

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Comparing Strategies of the 2d Punic War:  
Rome's Strategic Victory Over the Tactical/Operational Genius, Hannibal Barca**

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## ABSTRACT

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The period of time, 225-202 BC, in the Western Mediterranean, was a crucial turning point in the history of the Western World. The Roman Republic defeated its greatest rival, Carthage, and set the stage for Rome's 600 years domination of the Western World. It determined which culture, Greek/Roman or Semitic/Phoenician, would dominate the development of the Western World. This paper will focus on the strategic failure of Carthage and its military leader, Hannibal, during the Second Punic War. It will compare and contrast the national strategies employed by both Rome and Carthage. Carthage failed to effectively employ all aspects of national power into a national strategy, which doomed Carthage when confronted with the more coherent Roman strategy. Hannibal's unparalleled tactical/operational successes in Italy were rendered irrelevant to the war's conclusion.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>III</b>
<b>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</b> .....	<b>VII</b>
<b>SOURCES</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>STRATEGIC SETTING - THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN, 220 BC</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>EVENTS LEADING TO SECOND PUNIC WAR</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>EVENTS OF THE 2D PUNIC WAR</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>CARTHAGINIAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>ROMAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>FACTORS IN ROMAN VICTORY</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>LESSONS FOR TODAY’S STRATEGISTS</b> .....	<b>17</b>
1. ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.....	18
<b>Diplomatic Power</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>Economic Power</b> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>Informational Power</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>Military Power</b> .....	<b>21</b>

2. STRATEGIC ENDURANCE.....	21
3. ATTACK THE ENEMY’S STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY .....	24
4. STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS .....	24
5. CAMPAIGNS CONSIST OF LINKED OPERATIONS.....	25
6. IMPORTANCE OF JOINT OPERATIONS .....	25
7. REINFORCE SUCCESS .....	26
8. COALITION WARFARE.....	27
9. TRAINING OF STRATEGIC LEADERS .....	28
<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>ENDNOTES.....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>37</b>

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 2D PUNIC WAR .....	5
FIGURE 2. TIMELINE, EVENTS BETWEEN 1 <sup>ST</sup> AND 2D PUNIC WAR .....	6
FIGURE 3. 2D PUNIC WAR IN ITALY .....	8
FIGURE 4: KEY LEADERS OF 2D PUNIC WAR .....	9
FIGURE 5: TIMELINE OF 2D PUNIC WAR.....	11
FIGURE 6: POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS.....	23





## COMPARING STRATEGIES OF THE 2D PUNIC WAR: ROME'S STRATEGIC VICTORY OVER THE TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL GENIUS, HANNIBAL BARCA

Hannibal Barca, general of Carthage during the 2d Punic War with Rome, 218-202 BC, has few peers in the annals of military history. He invaded the homeland of his enemy and remained there, undefeated, for fifteen years. He soundly defeated every Roman army that dared to risk battle with him while in Italy. The military historian Trevor N. Dupuy named Hannibal, the "Father of Strategy."<sup>1</sup> Carthage, however, lost the 2d Punic War decisively and survived less than a century more; Hannibal was a strategic failure. If so, why did he fail? The failure was certainly not at the tactical or operational level of war. Hannibal won every major battle against the Romans in Italy. He formed and reformed successful armies without reinforcement from his strategic base. Hannibal's lone failure on the tactical battlefield occurred at Zama after he had already been forced to leave Italy and no longer threatened Rome.

In the final analysis Rome's national level strategy was superior to that of Carthage. What were the strategic factors that allowed Rome to absorb repeated body blows and to endure an enemy army in its homeland for more than a decade without succumbing? The answers to these questions provide the key to understanding Carthage's failure in the 2d Punic War.

A close examination of the 2d Punic War reveals many lessons at the strategic level of war that endure to this day. Hannibal and Carthage failed when their inherent strategic weakness was confronted by the more robust and resilient Rome. Roman strategy effectively combined all elements of national power into a coherent, war winning strategy.

A national strategy should be directed at the enemy's strategic center of gravity. In both opponents the strategic center of gravity was the political will of the respective governments, the Roman Senate and the Carthaginian oligarchy. Rome successfully attacked the Carthaginian center of gravity while the Carthaginians pursued a more peripheral strategy aimed at the allies of Rome. Carthaginian strategy focused almost solely on its military strategy, committed to war with Rome by a general unable to muster the strategic resources to win. Carthage never effectively employed its naval forces in concert with its land forces. Hannibal's successes point out the importance of training and experience in senior leaders. The strategic assumptions of a campaign plan must be valid for that plan to succeed. Hannibal's campaign was based on the invalid assumption that Rome's allies would defect following defeat of Roman armies in the field. Finally successful campaigns consist of operations linked in space and time. Rome succeeded

in linking their widely separated operations in Italy, Sicily, Greece, Iberia, and eventually North Africa. These lessons are explored later in this paper.

This paper looks at the 2d Punic War at the strategic level and attempts to answer question of why one of the “great captains” of military history failed so completely. This paper avoids the attraction of examining Hannibal's tactical and operational prowess except where those events provide an insight into strategic factors. A description of the rival strategies is followed by an analysis of why one succeeded and the other failed. The paper concludes with lessons a modern strategist can extract from the failures and successes of both Carthage and Rome during the 2d Punic War.

## **SOURCES**

Any examination of the Punic Wars must include a cautionary note on the sources available. Rome, as the winner, wrote the history of the Punic Wars. The modern reader only views Carthage and Hannibal through this Roman filter. The complete destruction of Carthage in 146 BC and the hegemony of Rome following the Punic Wars limited the survival of competing viewpoints. The two main sources that survived are Polybius and Livy. Both authors had access to primary sources contemporary to the 2d Punic War that have not survived. This includes books written by Greek "war correspondents" who marched with Hannibal. One of these, Sosilos, taught Hannibal Greek and wrote his biography.<sup>2</sup>

The reader of a modern source should always check to ascertain whether the writer relies more on Polybius or Livy. Polybius is clearly the more reliable source compared to Livy and meets a more strict criterion of honesty and truthfulness. Polybius was the son of a rich Greek landowner and rose to rank of general in the Achaean League. In 168 BC he was taken to Rome as a hostage. Polybius became very close to Roman nobility and was in fact adopted into the Cornelius Scipio family. He traveled extensively with his Roman hosts, walked the actual battlefields of the 2d Punic War only 40 years after they took place, and talked with surviving participants, including Numidian King Masinissa and Scipio Africanus' confidant Laelius.<sup>3</sup> Polybius accompanied Publius Scipio to Africa and witnessed the fall and destruction of Carthage that concluded the 3d Punic War. He later became a respected statesman in Greece and wrote extensively although many of his books have been lost.<sup>4</sup> Livy, on the other hand, wrote more than a hundred years after Polybius and was clearly a Roman writing for Romans; highlighting the greatness of Rome.

## **STRATEGIC SETTING - THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN, 220 BC**

Rome and Carthage emerged as the predominant powers in the central Mediterranean in the 100 years prior to the 2d Punic War. Carthage was the older, more developed state at that time. Carthage was founded in 814 BC as a colony of the wide-ranging Phoenicians from the city of Tyre in today's Lebanon. Carthage gained her freedom from Tyre in the fifth century BC. Carthage eventually established a powerful maritime, commercial empire unrivaled in the western Mediterranean. Described as the "London of Antiquity" and the richest city in the world,<sup>5</sup> Carthage established trading posts and colonies throughout the islands of the western Mediterranean, North Africa and Spain. Carthage tapped the rich trade routes of Egypt and Africa and also sailed to Britain and Senegal. Carthage, however, was more a carrier than a producer of goods.<sup>6</sup> Carthage was ruled by an oligarchy of the powerful commercial families.

Rome gradually developed from a small, agrarian, city-state into the predominant land power on the Italian peninsula. Rome had few contacts outside Italy during this period and confined most of its attention to consolidating power in Italy. Rome had assimilated several conquered peoples and established Roman colonies to form a Latin Confederation, the "allies of the Latin name." Additional conquered Italian peoples, such the Etruscans, the Samnites, and the Lucanians, among others, were established as Italian "allies" of Rome. Rome fought a series of wars with the Gauls, a warlike Celtic people, located in the Po Valley (Cisalpine Gaul) in northern Italy as well as across the Alps in modern day France (Transalpine Gaul). The Gauls were of particular concern to the Romans. Only a century prior to the Punic Wars the Gauls had attacked and sacked the city of Rome; the last to do this prior to the barbarian invasions that ended the Roman Empire 600 years later. In a war from 225-222 BC the Romans destroyed Gallic armies at the battles of Telamon and Clastidium.<sup>7</sup> Following these defeats the Gauls never again crossed the Apennine Mountains to threaten Rome, except as part of Hannibal's army. The Romans subsequently campaigned into the Po River Valley and by 220 BC the Gauls had been subdued. Rome's victory over the Gauls allowed placement of two important Latin colonies, Placentia and Cremona, in northern Italy. These two colonies blocked the major advances on Rome from the Po Valley and became a problem for Hannibal a few years later.<sup>8</sup>

Rome and Carthage had had diplomatic contacts for hundreds of years prior to the Punic Wars. The first recorded treaty was signed between the two states in 508 BC and another in 318 BC.<sup>9</sup> The treaties established the maritime trading rights of Carthage and allowed Rome free rein in Italy. The two states were nominal allies when, in 282 BC, Pyrrhus, king of Epirus,

invaded Italy in support of the city of Tarentum, a Greek colony in southern Italy, against the Romans and subsequently threatened Carthaginian interests in Sicily.<sup>10</sup> Rome and Carthage first went to war over Sicily in 264 BC in the 1<sup>st</sup> Punic War. The 1<sup>st</sup> Punic War ended in a decisive victory for Rome.

