09 June 2004
G8 Issues Action Plan on Global Nonproliferation
Leaders call on North Korea to dismantle nuclear
Leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) countries have strongly urged
North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons-related programs "in
a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner."
In a statement on nonproliferation issued on June 9 -- the second
day of their three-day summit -- the leaders expressed support
for the ongoing six-party talks to resolve concerns related to
North Korea's nuclear program and said Pyongyang's withdrawal from
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its
pursuit of nuclear weapons are "serious concerns" to the G8.
The G8 comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
the United Kingdom and the United States. The leaders are gathered
in Sea Island, Georgia, June 8-10 for their 2004 summit.
The G8 nonproliferation action plan endorses key elements of President
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to
prevent international trade in nuclear weapons materials and technology.
The PSI "core group" now includes all G8 members.
G8 leaders endorsed expansion of the global partnership initiated
at the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, to secure or eliminate
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet
Union. They welcomed the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand
to join the partnership.
They expressed strong support for U.N. Security Council Resolution
1540, which calls on member states to criminalize WMD proliferation
activities and improve related export control systems.
The leaders also agreed on the need to strengthen the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by making the adoption of the IAEA's
additional protocol a condition of the importation of certain nuclear
technologies. The protocol expands the IAEA's tools to verify nuclear
"The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard
in the field of nuclear supply arrangements," the leaders said. "We
will work to strengthen NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] guidelines
accordingly. We aim to achieve this end by the end of 2005."
In addition to listing North Korea as a nonproliferation "challenge," the
G8 expressed concern over Iran's nuclear program and its failure
to comply fully with its international obligations. "We deplore
Iran's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures,
as detailed in IAEA Director General reports," the G8 said.
Following is the text of the G8 action plan on nonproliferation
as released by the White House:
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Sea Island, Georgia)
June 9, 2004
G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation
At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism,
as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security.
This challenge requires a long-term strategy and multi-faceted
Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back proliferation, today,
at Sea Island, we announce an action plan to reinforce the global
nonproliferation regime. We will work together with other concerned
states to realize this plan.
All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation
commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly support universal
adherence to and compliance with these commitments under the relevant
multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage states in effectively
implementing their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes,
in particular implementing domestically their obligations under
such treaties, building law enforcement capacity, and establishing
effective export controls. We call on all states that have not
already done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling
on all states to establish effective national export controls,
to adopt and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation,
to take cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in
such weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. We
call on all states to implement this resolution promptly and fully,
and we are prepared to assist them in so doing, thereby helping
to fight the nexus between terrorism and proliferation, and black
markets in these weapons and related materials.
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation
The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of sensitive nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology that may be used for weapons
purposes are a threat to us all. Some states seek uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs contrary
to their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT
and to the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will
work to prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and
technology. We announce the following new actions to reduce the
risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear
materials and technology by terrorists, while allowing the world
to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.
-- To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful
nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation,
we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive
nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported
to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow
them to fall into terrorist hands. The export of such items should
only occur pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation
norms and to states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall
work to amend appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines,
and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the
future. We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next
G-8 Summit. In aid of this process, for the intervening year, we
agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives
involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and
technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt
this strategy of prudence. We will also develop new measures to
ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology,
including nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions,
for all states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments
-- We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards
and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement
these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach
efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support.
-- The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard
in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen
NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of
-- We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation
with states that violate their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards
obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority
for such decisions rests with national governments or the Security
-- To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and strengthen
its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations
and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a
new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This committee
would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened
safeguards and verification. We believe this committee should be
made up of member states in compliance with their NPT and IAEA
-- Likewise, we believe that countries under investigation for
non-technical violations of their nuclear nonproliferation and
safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions
by the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee regarding
their own cases.
2. Proliferation Security Initiative
We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement of Interdiction Principles,
which is a global response to a global problem. We will continue
our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking
in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related
materials. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation
from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen
domestic and international laws supporting PSI. We welcome the
increasing level of support worldwide for PSI, which now includes
all G-8 members. The Krakow meeting commemorating PSI's first anniversary,
attended by 62 countries, evidences growing global support.
