their government or their government hackers to moonlight a cyber criminals. This is not how responsible states behave in cyberspace, nor can responsible states condoned shielding of this criminal behaviour. The President has made clear also the nest the need to strengthen our alliances. The department is driving new approaches to do that. And we continue forward operations with partners even during pandemic and cyber exercises such as cyber flag to help our allies prepare for adversary actions. President Biden is currently conducting a review of national strategy which will culminate in the issuance of two key documents, the National Security Strategy and the National Cyber strategy. The President’s guidance will inform our own upcoming defence level review of the National Defence strategy and follow on national department’s second ever cyber Posture Review, which will evaluate our ability to execute national and departmental level strategies to achieve our goals in cyberspace. We look forward to delivering the strategy and Posture Review to Congress once they are completed. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to the members questions.
Jim Langevin 20:54
Thank you, Miss Mieke Eoyang, and GEN Nakasone you are now recognised for five minutes,
General Paul M. Nakasone 20:59
Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Gallagher and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I’m honoured to be here and testify beside Secretary o Yang, and represent the men and women of us Cyber Command. Three major incidents over the past six months demonstrate the importance of cyber security to our nation. well resourced and sophisticated adversaries are exploiting gaps in the nation’s ability to monitor us cyberspace infrastructure. while conducting operations from within the boundaries of the United States. The solar winds incident occurred through the highly skilled means of an adversary against a US company supply chain. at nearly the same time, the server hack associated with Microsoft Exchange showcased the ability of another adversary to exploit vulnerabilities and attack systems around the world. The colonial pipeline ransomware attack also demonstrate a growing trend of companies and even government agencies being held hostage by malicious cyber actors. These cases demonstrate the broadening scope, scale and sophistication employed by some adversaries. The United States government in tandem with industry partners must improve its defensive posture to prevent and or minimise the impacts while contesting and defeating those who would exploit such vulnerabilities and target American companies and citizens. Cyber Security is national security. Over the past year, I emphasise the importance of defending the election against foreign interference. We did this through the election security group, our combined team from us Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. We built on lessons from earlier operations and home partnerships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security, cybersecurity, and infrastructure security agency, sharing information with those who needed it as fast as possible. We also worked with the National Guard Bureau to create a mechanism that enabled Guard units to share information about incidents quickly, easily and uniformly. Us Cyber Command conducted more than two dozen operations to get ahead of foreign threats before they interfered with or influenced our elections in 2020. I am proud of the work that command and the election security group performed as part of a broader government effort to deliver a safe, secure 2020 election. cybercom is building on recent guidance from the department seeking to promote readiness, improve training and attract high end talent. The cyberspace environment has changed significantly over the past years. To your point Chairman even over the past 14 months we’ve seen a tremendous difference in the environment. adversaries are demonstrating a change risk calculus. They are undertaking malign activities in cyberspace at greater scope, scale and sophistication. they desire to take on the US in cyberspace, below the level of armed conflict. To defend our security and our interests in this environment. Us Cyber Command must continue to adapt, innovate, partner and succeed against such adversaries. The men and women at us Cyber Command look forward to working with this committee and are truly grateful for the support Congress has given to our command. Again, thank you for your support. And I look forward to your questions.
Jim Langevin 24:22
Thank you, GEN Nakasone. Mieke Eoyang for your your testimony here today. Before we begin, proceed your questions as well thank you again for your commitment to national security of the United States. And I want to just point out as a matter of personal privilege, we all recognise that our nation is one giant melting pot. And I think diversity is something to be celebrated. And I think this may be historic first for for this committee and that we have two members of the AAPI community testifying before us at the same time. So pretty cool to note and now. Thank you again. Very good. Well, thank you both for being here again for your testimony, your commitment to the national security, the United States. And thank you for your remarks. We’re going to now proceed with questions. Each member will be recognised for five minutes, beginning with myself. And so Eoyang, I want to start with you if I could. So the Assistant Secretary of defence for Special Operations and low intensity conflict is responsible for information operations. But the Assistant Secretary of defence for Homeland defence, a global security is responsible for cyberspace operations. Can you explain the logic as to why two separate chains are established for operations within the same information environments?
Ms. Mieke Eoyang 25:55
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the question here. I think I’m not sure that I am, can give the full history on how that evolved from the department’s perspective in terms of why those two things are in separate silos agree that there is a fair amount of overlap there. But as you may know, the psyops information ops had traditionally been held in the the Special Operations community. And as cyberspace grew up, it did went through a number of evolutions, and has found itself within the homeland defence and global security arena, in part because of the focus, I think, on the homeland security aspects of cybersecurity. But certainly there are some challenge coordination challenges in the division between the two.
Jim Langevin 26:41
So to that point, you know it how do you and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of defence for Special Operations and counterterrorism, a position that owns the information operations portfolio for OSD policy, coordinate and collaborate?
Ms. Mieke Eoyang 26:59
I’m in regular communication with my colleagues. And we are we are collaborating at all levels between our two offices, Mr. Chairman,
Jim Langevin 27:08
it’s something that we’re going to have to continue to work on everything to though. GEN Nakasone, one of the solarium, cyberspace Commission’s key outstanding questions, as to whether was was whether the cyber mission force designed now nine years ago was properly sized. You may remember that I asked you about this, at last year’s hearing. We spoke about this yesterday when you and I met, also my office. But last year, you had replied that you needed more relevant data. And without discussing the contents of the President’s budget, before its release, can you tell us about whether you acquire the information necessary to make a decision on the size of the forest and what insights you glean from this information?
General Paul M. Nakasone 28:06
Chairman, thank you. We do have the data. And again, to your point not to get ahead of the budget submission, but in general terms, I would anticipate that as we as we lay out the case, we have to look at some critical elements that will influence the future size of the cyber mission force now 133 teams in the future, we have to account for the growing importance of space, I think we have to account for the importance of what we’re seeing with malign cyber actors, whether or not it’s Russian cyber actors, Chinese cyber actors, Iranian cyber actors and their intent. And I think the the last piece is is that we are in a period of strategic competition. And I think the word is competition. So we have to have that balance of not only what we are going to support our fellow combatant commands, if conflict was to break out, but also if our adversaries are operating below the level of armed conflict every single day, what type of force Do we need to be able to ensure that we can counteract that much in the same way that we have done in our support to the national elections?
Jim Langevin 29:14
Thank you general. And recently, one of your subordinate commands are be Cyber Command established in information warfare Operations Centre at at nearly the exact same time, US Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg separately established in information warfare centred. So acknowledging that this is army specific good points to a wider issue about lack of clarity on mission sets and an absence of direction inside the department. How do you distinguish what Cyber Command and its cyber focus subordinate commands do versus what Special Operations Command and its soft centric subordinate elements do?
General Paul M. Nakasone 30:01
Chairman have a very, very close and enduring partnership with US Special Operations Command under the leadership of general rich Clark, we talk frequently on this, to provide a bit of perspective on this. I see it as only natural that Special Operations Command is they operate across all the different domains also has a capability within cyberspace. I think the delineation is, you know, what is the focus of US Special Operations Command? What is the focus of US Army Cyber Command? What is the overall focus of us Cyber Command? I think we have worked through that. I think, to your point, there’s still work to do on our doctrine, we will continue to, to advocate for that work. But we all realise that it’s more than, you know, just conducting one cyberspace operations. It’s the entire information domain that we have to understand and be able to operate within.
Jim Langevin 30:54
Thank you, gentlemen. I’ll hold there and turn to the ranking member for his questions now.
Mike Gallagher 30:59
Thank you. General, you mentioned the challenge in the colonial pipeline context of ransomware and criminal groups, and I think it’s safe to say that challenge is only going to grow in the short term. Part of the problem, it strikes me as an authorities problem, I’d be curious to the st can answer an open session, what tools you believe you have in your kit to get at that challenge? Because I believe you also mentioned that as NSA director, you’re limited in obviously monitoring domestic us IT infrastructure, do you think your cybercom forces could be provided under dsca to DHS, for example, and us to conduct a sort of monitoring analysis under DHS authorities, at least until DHS builds its own capabilities? How do we get this, get it this in the short term, while we sort of build out a longer term answer?
General Paul M. Nakasone 31:49
ranking member, I think, to your initial point, it’s really important to look at this as a broader element. And how do we get after this criminal activity? I think this is a whole government effort. In the United States, it is most appropriate that lead federal agencies, obviously Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, I don’t think there’s any problem with the authorities in terms of what it’s what it’s stated out to do. But as we look at ransomware. And as we continue to peel this back, as we see criminal actors that are operating outside the United States, I think what the administration obviously is moving towards is how do we have a whole of government approach that in brings together our levels of power that includes diplomacy, and certainly our economic and if necessary, and if authorised outside the United States, what the Department of Defence might do to your last point, Ranking Member with regards to support for an incident like this well established processes as you know, defence support to civil authorities. And I think that those would be executed if lead federal agencies needed to have that support?
Mike Gallagher 32:57
Well, as we attempt to step back and look at it holistically, I think it’s fair, at least with one lens to look at it as not just as this attack isolated but as a Russia problem, right. And part of the problem is you at times opaque relationships between the Russian government and criminal groups? Do we have the sufficient analytical capacity to tease out those relationships make those distinctions? Is there more regional expertise that we need to apply to this problem? I’d be curious to the extent again, the extent you can answer in this session, how you think about those opaque relationships and our ability to better understand them.
General Paul M. Nakasone 33:32
Quite simply, I think about it in terms of how do I provide the most intelligence I can as Director of the National Security Agency or commander, US Cyber Command that provides both viewpoint on intent and capability of our adversaries. I think, you know, as any director of a combat support agency would share with you is, we need to do more. And we can talk a little bit more in closed session today. But again,
Mike Gallagher 33:58
I think that overall, we have work to do across us Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. And then finally, one of the cyberspace solarium commission recommendations that we are working on right now, is this concept of systemically important critical infrastructure, which just case obviously brings up, do you support the idea of creating a codified relationship between the United States government and critical functions?
General Paul M. Nakasone 34:27
Congressman, I would say I support anything that is going to ensure the security of our critical infrastructure and key resources. My experience has been with elections, but there are 16 other sectors. And I think that what the administration has laid out in the 100 day plan, initially with regards to energy is is a great start where we need to figure out how do we bring the whole parts of the government and particularly important, how do we bring the private sector into a greater partnership to ensure that we have outcomes that will lead to greater resiliency and obviously security. Thank you.
Mike Gallagher 34:57
I guess the clock doesn’t count down when you’re up. This time on the Dyess, which is interesting, but in the interest of time, I’ll still yield back.
Jim Langevin 35:04
Well, we’ve we follow the lead of the chair ranking member, the full committee that the the chair and Ranking Member of the subcommittee are not on the clock. But with that, I want to now thank you for your questions. And I also want to commend the ranking member for his leadership as co chair of the cyberspace solarium commission that was proud to serve in the commission with you and really appreciate your commitment to national security. That report was one way I think toward getting us to a stronger place in cyberspace. With that I want to recognise now Mr. Larsen for five minutes.
Rick Larsen 35:43
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ranking Member Gallagher will see the clock ticking now that we’re on the others. General Nakasone. Joe Nakasone section 1729 of the NDA required a comprehensive evaluation by the SEC def, basically, on how to use the cyber capabilities of the National Guard. Do you have an update on the status of that evaluation?
General Paul M. Nakasone 36:14
Congressman, I would have to defer to the Secretary if she has when I personally don’t have one. But certainly, we can take that for the record if necessary, Congressman.
Rick Larsen 36:25
That’s great. Thank perhaps secretary.
Ms. Mieke Eoyang 36:31
So, Mr. Larsen, just want to clarify this. Since we’ve had a number of congressional interest provisions on National Guard exactly which of the provisions are we refer, referring to?
Unknown Speaker 36:43
cyber cyber capabilities and interoperability of the National Guard requires a comprehensive evaluation by secdef on the mechanisms by which the department is able to improve the utilisation of cyber capabilities resident in the National Guard.
Ms. Mieke Eoyang 36:58
Our understanding is that we should have an answer for you later this summer on that, on that topic.
Unknown Speaker 37:05
All right. I’m over a list of questions that are really more appropriate for a different setting. But I did want to ask, or my question. Oh, perhaps for Joel Nakasone. Can you highlight perhaps how you’re leveraging commercial threat information providers? And how do you share that information?
General Paul M. Nakasone 37:29
Congressman, we have a number of different relationships with with the private sector. Sincerely in terms of being able to understand better the the vulnerabilities that exist in our private industry in private companies is critical for us. This is obviously sometimes a means upon which we have early alerts to problems that might exist in the private sector. At the command, I assure you that any type of data is looked at screened, and carefully evaluated for us persons data. And if by rare occasion that we do have that, we will certainly minimise and, and we have processes and procedures upon which to deal with
Unknown Speaker 38:13
that. And then in last year’s NDA, we are authorised some language that has cybercom participate in and contribute to the joint cyber playing office at CES on how we plan to implement that Parisian
General Paul M. Nakasone 38:30
Congressman, we’ve we’ve had some experience in working very closely with CES and it began with the election. One of the things that I directed were a series of planners to go over and to work closely with sissa, as we put together our strategy for securing the 2020 election. What we found is that this truly is value added the way that we do planning operations is something that I think is very helpful as as we take a look at broad base problems like election security, we’re going to continue to support that that’s been been an element that the Secretary has emphasised to us and in very close partnership, obviously with sissa. So this will be just the first of many steps as we as we go to work this closely.