The other key actors in the Mediterranean during this time period were the three descendants of Alexander the Great's generals who ruled remnants of his empire: Ptolemy in Egypt, the Seleucids in Syria, and the Antigonid rulers in Macedonia. The Macedonians were of immediate concern to the Romans. In 229 BC, at the invitation of Greek city-states, Rome eradicated Illyrian pirates from the Adriatic Sea. The Romans subsequently established a protectorate over the Kingdom of Illyria, modern day Albania. Macedonia's ambitious young King Philip V resented the Roman incursion directly adjacent to his border. Rome also assisted Greek city-states that the Macedonians believed rightfully belonged in the Macedonian sphere of influence. Greece itself remained a collection of city-states loosely banded into the contending Aetolian and Achaean Leagues. Historically both the Romans and Carthaginians had fought wars with the Greeks, mainly over Greek colonies in both Italy and Sicily. Carthage however was viewed as a traditional maritime rival by the sea going Greeks while Rome was not.

## **EVENTS LEADING TO SECOND PUNIC WAR**

The First Punic War between Rome and Carthage lasted over twenty years, 264-241 BC. It was mainly a naval war with limited land engagements in Sicily and North Africa. The Romans were victorious and destroyed the heretofore Carthaginian naval supremacy forever. The terms of the peace treaty gave Rome the island of Corsica; all of Sicily, except the independent Greek colony of Syracuse; and imposed ten years of large annual war reparations payments on Carthage. Shortly after the conclusion of war the largely mercenary Carthaginian army revolted in North Africa. During Carthaginian preoccupation with this revolt Rome annexed the Carthaginian island of Sardinia.

Hannibal's father, Hamiclar Barca, was one of the few Carthaginian generals to emerge with an intact reputation from the 1st Punic War.<sup>11</sup> Hamiclar defeated the mercenaries in North Africa in 238 BC. In 236 BC, accompanied by his young son Hannibal, Hamiclar led a Carthaginian army to conquer Iberia (modern day Spain and Portugal). The Romans were told this Carthaginian expansion was necessary to pay off the reparations due Rome. Hamiclar's son in law, Hasdrubal, succeeded Hamiclar following his death in 228 BC. He established Iberia as a rich colony for Carthage. Iberia became the primary source of Carthaginian financial

wealth and manpower for Carthaginian mercenary armies. Hasdrubal also concluded a treaty with the Romans that agreed on a northern border for Carthaginian expansion in Iberia.




FIGURE 1. WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 2D PUNIC WAR

Hannibal succeeded the assassinated Hasdrubal as the leader of Carthaginian forces in Iberia in 222 BC at the age of 26. Hannibal quickly conducted two successful campaigns against outlying Iberian tribes to consolidate Carthaginian rule in Iberia. In 219 BC he attacked the city of Saguntum, an ally of Rome. Rome demanded Carthage halt the siege and surrender Hannibal to them. Carthage refused, Saguntum fell, and Rome declared war.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Iberia</b>	<b>Other</b>
•242/1 BC	•Battle of Aegate Islands, 1 <sup>st</sup> Punic War ends		•Mutiny of Carthaginian mercenaries in Africa
•238 BC	•Rome annexes Sardinia		•Hamilcar CINC Carthage, defeats mercenaries
•236 BC		•Hamilcar begins conquest of Iberia	
•229/8 BC		•Hamilcar dies, Hasdrubal assumes command	•Rome conquers Illyrian pirates
•226 BC		•Ebro Treaty W/ Rome	
•225 BC	•Roman victory over Gauls at Telamon/Clusium		
•222 BC	•Romans defeat Gauls, establish colonies in Cisalpine Gaul	•Hasdrubal assassinated, Hannibal assumes command	
•221 BC		•Hannibal completes conquest of Iberia	
•220 BC	•Hannibal's envoys meet with Gauls		

FIGURE 2. TIMELINE, EVENTS BETWEEN 1<sup>ST</sup> AND 2D PUNIC WAR

### EVENTS OF THE 2D PUNIC WAR

In 218 BC Hannibal began his epic march from Iberia to Italy. He bypassed the Roman allied, Greek colony of Massila (modern day Marseilles) to the north. Roman consul Publius Scipio, father of Scipio Africanus, landed one of Rome's armies at Massila and barely missed intercepting Hannibal west of the Alps. Scipio sent his army on to Iberia, its initial objective, while he returned to Cisalpine Gaul to confront Hannibal when he emerged from the Alps. Scipio assumed command of troops left in Northern Italy to keep watch on the recently defeated Gauls. Hannibal's celebrated march over the Alps cost him tens of thousands of veteran troops lost to both the elements and unfriendly mountain tribes. The other Roman consular army was in Sicily preparing to invade North Africa.

In the first battle of the 2d Punic War, a minor cavalry engagement, Scipio was defeated and badly wounded in at the Ticinus River. The other Roman consular army was rushed to the Po Valley where it suffered a crushing defeat to Hannibal at the battle of Trebia. Hannibal wintered his army in Cisalpine Gaul and recruited reinforcements from the Gauls. The Romans

fell back to their colonies to block the two main roads through the Apennines from northern Italy to Rome.

In the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal executed the first conscious turning movement in military history<sup>12</sup> by crossing the Apennines and crossing the supposedly impassable Arnus marshes. This movement placed the Carthaginian army between the two Roman armies. Gaius Flaminius, the newly elected Roman consul rushed south with his army from the Po Valley. Hannibal trapped the Roman army while it was still in march order in a defile beside Lake Trasimene and destroyed it, killing Flaminius as well. No Roman army existed between Hannibal and Rome following the battle. Hannibal, however, moved to southern Italy where he hoped to induce Roman allied cities to defect to Carthage.

Rome appointed Fabius Maximus as temporary dictator and followed his strategy of refusing open battle with Hannibal while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal's vicinity to limit his movement. Roman forces were more successful in Iberia where they won a naval engagement and pushed south along the Mediterranean coast as far as Saguntum. In 216 BC Roman leaders bowed to political pressure to abandon Fabian tactics. Hannibal drew a Roman army of 16 legions to battle at Cannae. He literally destroyed the Roman army and killed one of the two commanding consuls in a battle that military historians describe as "tactical perfection."<sup>13</sup> Sixty-thousand Romans lay dead and Rome was shaken to its foundations. Shortly thereafter yet another Roman army of two legions under Postrimus Albinus was ambushed in northern Italy near Modena and massacred by the Gauls.<sup>14</sup>

In the aftermath of Cannae several Roman allies defected to Hannibal, including Capua, the second largest city in Italy. Phillip V of Macedon also concluded an alliance with Hannibal against Rome. Most Roman allies, however, remained loyal and two hastily recruited legions were marched south to bolster Roman prestige. These forces successfully prevented Hannibal from seizing the important city of Nola. Roman forces were still successful in Iberia where Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal was defeated near the Ebro River. Hannibal appealed to Carthage for reinforcements to finish off Rome. He sent his brother Mago to Carthage, along with several baskets of signet rings from the dead Roman nobles, to directly appeal to the oligarchy for the needed resources. Most Carthaginian resources, however, were sent to Iberia in the hopes of stemming the tide of Roman success there.

The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate in the years following Cannae. Hannibal marched at will throughout southern Italy closely followed by Roman armies. Hannibal now had to garrison the towns of his newly acquired allies. The Romans attacked and




FIGURE 3. 2D PUNIC WAR IN ITALY



retook many of these towns. The war outside Italy expanded to include theaters in Macedonia, Greece, Sardinia, and Sicily as well as Iberia.

In 211 BC, as the Romans were on the verge of retaking Capua, Hannibal marched on Rome for the first and only time. Hannibal attempted to relieve the Roman siege by drawing off besieging forces by marching his own army on Rome. The Romans did not panic and maintained their siege of Capua. After demonstrating near Rome Hannibal retreated once more to southern Italy and Capua fell to the Romans.

Rome	Carthage
<p><b>Q. Fabius</b> – Consul/Dictator, Architect of Fabian Strategy  <b>Marcellus</b> – Gifted Roman consul; killed in ambush  <b>P. Scipio (Elder)</b> – Consul, Cdr at Ticinus, killed in Iberia  <b>C. Scipio</b> – Consul, brother to Elder, commanded &amp; killed in Iberia  <b>Sempronius</b> – Consul defeated at Trebia  <b>Flaminius</b> – Consul defeated/killed at Lake Trasimene  <b>Varro</b> – Consul, Roman Cdr at Cannae  <b>A. Paulus</b> – Consul killed at Cannae  <b>Nero</b> – Gifted Roman consul, made epic march, victor at Metaurus  <b>P. Scipio(Africanus)</b> – Roman victor in Iberia &amp; at Zama  <b>Masinissa</b> – Numidian prince who defected to Rome</p>	<p><b>Hamilcar</b> – Father of Hannibal, Carthaginian Army Cdr, died in Iberia  <b>Hasdrubal</b> – Succeeds Hamilcar in Iberia, signed treaty with Rome, assassinated in Iberia  <b>Hannibal</b> – Commander Carthaginian military in 2d Punic War  <b>Hasdrubal Barca</b> – Hannibal’s brother, commanded in Iberia, killed at Metaurus  <b>Mago</b> – Hannibal’s brother, commanded in Iberia, invaded N. Italy, died of wounds  <b>Hanno</b> – Leader of Peace Party, opponent of war  <b>Bomielar</b> – Admiral, failed to reinforce Syracuse  <b>Hasdrubal Gisgo</b> – General defeated in Africa by Scipio  <b>Syphax</b> – Numidian prince who defected to Rome &amp; later returned to Carthage  <b>Philip V</b> – Antigonid king of Macedonia, sided with Carthage in 2d Punic War</p>

FIGURE 4: KEY LEADERS OF 2D PUNIC WAR

The Roman capture of Capua was a major turning point in the war. In losing Capua, Hannibal lost his most important Italian ally and one he had pledged to defend. Capua was also located in Campania, the most fertile and productive area of Italy. In the same summer the Romans completed the conquest of Syracuse and destruction of a Carthaginian army in Sicily.<sup>15</sup> Rome shortly thereafter pacified Sicily and entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League to counter Phillip. The combination of these events marked the end of Carthaginian success in Italy. The only Carthaginian success during this time period was in Iberia where Hasdrubal defeated two Roman armies and killed the elder two Scipios.

Publius Cornelius Scipio, who would eventually earn the cognomen, Africanus, replaced his dead father and uncle the following year in Iberia. Scipio quickly reversed Roman fortunes

there, soundly defeating every Carthaginian army sent against him. Scipio's capture of New Carthage, capitol of the Carthaginian empire in Iberia, deprived Carthage of her finest harbor in Iberia and gateway to the most lucrative source of power and wealth in the west.<sup>16</sup> In 208 BC Hasdrubal abandoned Iberia to the Romans and marched his army towards Italy hoping to join his forces with Hannibal's. Carthaginian rule in Iberia ended with the victories of Scipio.

In 207 BC Hasdrubal arrived in Cisalpine Gaul hoping to unite with his brother in southern Italy. Roman consul Nero intercepted Hasdrubal's messengers after two sharp fights in Apulia with Hannibal at Grumentum and Venusia. These two stalemated battles prevented Hannibal from moving north. Nero then led a picked Roman force on an epic 240 mile forced march to unite with the other consular army confronting Hasdrubal.<sup>17</sup> Hasdrubal was killed and his army destroyed at the battle of the Metaurus River in northern Italy before he could link up with Hannibal. Following Metaurus, Hannibal retreated into Bruttium in the toe of Italy and remained there until he was recalled to Africa.<sup>18</sup>

Hannibal's brother, Mago, was ejected from Iberia by Scipio in 206 BC. Mago moved to the Balearic Islands where he recruited a small army for the purpose of invading Northern Italy. He landed his force near Genua and attempted to rally the Gauls and Ligurians against the Romans. The Gauls and Ligurians did not rally to the Mago's banner in the same manner they had to Hannibal's. Mago also attempted to subvert Roman rule in Rome's northern allies, most notably, the Etruscans. Mago was defeated and mortally wounded in battle the following year.

Scipio invaded North Africa in force in 204 BC. Scipio's initial campaign in Africa was to establish his new ally, Masinissa, as king of Numidia.<sup>19</sup> Scipio had turned Masinissa from the Carthaginian cause while campaigning in Iberia. Scipio's alliance with Masinissa provided the superb Numidian cavalry, backbone of Hannibal's army, to assist the Romans and denied it to the Carthaginians.

Scipio defeated a series of Carthaginian armies, culminating with Hasdrubal Gisgo's at the Battle of Great Plains, and the Carthaginian senate considered peace. During a negotiated armistice period the armies of Hannibal and Mago were simultaneously recalled and returned to North Africa. Upon Hannibal's return the Carthaginians broke off negotiations. Carthage formed a new army centered on Hannibal's Italian veterans. In 203 BC Scipio defeated and destroyed Hannibal's army at the battle of Zama. The political will of the Carthaginian senate was broken. Carthage sued for peace on Roman terms<sup>20</sup> and this ended the 2d Punic War.

Year	Italy	Iberia	Other
•219 BC		•Hannibal takes <b>Saguntum</b>	
•218 BC	•Hannibal arrives in Italy •Romans defeated at Ticinus & Trebia	•C. Scipio arrives in Iberia	
•217 BC	•Romans defeated at Lake Trasimene	•C. Scipio defeats Hasdrubal at Ebro, advances to Saguntum	
•216 BC	•Romans defeated at Cannae; Capua & S. Italy defects	•Hasdrubal defeated	•Philip V signs alliance with Hannibal
•215 BC	•Hannibal in S. Italy	•Hasdrubal defeated	•Romans defeat Philip, burns his fleet
•214 BC	•Hannibal in S. Italy	•Roman victories at Castulo, Munda, Aurinx	•Carthage lands army in Sardinia, Rome destroys it
•213 BC	•Hannibal in S. Italy	•Rome captures Saguntum	•Carthage lands army in Sicily
•212 BC	•Hannibal takes Tarentum, Romans besiege Capua		•Negotiations with Aetolian L.; Marcellus takes Syracuse
•211 BC	•Hannibal marches on Rome, Romans take Capua	•Hasdrubal defeats & kills 2 Scipios	•Rome signs treaty with Aetolian League
•210 BC	•Romans take towns in S. Italy	•Young Scipio assumes command	•Philip fights A.L.; Rome pacifies Sicily
•209 BC	•Romans retake Tarentum; 12 Latin allies refuse to provide troops	•Scipio takes New Carthage	•Philip wins at Lamia; Carthaginian fleet in Greece
•208 BC	•2 Roman consuls killed in ambush	•Scipio wins at Baecula	•Carthaginian fleet leaves Greece
•207 BC	•Hasdrubal & army die at Metaurus	•Scipio wins at Orongis; Hasdrubal leaves Iberia	•Philip raids Aetolia
•206 BC	•Minor ops in Bruttium	•Scipio complete conquest	•Mago recruits army in Balearic Islands
•205 BC	•Mago lands in Genua, Rome retakes Locri		•Peace of Phoinike, Philip out of war
•204 BC	•Minor ops in Bruttium		•Scipio lands in N. Africa
•203 BC	•Hannibal & Mago recalled to N Africa, Mago dies enroute		•Scipio wins battle of Great Plains; Carthage sues for peace
•202 BC			•Scipio defeats Hannibal at Zama, 2d Punic War ends

FIGURE 5: TIMELINE OF 2D PUNIC WAR

## CARTHAGINIAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR

The Carthaginian strategy for the 2d Punic War was neither a war of annihilation nor initially a war of attrition. Hannibal stated, "I am not carrying on a war of extermination against the Romans. I am contending for honor and empire."<sup>21</sup> Hannibal openly disclaimed pursuing a war of annihilation in his treaty with Phillip V of Macedon. Hannibal obviously envisioned a Rome existing after the war.<sup>22</sup> The centerpiece of Carthaginian strategy was military and almost exclusively landpower. The desired ends of Carthaginian strategy was to replace Rome as the preeminent military power in the western Mediterranean, to regain the status Carthage had lost in the 1<sup>st</sup> Punic War. The ways of Carthaginian strategy were the overland invasion of the Italian homeland of Rome while protecting the strategic bases of Iberia and North Africa. The means of effecting this strategy were the mercenary armies led by Carthaginian officers financed by Carthaginian holdings in Iberia.

The goal of Hannibal's military strategy was to persuade Roman allies to leave Rome.<sup>23</sup> Carthaginian military strategy in Italy contained three phases: 1) Defeat Roman field armies 2) Move south and separate allies 3) Invade Latium and besiege Rome.<sup>24</sup> Central to Hannibal's strategy was to defeat Roman armies in the field to weaken Rome's credibility with its Italian allies and concurrently diminish Rome's manpower advantage. After Lake Trasimene, Hannibal stated, "I have not come to fight Italians, but on behalf of the Italians against Rome."<sup>25</sup> Hannibal made the strategic assumption that Rome's allies would defect following Rome's repeated defeats on the tactical battlefield. Hannibal always freed allied prisoners following battles without ransom in hopes of building good faith and weaken allied ties with Rome.<sup>26</sup>

Hannibal invaded Italy and relied on the anti-Roman fervor of the Gauls in northern Italy to replenish and reman his depleted army. Hannibal had sent diplomatic envoys to the Gauls on both sides of the Alps as early as two years before his invasion.<sup>27</sup> Hannibal, however, could not remain in northern Italy living off land of Gauls for an extended period.<sup>28</sup> He invaded the rich lands of southern Italy hoping to separate the Roman allies from Rome. Moving into southern Italy targeted some of the most important Roman allies as well as potentially securing sea LOCs to North Africa.<sup>29</sup>

The Carthaginians also sought to protect both North Africa and especially Iberia, the primary source of Carthaginian financial wealth. Hannibal's initial deployment of forces detached a large part of his army under the command of Hasdrubal to secure Iberia. Hannibal also sent a force composed mostly of Iberians to North Africa, both as a defense against Roman invasion and as hostages for Iberian loyalty to Carthage.<sup>30</sup> Hannibal's invasion of Italy was

clearly aimed at preventing a Roman invasion of both of these areas by tying Roman armies to Italy to confront a major threat to Rome itself.

Outside of Italy, the Carthaginians attempted to obtain military support from Macedonia. Hannibal concluded a treaty with Phillip against Rome following Cannae.<sup>31</sup> After Hannibal's initial successes in Italy Carthaginian strategy diverged. The Carthaginian Senate did not reinforce Hannibal to pursue his third phase of marching on Rome. Carthage shifted to a more peripheral strategy. Roman success in Iberia required vigorous reinforcement of Carthaginian armies there. Carthage also unwisely landed forces in Sardinia as well as Sicily. Phillip V attacked Roman interests in Illyria while the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman domination.<sup>32</sup> The Carthaginians also tried to pry Greek colonies, located in Italy, away from Rome. They succeeded only in the case of Tarentum.

Hannibal, thwarted in obtaining the requisite military power to march on Rome, successfully obtained an alliance with newly crowned King Hieronymous of Syracuse, the most important city in Sicily. The king was assassinated shortly thereafter but Carthaginian agents were able to install a pro-Carthaginian king and Rome was forced to fight.<sup>33</sup> Carthage moved to secure Sicily once Syracuse defected from the Roman cause. Hannibal needed Sicily as a secure base to his south. The stalemate in Italy could have been broken by a Carthaginian victory in Sicily.<sup>34</sup> Carthage landed an army of nearly 30,000 there but this force was eventually destroyed outside Syracuse by the Romans under Marcellus.<sup>35</sup>

With Marcellus' victory in Sicily Rome regained possession of the strategic harbor of Syracuse and effectively isolated the sea lines of communications to southern and western Italy. Any reinforcement of Hannibal now had to come overland from Iberia.<sup>36</sup> Hasdrubal attempted this. Hasdrubal's goal after leaving Iberia was to join his army with Hannibal's by marching over the Alps and then to southern Italy. He failed and his army was destroyed at the battle of Metaurus.

Carthage's later strategy, having lost the tactical initiative, was to have Hannibal hold on in Italy to preclude a Roman invasion of North Africa. Mago's late invasion of north Italy was not only aimed at rallying Gauls and Ligurians. He used bribes to subvert the Etruscan allies of Rome. This led to series of investigations by Rome and the condemnation of Etruscan nobles. At this point in the war this was the real aim of Mago, not to join his forces with Hannibal.<sup>37</sup> The Carthaginians thus maintained their mostly futile efforts aimed at Roman allies to the very end of the war.

## ROMAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR

Roman strategy evolved as events dictated changes to initial plans. The ends of Roman strategy were to limit the resurgent power of Carthage fueled by Carthaginian conquests in Iberia and to maintain Rome's preeminent military status in the western Mediterranean. The ways of Rome's strategy were sea launched land attacks against both the North African homeland of Carthage and the financial center of the Carthaginian empire, Iberia. The two Roman consuls leading armies were to invade Iberia and North Africa, respectively. Scipio the Elder sailed for Iberia while Sempornius, the other consul, was to launch an invasion of North Africa from Sicily. The means were the senate directed military, the preeminent Roman navy and the legions of the Roman army.

Central to Roman strategy was the critical advantage of Roman sea supremacy. Their ability to control the sea lines of communication of central and western Mediterranean enabled them to move and resupply large forces at will. The Romans maintained this advantage throughout the war and they were quickly able to respond to problems arising in distant areas. This stands in marked contrast with Carthaginian naval efforts. Carthage possessed a potent naval force but never successfully deployed it against the Romans.

Roman strategy first changed when Scipio the Elder, enroute by sea to Iberia, learned of Hannibal's movement towards the Alps while resupplying his invasion force at Massila. Scipio failed in his attempt to intercept Hannibal west of the Alps but did make the critical operational decision to send his army on to Iberia. Scipio returned to Italy to confront Hannibal with forces left to control the Gauls in northern Italy. Sempronius cancelled the North African invasion and moved his consular army to northern Italy as well.

Roman military strategy changed again after repeated tactical defeats. The Romans concluded they could not beat Hannibal on the tactical battlefield of his choosing and the war in Italy became one of survival for the Romans. They adopted the policy of Fabius Maximus to rely on their walled cities and road network to shadow Hannibal's army in Italy, limit his ability to forage for supplies, and prevent his reinforcement. Fabian military strategy acknowledged that Roman defeats would weaken the hold of Rome on allies.<sup>38</sup> Rome focused on removing Iberia as a source of wealth and manpower for Carthage. The success of Romans in Iberia convinced the Carthaginian oligarchy, despite Roman losses at Cannae, to divert reinforcements planned for Hannibal to Iberia. Rome reinforced successful efforts in Iberia and Sicily and thwarted Carthaginian attempts to regain Sardinia.

The Romans also quickly reacted to the Macedonian threat. Roman praetor, Laevinius, moved a force across the Adriatic, defeated Philip, and forced him to burn his fleet and

withdraw. Phillip waited in vain for support from the Carthaginian fleet while the Romans used diplomacy to conclude an alliance with the Aetolian League. These Greek states were quickly joined by the additional Greek city-states of Elis, Messina, Sparta, Pergamum, Thrace and Illyria against Macedonia. Rome not only diverted help from Hannibal but the war in Greece was shifted to Greek shoulders.<sup>39</sup> This was clearly an economy of force theater for the Romans who through skillful diplomacy got the Greeks to fight the Macedonians and prevented significant Carthaginian support to Philip by dominating the Adriatic Sea LOCs.

The Romans were also skillful in the use of information warfare to maintain their hold on allies. The Carthaginians were labeled as outsiders who did not share the Italian traditions and religion. When Capua fell to the Romans they executed the surviving Hannibalic supporters. All other Capua citizens, except artisans and the poor, were sold into slavery and all property confiscated.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, cities who came back to Rome freely were treated well. The Romans also successfully painted Semetic Carthage as a traditional commercial rival and enemy of the Greeks.

Roman strategy changed once again with Scipio the Younger's victory in Iberia and the destruction of Hasdrubal's army at Metaurus. Hannibal was now isolated in Bruttium and no longer posed a significant threat to the survival of Rome. Mago was likewise isolated in northern Italy with an operationally insignificant force.

Scipio and Fabius differed over Roman strategy at this point. Fabius preferred a typical, Republican Roman, agrarian strategy of continuing to isolate Hannibal in Italy and only undertaking an invasion of Cisalpine Gaul to remove the Gauls as allies of Carthage. Fabius did not want to undertake an invasion of North Africa while Hannibal remained in Italy. Scipio provided Rome with its first imperial vision, to take the fight to North Africa.<sup>41</sup> Scipio's famous answer to Fabius during the senatorial debate on Roman military strategy was: "I shall meet Hannibal, Quintus Fabius, but I shall pull him after me; not let him hold me back. I shall force him to fight in his own country and the prize will be Carthage, not the half ruined hill forts of the Brutii."<sup>42</sup> Scipio called for the invasion of North Africa to turn the tables on Hannibal, to separate Carthaginian allies there and to draw both Hannibal and Mago back to North Africa. The Roman Senate agreed to Scipio's plan.