We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and
coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by
stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants,
laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with international law. Several
of us are already developing mechanisms to deny access to our ports
and airports for companies and impose visa bans on individuals
involved in illicit trade.
We encourage all states to strengthen and expand national and
international measures to respond to clandestine procurement activities.
Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we
will work actively with states requiring assistance in improving
their national capabilities to meet international norms.
3. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass
Since its launch by G-8 Leaders two years ago at Kananaskis, the
Global Partnership has become a significant force worldwide to
enhance international safety and security. Global Partnership member
states, including the six new donors that joined at Evian, have
in the past year launched new cooperative projects in Russia and
accelerated progress on those already underway. While much has
been accomplished, significant challenges remain. We recommit ourselves
to our Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines as the
basis for Global Partnership cooperation.
-- We recommit ourselves to raising up to $20 billion for the
Global Partnership through 2012.
-- Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor countries
is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure the
effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of Australia,
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of
Korea, and New Zealand to join.
-- We will continue to work with other former Soviet states to
discuss their participation in the Partnership. We reaffirm that
Partnership states will participate in projects according to their
national interests and resources.
-- We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges worldwide.
We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan
scientists involved in past WMD programs. We also support projects
to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel
in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent
HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export
control and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will
use the Global Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.
4. Nonproliferation Challenges
-- The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, which is unprecedented;
its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, including through both
its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium enrichment programs,
in violation of its international obligations; and its established
history of missile proliferation are serious concerns to us all.
We strongly support the Six-Party Process, and strongly urge the
DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programs in
a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, a fundamental
step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
-- We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation
implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program resolved. Iran
must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards
agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA Board
of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note that since Evian,
Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has committed itself
to cooperate with the Agency, and to suspend its enrichment and
reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge the areas
of progress reported by the Director General, we are, however,
deeply concerned that Iran's suspension of enrichment-related activity
is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies
in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA
Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully
to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements,
including ratification and full implementation of the Additional
Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related
to its nuclear program.
-- We welcome Libya's strategic decision to rid itself of its
weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles, to fully
comply with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and to commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile
Technology Control Regime. We note Libya has cooperated in the
removal of nuclear equipment and materials and taken steps to eliminate
chemical weapons. We call on Libya to continue to cooperate fully
with the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
5. Defending Against Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all
nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies.
We commit to concrete national and international steps to: expand
or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities
to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops;
improve our prevention and response capabilities; increase protection
of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate
the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious
outbreaks of disease. In this context, we seek concrete realization
of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The
BWC is a critical foundation against biological weapons' proliferation,
including to terrorists. Its prohibitions should be fully implemented,
including enactment of penal legislation. We strongly urge all
non-parties to join the BWC promptly.
6. Chemical Weapons Proliferation
We support full implementation of the CWC, including its nonproliferation
aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the CWC promptly,
and will work with them to this end. We also urge CWC States Parties
to undertake national legislative and administrative measures for
its full implementation. We support the use of all fact-finding,
verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary,
challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.
7. Implementation of the Evian Initiative on Radioactive Source
At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive sources
to prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial
progress toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved
a revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources in September 2003. We urge all states to implement the
Code and recognize it as a global standard.
We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk
radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized
end-users in states that can control them. States should ensure
that no sources are diverted for illicit use. We seek prompt IAEA
approval of this guidance to ensure that effective controls are
operational by the end of 2005 and applied in a harmonized and
consistent manner. We support the IAEA's program for assistance
to ensure that all countries can meet the new standards.
8. Nuclear Safety and Security
Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chornobyl, we have worked
with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the site. We
have already made a large financial contribution to build a safe
confinement over the remnants of the Chornobyl reactor. We are
grateful for the participation and contributions made by 21 other
states in this effort. Today, we endorse international efforts
to raise the remaining funds necessary to complete the project.
We urge Ukraine to support and work closely with us to complete
the confinement's construction by 2008 in a way that contributes
to radiological safety, in particular in Ukraine and neighboring
An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system is essential
for our safety and security. We affirm the importance for national
regulators to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence.