

CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEFENSE STRATEGY

In order to shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises, U.S. forces must possess unmatched military capabilities to succeed in a broad range of missions and operational environments. The U.S. military is structured to give national leaders an array of viable options for promoting and protecting U.S. interests in peacetime, crisis, and war. The depth and breadth of U.S. military capabilities were demonstrated most recently in Kosovo, where U.S. forces, acting in concert with its NATO Allies and coalition partners, prevailed against a determined foe while maintaining the ability to respond to other security requirements as dictated by the defense strategy.

OVERARCHING CAPABILITIES—CHARACTERISTICS OF A FULL-SPECTRUM FORCE

The broad demands of the strategy require a full array of military capabilities from all Services—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps—and from all components—active, reserve, guard, civilian. (See Table 2-1 for a summary of major conventional force elements.) This full-spectrum force must be able to prosecute the most demanding missions, including defeating large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters nearly simultaneously, conducting the full range of smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, and supporting routine shaping activities.

To conduct this wide range of missions the full-spectrum force must be highly versatile, requiring the highest training and readiness standards and equipment that is effective across a range of tasks or, in certain cases, tailored to critical missions. The force must also be highly mobile and responsive, able to meet the demands of the strategy by responding to challenges in varied locations around the world. This capability requires integrated air, sea, and land transportation assets and a comprehensive set of basing, infrastructure, and access arrangements with allies and friends to enable military operations in distant locations. Where possible, it also requires prepositioned stocks and equipment in critical areas to reduce deployment times and facilitate the rapid transition to combat operations.

Table 2-1		
Major Conventional Force Elements		
	Active	Reserve/National Guard
Army		
Divisions	10	8
Armored Cavalry Regiments	2	0
Enhanced Separate Brigades	0	14
Navy		
Aircraft Carriers	12	0
Attack Submarines	55	0
Surface Combatants	108	8
Air Force		
Fighter Wings	12+	7+
Bombers ^a	181	27
Marine Corps		
Divisions	3	1
Air Wings	3	1
^a Total inventory.		

The effective employment of this full-spectrum force rests both on the ability to maintain forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces in peacetime, and on the ability to project power quickly in crisis and war. The full-spectrum force also requires a range of enabling capabilities supporting the full array of military operations.

OVERSEAS PRESENCE

Maintaining a substantial overseas presence is vital to both the shaping and responding elements of the defense strategy. Overseas presence promotes regional stability and deters aggression and coercion by serving as a tangible manifestation of U.S. commitment to protecting its interests in the region. U.S. forces overseas also play a critical role in helping to assure access and enable the projection of joint combat power from outside the theater. By promoting joint and combined training and facilitating regional integration, overseas presence also enhances the effectiveness of coalition operations. Finally, overseas presence ensures a timely response in the event of emerging threats, and reduces the number of additional forces that might be required to be moved to the theater in the event of military conflict.

The Department continually assesses its overseas presence posture to ensure it effectively and efficiently contributes to achieving U.S. national security objectives. The aim of such assessments is to define the

right mix of permanently stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily deployed forces, and infrastructure, in each region and globally, required to conduct the full range of military operations.

POWER PROJECTION

Equally essential to the shaping and responding elements of the strategy is the ability to rapidly move, mass, employ, and sustain U.S. military power to and within distant corners of the globe, including if necessary, the ability to establish a military lodgement on foreign territory without access to infrastructure elsewhere in the region. Effective and efficient global power projection provides the flexibility demanded by the strategy, and ultimately provides U.S. leaders with an increased range of options for responding to potential crises and conflicts. Being able to project power allows the United States to shape and respond to events in a region of interest even without permanent presence or infrastructure there.

ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Critical to the U.S. military's ability to shape the international security environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises is a host of capabilities and assets that enable the worldwide application of U.S. military power. These critical enablers include quality people, superb leadership, a globally alert intelligence system, comprehensive and secure communications, space superiority, control of the seas and airspace en route to the theater of operations, and strategic mobility. Without these critical enablers, the United States could not execute its defense strategy.

MEETING SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE STRATEGY

In general, each of the capabilities described above is required to carry out more than one aspect of the strategy. For example, the capabilities needed to fight and win a major theater war are also important for deterrence (both on a daily basis and in crisis), and may be essential to conducting SSC operations as well. However, both shaping activities and each of the three types of crisis response—deterring aggression and coercion, conducting SSC operations, and fighting and winning major theater wars—have unique requirements of their own.

SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Promoting regional stability and preventing or reducing conflicts and threats require an effective overseas presence, participation in routine alliance activities, military-to-military exchanges, combined training and exercises, defense cooperation, security cooperation, and international arms cooperation. Deterring aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis requires the capabilities needed to respond to the full range of crises, from smaller-scale contingencies to major theater wars, including in a nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) environment. Deterrence also requires maintaining a sufficient nuclear force to dissuade any potential adversary from using or threatening to use NBC weapons against the United States or its allies, and to hedge against defeat of U.S. conventional forces in defense of vital interests.

Because the United States has limited resources with which to address global security challenges, the Department must prioritize its peacetime shaping activities to ensure they do not hamper U.S. war-fighting capabilities. These priorities vary by region and situation according to the national security interests involved—be they vital, important, or humanitarian—and also to the extent to which the application of DoD resources can significantly advance those interests.

Accordingly, each regional commander in chief (CINC) annually develops a Theater Engagement Plan that links planned engagement activities to prioritized regional objectives. The Theater Engagement Plan is a comprehensive multi-year plan of CINC engagement activities that has been incorporated into the Department's deliberate planning system. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) reviews and integrates each theater plan into the global family of engagement plans. The CJCS forwards it to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval. This process enhances the Department's effectiveness in prioritizing, from a global perspective, the CINCs' engagement activities and the associated resource requirements and tempo considerations.

DETERRING AGGRESSION AND COERCION IN CRISIS

Deterrence in crisis requires the timely ability to increase the readiness levels of deployable forces, to move forces deployed in the area closer to the crisis, and to rapidly deploy forces from the United States to the crisis region. Deterrence also requires the ability to execute actions such as sanctions enforcement or limited strikes. Although these capabilities are required in the initial stages of responding to smaller-scale contingency operations or major theater wars, they must also exist in peacetime as means of defusing crises and precluding the need for larger interventions. The ability of U.S. forces to fight and win despite the threatened or actual use of NBC weapons also helps deter potential adversaries from acquiring or using such weapons.

CONDUCTING SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Many capabilities required for smaller-scale contingency operations are similar or identical to those required for fighting and winning major theater wars. Because of the range and unpredictability of smaller-scale contingencies, U.S. forces must be multi-mission capable and must be trained, equipped, and managed with multiple mission responsibilities in mind. Furthermore, U.S. forces must be capable of withdrawing from smaller-scale contingency operations, reconstituting, and then deploying to a major theater war within required timelines. Although in some cases this may pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges, the ability to transition between SSC operations and warfighting remains a fundamental requirement for U.S. military forces.

Sustained commitment to multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingencies can be stressful to U.S. forces—for example, by creating tempo and budgetary demands on selected units—in ways that must be carefully managed. SSC operations also require the U.S. military to work effectively with other U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a variety of coalition partners. Because of the highly complex and fluid nature of SSC operations, the U.S. government, including DoD and other agencies, must continuously reassess the challenges posed by such operations and the capabilities required to meet these challenges.

FIGHTING AND WINNING MAJOR THEATER WARS

The most stressing military requirement facing U.S. forces is the capability to fight and win two major theater wars in overlapping time frames. This requires that the U.S. military maintain a full spectrum of capabilities sufficient to defeat any two regional adversaries in full-scale warfare involving land, sea, and aerospace forces in two separate and distant theaters of conflict, with only a short period of time separating the initiation of the two conflicts.

A key challenge posed by major theater wars is the ability to defeat the offensives of both adversaries rapidly and well short of their objectives. This capability may be made even more demanding by the critical need to transition U.S. forces to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement—that is, from substantial levels of peacetime engagement activities overseas and possibly from multiple concurrent SSC operations. The ability to defeat enemy offensives rapidly is essential for the United States to seize the initiative in both theaters and minimize the amount of territory to be recaptured from enemy forces. Failure to defeat an enemy offensive rapidly can make the subsequent campaign much more difficult, lengthy, and costly, and could weaken coalition support, undermine U.S. credibility, and increase the risk of conflict elsewhere.

In transitioning to respond to a major theater war and to deter the possible outbreak of a second war, the United States would need to be extremely selective in making any additional commitments either to military engagement activities or SSC operations. The United States would likely also choose to begin disengaging from those activities not deemed to involve vital U.S. interests. In the event of a second major theater war, U.S. forces would be withdrawn from peacetime engagement activities and SSC operations as quickly as possible to be readied for war. The Department continually reviews the engagement posture of U.S. forces, and, as during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, makes adjustments as necessary to protect vital national interests within manageable levels of risk.

An additional challenge of major theater wars is the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons, a likely prospect given an adversary intent on disrupting U.S. operations and logistics. U.S. forces must continue to improve their capabilities to locate and destroy such weapons before they can be used, and, if preemption fails, to defend against and manage the consequences of their use. Capability enhancements alone are not enough. Equally important is continuing to adapt U.S. doctrine, operational concepts, training, and exercises to take full account of the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons and other asymmetric threats. Moreover, given that the United States will most likely conduct future operations in coalition with other countries, it must continue to encourage friends and allies to train and equip their forces to operate effectively in a chemical and biological environment.

CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO ASYMMETRIC THREATS

To be a truly full-spectrum force, the U.S. military must be able to defeat even the most innovative adversaries. Those who oppose the United States will increasingly rely on unconventional strategies and tactics to offset U.S. superiority in conventional forces. The Department's ability to adapt effectively to adversaries' asymmetric threats—such as information operations; nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons use; ballistic missiles; and terrorism—is critical to maintaining U.S. military preeminence into the 21st century.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information operations refers both to offensive actions to degrade adversary information and information systems and to defensive actions to protect one's own information and information systems. The increasing availability of technology and sophistication of potential adversaries demands that the United States continue to improve its ability to operate in the face of information threats. Defense against hostile information operations, including operations against those elements of the civilian infrastructure that

support national security requirements, requires unprecedented cooperation among Services, defense agencies, other U.S. government agencies, commercial enterprises, and U.S. allies and friends.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Department has made substantial progress toward fully integrating considerations of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons use against U.S. forces into its military planning, acquisition, intelligence, and international cooperation activities. This includes efforts to:

- Embed counterproliferation concerns in all aspects of the planning and programming process.
- Adapt military doctrine and operational plans to deal with NBC weapons in regional contingencies.
- Adjust acquisition programs to ensure that U.S. forces are adequately trained and equipped to operate effectively in contingencies involving NBC threats.
- Retain the capacity to defend against and respond decisively to the use of NBC weapons so that an adversary will not perceive any advantage from employing them.
- Reallocate intelligence resources to provide better information about adversary NBC capabilities and how they are likely to be used.
- Undertake multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts with U.S. allies and friends to develop a common approach to address the military risks posed by NBC proliferation.
- Strengthen capability of military forces to assist U.S. civil authorities in dealing with NBC attacks.

In addition, in 1997, the Secretary of Defense added \$1 billion to the Future Years Defense Program for operating in a potential NBC environment, and has since directed a further increase of \$550 million for biological warfare defense, vaccines, and biological detection systems.

DoD must meet two key challenges as part of its strategy to ensure future NBC attack preparedness. It must institutionalize counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of military activity, from logistics to maneuver and strike warfare. It must also internationalize those same efforts to ensure U.S. allies and potential coalition partners train, equip, and prepare their forces to support and operate with U.S. forces in NBC conditions.

To advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation, the Joint Staff, CINCs, and Services are developing a joint counterproliferation strategy that integrates both offensive and defensive measures. This strategy will serve as the basis for refining existing doctrine so that it more fully integrates all aspects of counter-NBC operations. In addition, the Services and CINCs will place greater emphasis on regular individual, unit, joint, and combined training and exercises that incorporate realistic NBC threats. The Services will work to develop new training standards for specialized units, such as logistics and medical units, and larger formations to improve their ability to perform complex tasks under prolonged NBC

conditions. In summer 2000, the Secretary of Defense directed that chemical and biological defense readiness standards be improved. The Services are developing concepts of operations and the CINCs are preparing quantitative standards to help ensure mission accomplishment in an NBC warfare environment. The Services are also working to provide for space-based NBC detection systems, prepositioning or early deployment of NBC and theater missile defense capabilities and personnel into theaters of operations. The timing necessary for the arrival of such capabilities will help determine whether or not those capabilities reside in active or reserve components.

Unless properly prepared to deal with NBC threats or attacks, allies and friends may present vulnerabilities for a U.S.-led coalition. In particular, potential coalition partners cannot depend on U.S. forces to provide passive and active defense capabilities to counter NBC threats. U.S. counterproliferation cooperation with its NATO allies through the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation provides a template for improving the preparedness of allies and other countries that may choose to act in concert with the United States in future military coalitions. Similar efforts with allies in Southwest Asia and Asia-Pacific will seek to ensure that potential coalition partners for major theater wars have effective plans for NBC defense of populations, forces, and critical nodes.

Further information on DoD's counterproliferation program can be found in two DoD publications: *Proliferation: Threat and Response* and *Department of Defense Biological and Chemical Defense Annual Report to Congress*. These and other counterproliferation documents are available on the Internet.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

A growing number of nations are working to acquire ballistic missiles, including missiles that could threaten U.S. territory. Ballistic missiles can be used to deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The increasing availability of sophisticated technology today may enable a nation to develop or acquire, with relatively little warning time for the United States, an intercontinental range ballistic missile capability. To protect against this growing threat and deter possible adversaries from considering such attacks on American territory, the United States is engaged in a vigorous effort to develop a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. The NMD system under development would defend all 50 states against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack such as could be launched by a state of proliferation concern. This NMD system could also provide some inherent capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from existing NBC capable states.

TERRORISM

The terrorist threat has changed markedly in recent years for a number of reasons, including: changing terrorist motivations; the proliferation of technologies of mass destruction; increased access to information and information technologies; a perception that the United States is not willing to accept casualties. As a result of the dynamic environment influencing terrorism, recently demonstrated by the attack on the *USS Cole*, the United States must continue to improve its ability to stay ahead of terrorists' increasing capabilities.

DoD's program for combating terrorism has four components: antiterrorism, counterterrorism, terrorism consequence management, and intelligence support. Antiterrorism consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, forces, and property to terrorist acts. Counterterrorism consists of

offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Terrorism consequence management consists of measures to mitigate the effects of a terrorist incident, including those resulting from the use of a weapon of mass destruction. Intelligence support consists of the collection, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence on terrorist groups and activities to protect, deter, preempt, or counter the terrorist threat to U.S. personnel, forces, critical infrastructures, and interests.

Many significant initiatives support DoD's antiterrorism efforts. The Department has completed interagency agreements delineating security responsibility for all non-CINC assigned personnel in 120 countries and is negotiating agreements for 33 additional countries. Joint Staff, CINC, and Service Vulnerability Assessment Teams are evaluating and improving commanders' antiterrorism programs worldwide. The Department's antiterrorism training program, which reaches all levels of DoD personnel—from individual Service members, civilian employees, and family members to senior commanders—is being refined. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides an important means for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to help combatant commanders meet emergency and other unforeseen high-priority requirements. The Department has established force protection standards for military construction projects and continues to exploit technology enhancements for countering terrorism, particularly in the areas of threat analysis and warning, explosive device detection, and early detection of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, Defense intelligence organizations are engaged in an aggressive effort to better alert decision makers to potential terrorist attacks, to strengthen their close working relationships with other elements of the national intelligence community, and to increase intelligence exchanges with U.S. friends and allies.

In the area of counterterrorism, U.S. armed forces possess a tailored range of options to respond to terrorism directed at U.S. citizens, interests, and property, both domestically and overseas. DoD can employ the full range of military capabilities, including rapid-response Special Operations Forces that are specifically trained, manned, and equipped to pre-empt or resolve incidents of international terrorism. DoD also continues to refine its capabilities, which have been intensively exercised with interagency counterparts.

In the area of terrorism consequence management, DoD continues to work hard to deter, and when necessary, minimize the effects of a weapons of mass destruction incident. DoD has created, and is continually refining, an excellent response capability. For example, DoD established an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support to provide policy guidance and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support to assume operational responsibility for DoD's consequence management support to civil authorities for weapons of mass destruction incidents within the United States, its territories, and possessions. (See Chapter 7 for additional information.)

With respect to intelligence support, DoD recognizes the importance of timely dissemination of terrorist threat information from the Intelligence Community to the operators in the field. DoD continues to strive toward its goal of having fully coordinated joint operations and intelligence fusion cells at all levels. DoD intelligence organizations remain engaged in an aggressive, long-term collection and analytic effort designed to provide information that can better alert local commanders to potential terrorist attacks. Close working relationships with other members of the national Intelligence Community are being strengthened, and intelligence exchanges with U.S. allies have been increased.

CONCLUSION

The United States must size, shape, and manage its military forces to meet the fundamental challenge of the defense strategy—maintaining near-term capabilities to support the shape and respond elements of the strategy while simultaneously undergoing transformation to shape and respond in the future. The Department must continue its efforts to support regional security objectives efficiently and within resource constraints. At the same time, U.S. forces must be capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict—meeting the challenges posed by smaller-scale contingency operations as well as major theater wars—and in the face of asymmetric threats.