Scipio prepared the invasion force in Sicily from the surviving legionnaires from Roman disasters at Cannae and Herdonea.<sup>43</sup> Once in North Africa he successfully separated the Numidians from Carthage and obtained the formidable Numidian cavalry for his army. Hannibal was drawn back to North Africa and defeated at Zama. Defeat at Zama was compounded as Hannibal had been lured into an area where there was no fort to fall back on and prevent the

annihilation of his army. The result was the bloodless surrender of Carthage.<sup>44</sup>

## **FACTORS IN ROMAN VICTORY**

There were eight major strategic limiting factors that together contributed to Carthage's defeat:

1. The war had to be a ground war. Carthage refused to employ its naval resources to confront Rome.
2. The main theater of war had to be fought in Italy. Fighting Rome elsewhere would not threaten Roman political will.
3. Hannibal's invasion of Italy had to be over land due to lack of naval support.
4. Hannibal had to find replacements for combat losses in Italy. Carthage did not possess the means or will to resupply or reinforce Hannibal.
5. Hannibal had to reduce Rome's manpower advantage through battle or politics. Rome had to be willing to fight Hannibal on the battlefield and the manpower resources of the Roman allies had to be induced away from Rome.
6. Rome had to be prevented from striking directly at Iberia or Carthage. Roman armies had to remain in Italy unable to strike at the center of Carthaginian wealth, Iberia, or the political center of the Carthaginian Empire, North Africa.
7. All of Rome's armies could not be defeated. The political will of Roman Senate was Rome's center of gravity. Breaking that will could lead to a treaty advantageous to Carthage. The repeated defeat of Roman armies could lead to loss of political will in Senate.<sup>45</sup>
8. Carthage's armies were not as numerous or resilient as Rome's, they could be and were defeated. The political will of the Carthaginian ruling oligarchy was Carthage's center of gravity. Attacking the source of financial wealth, Iberia, and threatening Carthage in North Africa could and did break it.

The Carthaginians also failed to maintain the strategic initiative Hannibal had seized by failing to reinforce him. They wasted their more limited resources on fringe activities, such as an invasion of Sardinia and repeated reinforcement of Iberia while Hannibal; their most successful effort, was required to support himself from Italian resources. The Carthaginians



were never able to fully leverage their Macedonian allies. Macedonia could not reinforce Hannibal in Italy due to Roman domination of the Adriatic Sea. Carthage had the means in the way of ships and certainly the tradition to challenge Rome as sea but never did.

Roman strategy was superior to Carthaginian strategy in its execution for several basic reasons. The Romans combined all elements of national power that eventually evolved into a coherent national strategy. The Romans dominated the sea lines of communication. The Romans had superior strategic resources. The Romans had superior strategic endurance. The Romans reinforced success as opposed to failure. The Romans also treated their allies and friends much better than the Carthaginians did theirs.

Carthage had been erstwhile competitors, especially for the Greek colonies of the western Mediterranean, and was oppressive in dealing with subject peoples. Roman rule provided better roads, civic infrastructure, secure trading routes, and a great deal of local autonomy. Carthaginian rule was based on cruelty and was very heavy handed. Carthaginian politics were based on wealth and avarice. Loyalty to Carthage never ran very deep.<sup>46</sup> This ran counter to the Carthaginian goal of luring Roman allies away. Rome was savage in punishing former allies who resisted Rome, such as Capua. Former allies, who returned voluntarily, even with a Roman army at its gate, were treated much more evenly.

## **LESSONS FOR TODAY'S STRATEGISTS**

As stated earlier, there are numerous lessons for the modern strategist in the conduct of the 2d Punic War:

1. All elements of national power should be welded into a cohesive national policy. Diplomatic skill can obtain what force cannot. Informational power and economic power should be leveraged in concert with military power to achieve political goals. Military strategy should not lead political policy.<sup>47</sup>
2. A nation's strategic endurance is a central calculation for success in warfare. Popular support for the war as well as the strategic resources to prosecute the war are needed. Rome clearly possessed greater strategic endurance than Carthage.
3. In order to succeed you must successfully attack the enemy's strategic center of gravity. At the strategic level this is often the political will of the enemy. Rome's political will never wavered through many defeats while Carthage's crumbled following tactical defeat at Zama.

4. Strategic assumptions must be valid or a plan is doomed to failure. Carthage assumed Rome's Italian and Latin allies would defect and therefore rob Rome of its significant manpower advantage. This assumption proved invalid and doomed the Carthaginian strategy.
5. Theater strategy is executed through campaigns that consist of operations synchronized in time and space. Rome successfully linked their operations in Iberia, Sicily, Macedonia, and eventually North Africa into a war winning campaign.
6. Military power is most effective when exercised in a synergistic joint manner; Carthage never leveraged naval power. A maritime power that cannot control the sea will cease to be a power.
7. It is important to reinforce success at the strategic level; to build on the opportunities successes present. Rome consistently reinforced successes in outlying theaters, successfully diverting Carthaginian resources from Hannibal.
8. Coalition warfare is difficult but also has the potential to provide significant advantages. Hannibal's matchless army was a coalition of a wide range of nationalities. Rome successfully blunted Macedonian efforts with cooperation with the Aetolian League.
9. Strategic leaders require training and experience. Military brilliance, as evidenced by Hannibal, can compensate for shortages in strategic resources.

## 1. ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

The elements of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, and informational should be employed in a comprehensive national strategy aimed at the political goals of the nation. It is here that Roman policy was clearly superior to that of Carthage and Hannibal.

### **Diplomatic Power**

Roman diplomacy resulted in obtaining grain from Egypt when Italy ceased to produce enough due to Hannibal's operations in southern Italy. In 210 BC, Valerius concluded an alliance with the Aetolian League which kept Philip busy maintaining his own territory instead of helping Hannibal in Italy.<sup>48</sup> The good will generated by Rome's removal of Illyrian pirates set the stage for successful diplomacy with the Aetolian League. Rome, in subduing the Kingdom of

Illyria and its nests of pirates, established a buffer against Macedon and secured trade routes and commerce for the Greeks as well.<sup>49</sup> The Greek colonies in the Western Mediterranean were historical rivals of the Carthaginians and their Phoenician predecessors. These Greek colonies applied for help to Rome.<sup>50</sup> The allies and Greek cities' mercantile citizens preferred the security offered by Rome and they saw Carthage as a traditional rival.<sup>51</sup>

Scipio Africanus was successful in separating nearly all of Carthage's allies while operating in Iberia<sup>52</sup> and was particularly successful in separating the valuable Numidians from Carthage. Syphax, king of Numidia and his rival, Masinissa were convinced to switch sides by Scipio in Iberia.<sup>53</sup> Carthage won Syphax back with marriage to daughter of Hasdrubal Gisgo, Sophonisba; Scipio then turned to Masinissa. After arriving in North Africa Scipio sent Masinissa to Rome to confirm his kingship over Syphax, cementing this alliance.<sup>54</sup> Roman envoys were also sent to Africa throughout the war to stir up trouble for Carthage.<sup>55</sup>

The negotiated Peace of Phoinike ended the war with Macedonia well before the end of the 2d Punic War, and it was advantageous to Philip in that it allowed him to retain some of his gains in the Balkans at Roman expense. However, the peace treaty represented a triumph of Roman diplomacy in the context of its struggle with Carthage. With a minimum effort Rome had frustrated any possibility of Macedonian aid for Hannibal and maintained a presence, albeit smaller, on the eastern Adriatic shore. Rome would return at a later date to finish Macedonia.<sup>56</sup> Carthage sent a delegation to the negotiations urging an invasion of Italy. Macedon eventually only sent a small Macedonian force to North Africa where it was destroyed as part of Hannibal's army defeated at Zama.<sup>57</sup> Roman diplomacy achieved the military goal of preventing reinforcement of Hannibal.

### **Economic Power**

Carthage missed several opportunities to wield its significant economic power against Rome. In North Africa, Libya produced large amounts of grain for Carthage and for export to Greece for hard currency.<sup>58</sup> Rome was not so fortunate. Italian farms were not producing due to Hannibal's activities in southern Italy. There would have been a famine if not for grain bought from Egypt and grown in Sicily following the Roman victory there. Carthage never interdicted the flow of grain from Egypt either diplomatically or militarily.

In 215 BC the war was such a strain on Roman economy that soldiers went unpaid and a heavy property tax was levied to finance war. Even the sacred treasuries of Roman temples were utilized to finance the war effort. In a patriotic gesture, aristocrats refused to accept pay.<sup>59</sup>

Roman currency was debased. In 209 BC, 12 of 30 Latin allies refused to provide yearly men and money.<sup>60</sup> Once again Roman strength of will overcame a Carthaginian opportunity for success.

The 2d Punic War revolved around the mineral wealth of Iberia. This money was needed to pay the mercenary armies of Carthage. Hamilcar conquered Iberia to replenish Carthaginian treasury following the 1st Punic War. Mineral wealth from Iberia emboldened Carthage to support Hannibal's attack of Rome.<sup>61</sup> When Scipio captured the Carthaginian fleet in the New Carthage harbor, it included a siege train meant for Hannibal, military supplies, and significant mineral wealth. The wealth seized replenished the strained coffers of Rome.<sup>62</sup>

### **Informational Power**

The Romans used information operations as their best weapon against Hannibal's prime objective of separating the Roman allies. The Romans painted the Carthaginians as foreigners and severely punishing Capua and other cities that did not remain loyal. The fall of Tarentum to Romans under Fabius and the harsh treatment of Tarentines was yet another blow to Hannibal's prestige with potential allies.<sup>63</sup> In 209 BC Fabius raided into Samnium, a Hannibalic stronghold, while Hannibal was in lower Italy. Samnite towns, left without support, surrendered themselves and their Carthaginian garrisons. Surrendering towns are treated with moderation and thereafter a number of other towns in Lucania and even in Bruttium negotiated with Rome.<sup>64</sup> The Romans were able to thwart the main thrust of the Carthaginians strategy aimed at separating allies from Rome by their tempered treatment of former allies who did not resist returning to the fold.

In 205 BC the twelve Latin allies who refused service in 209 BC were forced to provide double the yearly quota, all from the wealthy classes. These troops were then sent overseas on hardest service.<sup>65</sup> Since the 1st Punic War the Romans pursued a very smart policy with their Italian allies, colonizing, building roads, fortresses, and wise government policy that allowed the allies to share in profits and glory of Rome.<sup>66</sup> It was these walled cities that formed the pivots of Roman strategy. The Roman armies shadowing Hannibal's army always had secure bases to withdraw into. The walled cities of the loyal allies were connected by roads and could be readily resupplied. Hannibal's field army could not take them.<sup>67</sup>

Hannibal was a true master of informational warfare. Hannibal ordered that Fabius' estates be left alone while others around it were devastated, undermining politically the most effective Roman strategist.<sup>68</sup> Hannibal was very careful in his attempts to woo allies. Allied

prisoners were always returned home without ransom. When taking Tarentum by subterfuge Hannibal carefully ensured Tarentine houses were spared while Roman houses were plundered.<sup>69</sup>

### **Military Power**

The most important lesson a modern strategist can take from the failure of Carthage is the danger of allowing the military strategy to drive national policy. Political objectives should direct politico-military strategy, not the reverse. Carthage was committed to war with Rome by Hannibal's attack on Saguntum. Carthage allowed Hannibal to set national policy with his attack on this Roman protected city.<sup>70</sup> Hannibal's disposition of Carthaginian forces obviously indicated he was, at least initially, entrusted with overall command of the Carthaginian military.<sup>71</sup> Hannibal however could not, and certainly did not, direct Carthaginian military strategy once he arrived in Italy. Isolated in Italy by Roman domination of the sea LOCs to North Africa, Hannibal was reduced to a spectator in the allocation of Carthaginian military resources. The Carthaginian oligarchy directed military operations outside of Italy. The Carthaginian rulers were more interested in maintaining Iberia as the source of their wealth instead of targeting the greatest threat to that source, Rome, with their most potent weapon - Hannibal. Hannibal attempted to raise allies in both Macedonia and Syracuse but was thwarted by Carthaginian inability to provide the required resources to benefit from these alliances.

In Rome, the Roman senate always directed policy. Roman military leaders were selected from the ranks of the senate. Roman military leaders had to convince the Roman senate of their planned operations. The debate between Scipio and Fabius is an example of the primacy of the senate in determining the direction of military operations. The political objectives of the Roman senate directed the operations of the Roman military to its eventual victory over Carthage.

## **2. STRATEGIC ENDURANCE**

Strategic endurance is defined as political will combined with the strategic resources to sustain a nation's effort in a war. A nation must have the strategic endurance to win before and while a major war is prosecuted. Strategic endurance is a result of political will, social organization, and the ability to leverage strategic resources.<sup>72</sup> Rome's strategic endurance was clearly superior to Carthage's. Rome's political will remained constant in the face of the devastating defeats early in the war and throughout Hannibal's stay in Italy. Carthage's political will evaporated when confronted with a Cannae-like scenario following Zama.

Rome's political will was most at risk following the defeat at the battle of Cannae. Roman consul Varro, the prime architect of disaster at Cannae, however was greeted warmly by Roman citizens following the battle and thanked for not losing heart in the Roman Republic. It was this flexibility, the sheer strength and vitality of Rome's political institutions that proved so formidable for Hannibal to overcome.<sup>73</sup> In another example following Cannae, ten captured Romans and a Carthaginian envoy named Carthalo, went to Rome to ransom the numerous patrician prisoners from the battle. The Senate refused the ransom and ordered Carthalo and his prisoners to be clear of Roman territory by nightfall.<sup>74</sup> The Roman Senate went into continuous session after Cannae to demonstrate that leaders had not abandoned the city and were tending to public business. When Hannibal finally marched on Rome there was not a severe panic. The land upon which Hannibal was camped outside Rome was sold at public auction for full price.<sup>75</sup>

Carthaginian political will was embodied in the ruling oligarchy. While there was a Carthaginian Senate, the real power in Carthage was with the inner "Council of Thirty" and the board of judges known as "The Hundred."<sup>76</sup> These two bodies consisted of the wealthy, commercial families of Carthage. Two political factions operated in Carthage: the war party, also known as "the Barcids" (Hannibal's family name) and the peace party led by Hanno.<sup>77</sup> Hanno was instrumental in denying Hannibal's requested reinforcement following Cannae. Hannibal had started the war without the full backing of Carthaginian oligarchy. His attack of Saguntum presented the oligarchy with a choice of war with Rome or loss of prestige in Iberia. The oligarchy and not Hannibal controlled the strategic resources of Carthage.<sup>78</sup> Hannibal constantly sought reinforcement from either Iberia or North Africa. Hannibal's combat losses were replaced with less well-trained and motivated Italian or Gaulish mercenaries. The commercial interests of the Carthaginian oligarchy dictated the reinforcement of Iberia instead of Hannibal throughout the war.

Carthage could never match the political will and strategic resources of Rome. Carthage could only field 100 to 120 thousand soldiers and needed to defend both Iberia and North Africa.<sup>79</sup> In contrast, Rome could muster 700 thousand trained soldiers per year. All Roman male citizens between the ages of 17 and 46 were liable for military service. The privilege of Roman citizenship entailed military service.<sup>80</sup> Carthaginian armies were always composed of mercenaries. Carthaginians served only in Africa or as officers in Carthaginian armies deployed overseas.<sup>81</sup> Any time Hannibal chose a war of attrition he was fated to fail. Rome, on the other hand, successfully engaged Carthage on several fronts and still confronted Hannibal in Italy.<sup>82</sup>

A key Roman strategic resource that Hannibal readily appreciated was the manpower and money provided to Rome by her allies. More than half of any Roman army and most of its cavalry consisted of allied troops. Roman domination was generally acceptable in colonies and allies due to the extension of Roman citizenship to the allies and that no tribute was demanded.<sup>83</sup> Following Cannae, the low point of Roman prestige, the heartland of the Roman confederacy: Latium, Etruria, Umbria, and Picenum remained loyal and even in Capua dominated Campania there remained loyal allies.<sup>84</sup>




FIGURE 6: POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

In the final analysis Rome just refused to give up when a less robust nation would surely have succumbed. Carthage and Hannibal did not adequately appreciate the recent lesson of the 1<sup>st</sup> Punic War. In the 1st Punic War, a mainly naval war, Rome repeatedly lost its fleet, either in action or to storms. Over 100,000 men and thousands of ships were lost. Each time the Romans rebuilt the fleet and regained control of the seas from the historically superior maritime power - Carthage.<sup>85</sup>

### 3. ATTACK THE ENEMY'S STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY

The Roman strategic center of gravity was the political will of the Roman Senate. Carthaginian strategy however was aimed at separating Roman allies. Once allies were separated, such as in Southern Italy, Hannibal proved incapable of providing the garrisons needed to defend them when his army was not in their immediate vicinity.

Carthage's best opportunities for attacking the will of the Roman Senate were following Hannibal's decisive victories at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. No Roman army stood between Hannibal and Rome in both cases. One of his lightning advances on Rome might have broken the will of the Senate.<sup>86</sup> Instead he chose to concentrate on southern Italy and consolidate his newly acquired allies. Hannibal probably could not have taken Rome by storm as he lacked a siege train. Hannibal had taken eight months to reduce the minor city of Saguntum, his only successful siege operation. However, a march on Rome following Cannae might have forced the Romans to a negotiated peace with Rome in a position of weakness. Hannibal's only march on Rome occurred from a position of weakness. It was a desperate attempt to relieve the Roman siege of the key city of Capua and it failed miserably when the Romans recognized it as such.<sup>87</sup>

The Romans very clearly went after the Carthaginian strategic center of gravity – the political will of the Carthaginian oligarchy. Their strategy aimed at both the home city of Carthage and the financial heart of the very commercial Carthage – Iberia. Forced to fight for its survival in Italy, Rome was still able to maintain pressure on Carthage through operations in Iberia. Once Iberia was secured Rome moved directly against the North African homeland of Carthage. Scipio's presence outside the walls of Carthage forced the oligarchy to recall Hannibal to North Africa. Hannibal's defeat at Zama broke the political will of the Carthaginians.

### 4. STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS

Strategic assumptions must be valid or a plan is doomed to failure. Carthage assumed Rome's Italian and Latin allies would defect following Roman battle losses. This would rob Rome of its significant manpower advantage and Hannibal could then dictate terms to a defeated Rome. Hannibal had a relatively contemporary lesson that should have provided him an insight into the validity of this assumption. Pyrrhus also tried to influence Italian tribes to leave their alliance with Rome. Rome was defeated several times in battle but remained resilient and the allies remained loyal. Rome refused to yield while the Epiran army was being destroyed in a series of bloody battles. This took place at a time when Rome's allies were even less tied to Rome, where such a strategy would have had a greater chance of success.



Romans forced Pyrrhus to defend and garrison the towns he had already taken. These were very similar tactics to those that eventually defeated Hannibal.<sup>88</sup>

Carthage's strategy collapsed when very few of the Italian allies and none of the Latin allies defected from Rome despite the Roman debacles at Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae. Hannibal was forced to garrison the few allies he did gather with veteran troops he could not afford to spare. The Romans picked off these garrisons once Hannibal moved his army from their locale. The invalidity of the base assumption of the Carthaginian plan forced Hannibal to fight a war of attrition he could not win against a foe with the superior resources Rome possessed.

## 5. CAMPAIGNS CONSIST OF LINKED OPERATIONS

Theater strategy is executed through campaigns that consist of operations synchronized in time and space. Rome successfully linked their operations in Italy, Iberia, Sicily, Macedonia, and eventually North Africa. Roman operations in Iberia and Sicily drew off reinforcements meant for Hannibal while Hannibal was isolated in southern Italy by surrounding Roman armies. Rome quickly moved an army across the Adriatic to smash Phillip's fleet and then used the Aetolian League to tie Phillip down in Greece instead of assisting Carthage in Italy. Finally, Rome was not distracted by Hannibal's weakened army in Bruttium nor Mago's small force in Cisalpine Gaul prior to Scipio's invasion of North Africa. Rome launched its final operation aimed at the heart of Carthage, which resulted the recall of the two Carthaginian armies operating in Italy.

Carthage was less successful. A large Carthaginian force was sent to Sardinia at a time when Hannibal was in position to threaten the existence of Rome had he been provided with this force. The Romans destroyed this army shortly after it arrived. The Carthaginians did attempt to link their operations by deploying a large force to Sicily to assist the newly acquired ally of Syracuse. Rome successfully countered this move however and Carthaginian Admiral Bomniclar's naval failure off Sicily doomed Syracuse. A similar Carthaginian failure to link operations was the destruction of Hasdrubal's army at the Metaurus. Hannibal's army failed to fight north to link up with Hasdrubal. This allowed the Romans under Nero to destroy Hasdrubal's army while Hannibal remained in camp in southern Italy.

## 6. IMPORTANCE OF JOINT OPERATIONS

All major battles of 2d Punic War were fought on land but sea power played a pervasive role. The Romans effectively leveraged their land and naval forces into a coherent grand

strategy. Rome used its fleet to transport its land forces to several different theaters and maintain them once deployed. The Roman alliance with Massila combined with possession of Corsica and Sardinia allowed the Romans to control the northern half of western Mediterranean.<sup>89</sup> Carthage was never able to penetrate Adriatic and assist Phillip and therefore the alliance of Carthage and Macedon never reached full potential.

Carthage, on the other hand, was a major regional power engaged in a war far from her shores and conceded control of the seas to their enemy. This prevented strategic surprise by large movements of troops; resupply, reinforcement and evacuation were also difficult. The Romans could easily disrupt Carthaginian trade and the North African shore was open to Roman raids.<sup>90</sup> There is evidence that Carthage had the means to effect a naval strategy. Five hundred Carthaginian warships were burned as part of the peace settlement ending the 2d Punic War.<sup>91</sup> Carthage successfully moved a large army to Sicily. They also moved large forces to Sardinia and repeatedly to Iberia. A Carthaginian fleet spent two years in Greek waters without significantly assisting their most potent ally, Philip, before withdrawing. Late in the war they still had the ability to move Mago's small army as far as Genua in northern Italy. The Carthaginian allies of Syracuse and Tarentum also had significant naval assets. Carthage had the resources and certainly a strong naval tradition but had lost the will. During the Roman siege of Syracuse the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar had superior, in number, warships and yet he retreated at the appearance of a smaller Roman fleet.<sup>92</sup> Scipio seized a substantial Carthaginian fleet still moored to its docks when he took New Carthage in Iberia. The existing records do not adequately explain why Carthage failed to employ its naval assets.

Sea power played a critical role in defeating Hannibal. It conditioned his strategy of invading Italy. He was forced to take the long, costly overland move vice a maritime move. The overland move from Iberia through the Alps cost Hannibal tens of thousands of veteran soldiers. Roman sea power consistently prevented adequate reinforcements from reaching Hannibal. Hannibal was only able to evacuate Italy during an "armistice" period with Scipio already in Africa. Roman success underlines the importance of a "Fleet in Being."<sup>93</sup>

## 7. REINFORCE SUCCESS

The Romans pragmatically reinforced success while minimizing the risk associated with their failures. Following Cannae they refused to meet Hannibal on the tactical battlefield of his choosing. Roman armies always covered Rome and its most important provinces. Hannibal was kept in view and his power cut down when opportunities presented themselves.<sup>94</sup> The most

effective Carthaginian army was therefore systematically reduced in effectiveness without risking a full battle.

Elsewhere, Rome's unceasing activity served to isolate Hannibal and forced him to fight alone.<sup>95</sup> Rome employed forces throughout the western Mediterranean where they experienced success against less talented Carthaginian commanders. Carthaginian armies were defeated and destroyed in Sardinia, Sicily, and most importantly, Iberia. Carthage had the strategic initiative early with a dominant position in the main theater only to lose it due to Roman successes in these other theaters.

## 8. COALITION WARFARE

Coalition warfare presents numerous difficulties, most notably in the unity of effort and purpose. For that reason, when considering the composition of the Carthaginian army, Hannibal certainly ranks as one of the great commanders of history. He successfully welded Iberians, Gauls, Libyans, Numidians, and Italians into an army Rome could not match. Hannibal returned to North Africa with an army composed almost entirely of Italians and Gauls.<sup>96</sup> The only large-scale desertion from Hannibal's army was 1200 Spanish and Numidian cavalry who defected after the drawn battle of Nola.<sup>97</sup> This is in marked contrast to other Carthaginian armies where the Romans were successful in securing the defection of Carthaginian mercenaries. Hannibal did have his problems coordinating the actions with the volatile Gauls. The revolt of the Boii was obviously too early; Hannibal hoped to have it coincide with his descent from the Alps. He crossed the Alps to find Roman armies and colonies planted near the Po Valley.<sup>98</sup>

The Romans were also successful in coalition warfare. Their use of the Aetolian League against the Macedonians was masterful. The Aetolian League ground forces engaged Philip while the Roman navy controlled the Adriatic and central Mediterranean. Greek colonies, Rome's "naval allies," provided the backbone of Roman fleet, and for most part remained loyal.<sup>99</sup> Scipio's invasion of North Africa depended on obtaining Numidian cavalry. He had co-opted Numidian kings Syphax and Masinissa while in Iberia.<sup>100</sup> Scipio's first actions in North Africa were to secure Masinissa on the Numidian throne. Masinissa's arrival and support of Scipio was a key event for the Roman victory at Zama.

## 9. TRAINING OF STRATEGIC LEADERS

“Carry on offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick; read, re-read the history of their eighty-eight campaigns; model yourself after them - that is the only means of becoming a great captain and acquiring the secret of the art of war; your genius, thus enlightened, will reject such principles as are opposed to those of these great men” - Napoleon<sup>101</sup>

Study of the profession of arms and the training of strategic leaders is a key to strategic success. Good generalship matters. Hannibal nearly triumphed in the 2d Punic War despite the serious strategic disadvantages he was faced with. Hannibal was trained in the art of war from his earliest days riding at the side of his father, Hamiclar. At the age of nine, he accompanied Hamiclar on his invasion of Iberia and remained with the army as a subordinate commander under his uncle, Hasdrubal. Hannibal obviously made a name for himself as the soldiers acclaimed him commander of the army and the confirmation was approved by the Carthaginian oligarchy. As noted above, Hannibal forged an effective army out of widely dissimilar peoples.<sup>102</sup>

The amateurish efforts of the senior Roman commanders early in the war compare poorly with this. The Roman custom of electing two consuls each year and entrusting them with military strategy was flawed when incompetent leaders were elected. The Romans paid the price at Trebia for Sempronius, at Lake Trasimene for Flaminius, and most notably at Cannae for Varro. As with all things in the 2d Punic War, the Romans adjusted. Hannibal trained a series of Roman commanders through their experience fighting him. Fabius, Nero, and Marcellus became adequate if certainly not equal to Hannibal. Hannibal's most apt pupil was clearly Scipio Africanus. Scipio had direct experience fighting Hannibal having served in the Roman armies at Ticinus, Trebia, and Cannae. Scipio's generalship in Iberia and North Africa was very similar to Hannibal's in Italy.

The Romans also modified their practice of entrusting all military matters to the annual consuls. The senate eventually extended the “imperium” or command of armies to gifted commanders. Marcellus, Nero, and Fabius were continued in command of Roman legions after they achieved some success in battles with Hannibal. Most notably, Scipio's consulship had ended by the time he invaded North Africa but he was kept in command through the end of the war.

## CONCLUSIONS

Hannibal is one of the most fascinating characters in military history. He captures the imagination of many for his exploits at the tactical and operational level. At those levels he has rarely, if ever, been matched. However a close examination of the 2d Punic War reveals the weakness of the Carthaginian strategic concept. Hannibal and Carthage were thinking out of date; they kept expecting Rome to surrender. Rome had learned that defeat in battle does not equal strategic defeat.<sup>103</sup> A plan must be resourced to win. Hannibal's plan in invading Italy had been based on the assumption that Rome's Latin and Italian allies would join him. However not a single Latin ally nor a majority of the Italian allies ever came over to him.

The real strategic level lessons to be gleaned from the 2d Punic War come from the Roman side. Their skillful combination of different elements of national power combined with incredible resilience and endurance provide ample education to the modern strategist. Strategic endurance became a major characteristic of interstate war following the Punic Wars. Prior to Hannibal's time, most wars were decided in one or two major battles, all or nothing affairs. Behind the Roman Senate's successful prosecution of the war was the stability of the Roman political institutions. Despite disagreements there was never any bloodshed, revolution, or suspension of citizens' rights.<sup>104</sup> Carthage's political disputes led to a dilution of military focus and their eventual defeat.

The blame for Carthage's defeat may be placed in the hands of the Carthaginian ruling oligarchy that failed to support Hannibal's concept once they were committed to war due to Hannibal's actions. Hannibal was pragmatic to the last and immediately recognized how defenseless Carthage was following Zama. He emphatically persuaded the Carthaginian senate of the need for peace, even on Roman terms. Hannibal subsequently became one of the leading political leaders of post-war Carthage. He was instrumental in rebuilding Carthaginian prestige following the war to the point he was forced to flee by a nervous Rome. He remained in the eastern Mediterranean where he eventually ended his own life steps ahead of apprehension by the Romans.

"The man himself eludes us, just as he eluded so many during his lifetime....Hannibal, the boy from North Africa who grows up to dominate European history for sixteen years, seems to vanish like the mist rising off Lake Trasimene on that fateful day; or like the south wind, the sun, and the dust that blinded the Romans at Cannae" - Ernle Bradford.<sup>105</sup>

WORD COUNT = 10,391



## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Trevor N. Dupuy, The Military Life of Hannibal, Father of Strategy. (NY: Franklin Watts, 1969).
- <sup>2</sup> Leonard Cottrell, Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, (NY: Holt, 1961), 6.
- <sup>3</sup> Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 34.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid, 12-15.
- <sup>5</sup> Theodore A. Dodge, Hannibal: A History of the Art of War Among the Carthaginians And the Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 BC, With a Detailed Account of the Second Punic War, (Boston: Houghton, 1896), 4.
- <sup>6</sup> H.H. Scullard, A History of the Roman World 753-146 BC, (NY: Methuen & Co, Ltd, 1980), 163.
- <sup>7</sup> R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), 61. 226BC, Gauls: Boii, Insurbanes, Lingones, Taurini, Gaesati gathered against Rome. Huge battle fought after Gauls marched on Rome; Gauls trapped between 2 Roman armies and destroyed.
- <sup>8</sup> Scullard, 189-190.
- <sup>9</sup> Cottrell, 9.
- <sup>10</sup> Dodge, 108.
- <sup>11</sup> Dupuy and Dupuy, 61. Hanno, the Carthaginian general who lost the decisive battle of the Aegate Islands to the Romans, was crucified upon his return to Carthage.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid, 64.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid, 66.
- <sup>14</sup> T.A. Dorey, and D.R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), 69. Postrimus Albinus' skull was used by Boii as a drinking cup.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid, 79.
- <sup>16</sup> Ernle D. Bradford, Hannibal, (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 158.
- <sup>17</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 83.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid, 86.
- <sup>19</sup> Daniel A. Fournie, "Clash of Titans at Zama," Military History, (Feb 00), 26.
- <sup>20</sup> Dodge, 610. The Roman terms for peace:

1. Reparations for breaking truce.
2. Delivery of all warships, except 10, and all elephants.
3. Delivery of all POWs and Roman deserters.
4. No war outside Africa and inside Africa only with Roman approval.
5. Masinissa recognized as King of Numidia.
6. Provide for Roman army for 3 months.
7. Annual payment of 200 talents for 50 years.
8. 100 hostages selected by Rome

<sup>21</sup> Cottrell, 150.

<sup>22</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 37.

<sup>23</sup> Dodge, 639.

<sup>24</sup> Dupuy, 48.

<sup>25</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1954), 124.

<sup>26</sup> Dodge, 398.

<sup>27</sup> Dodge, 157.

<sup>28</sup> Cottrell, 99.

<sup>29</sup> Bradford, 96

<sup>30</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 38

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, 358-359. Treaty between Hannibal and Phillip:

1. Macedonians protect Carthaginians.
2. Carthaginians protect Macedonians. Lists Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria as allies.
3. No plots or ambushes.
4. Enemies of each other are their enemies.
5. Allied against Rome.
6. Any peace treaty will include Macedonia and will return Illyrian possessions.
7. If Rome ever makes war against one, the other will help.
8. Any other who attacks is also an enemy of both.



9. No changes to treaty unless both agree.

<sup>32</sup> Scullard, 211

<sup>33</sup> Dodge, 413

<sup>34</sup> J.F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 106.

<sup>35</sup> Bradford, 140.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 143.

<sup>37</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 89.

<sup>38</sup> Cottrell, 116

<sup>39</sup> Scullard, 215-216

<sup>40</sup> Dodge, 490.

<sup>41</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 87.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 87.

<sup>43</sup> Dodge, 578.

<sup>44</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d Revised Edition, (New York: Frederic Praeger Publishers, 1967), 53.

<sup>45</sup> Richard A. Gabriel and Donald W. Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, ( Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994), 287-8.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 287.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 315.

<sup>48</sup> Dodge, 494.

<sup>49</sup> Scullard, 193

<sup>50</sup> Cottrell, 6-7.

<sup>51</sup> Bradford 97.

<sup>52</sup> Dodge, 520.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 447

<sup>54</sup> Bradford, 193.

<sup>55</sup> Dodge, 500.

<sup>56</sup> Lazenby, 168.

<sup>57</sup> Dodge, 576

<sup>58</sup> Gabriel and Boose, 284

<sup>59</sup> Cottrell, 158

<sup>60</sup> Dodge, 507.

<sup>61</sup> Bradford, 166-7

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 160

<sup>63</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 80.

<sup>64</sup> Dodge, 514-15.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 577. The tribes were: Nepete, Sutrium, Cales, Alba, Curseoli, Sora, Suessa, Setia, Circeii, Narnia, and Interamma

<sup>66</sup> Walter Krueger, The Conditions of Success in War: Illustrated by Hannibal's Campaigns in Italy, (Washington Barracks, DC: AWC, 1923), 4.

<sup>67</sup> Fuller, 129.

<sup>68</sup> Dodge, 335.

<sup>69</sup> Cottrell, 170

<sup>70</sup> Gabriel and Boose, 315.

<sup>71</sup> Bradford, 46

<sup>72</sup> Gabriel and Boose, 280.

<sup>73</sup> Bradford, 117.

<sup>74</sup> Bradford, 118.

<sup>75</sup> "The Second Punic War," available from [history.idbsu.edu/westciv/punicwar/htm](http://history.idbsu.edu/westciv/punicwar/htm), accessed 11 Nov 00.

<sup>76</sup> Lazenby, 4-5.

- <sup>77</sup> Dodge, 143.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid, 571.
- <sup>79</sup> Gabriel and Boose, 284.
- <sup>80</sup> Lazenby, 9-10.
- <sup>81</sup> Scullard, 162
- <sup>82</sup> Gabriel and Boose, 286
- <sup>83</sup> Dorey and Dudley, xvi.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid, 70
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid, 131.
- <sup>86</sup> Gabriel and Boose, 311.
- <sup>87</sup> Dodge, 483
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid, 108.
- <sup>89</sup> Dorey and Dudley, 148-149.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid, 286
- <sup>91</sup> Lazenby, 16.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid, 117-118.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid, 152.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid, 634.
- <sup>95</sup> Scullard, 237.
- <sup>96</sup> Dodge, 592
- <sup>97</sup> Dupuy, 82
- <sup>98</sup> Bradford, 74.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid, 120
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid, 185.
- <sup>101</sup> Francis V. Fitzgerald, "Campaigns of Hannibal." QM Review 77 (Sep Oct

1931), 23.

<sup>102</sup> Dodge, 620.

<sup>103</sup> Bradford, 120

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, 237.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, 212.

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