CONCEPT FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Summary. This concept describes the importance of information and how to win the information war in military operations now and into the twenty-first century. It identifies information as an essential enabler of military power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It details the ways in which information contributes to friendly mission success and adversary defeat as an integral part of joint, combined, multinational, or interagency operations. This concept defines information operations (IO) as the framework for integrated support for battle command and describes the operational capabilities necessary for its planning and execution.
Applicability. This pamphlet applies to all TRADOC elements, to include Headquarters (HQ) TRADOC staff, major subordinate commands, functional centers, schools, and activities.
Suggested Improvements. The proponent for this pamphlet
is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments. Send comments
and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes
to Publications and Blank Forms) through channels to Commander,
TRADOC, ATTN: ATCD-BP, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000. Suggestions
may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence
Program [AIEP] Proposal).
|General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA
1-1. A dynamic world.
a. We live in a dynamic world, an era of contradictory trends shaped by two great forces, one strategic, the other technical-he advent of the Information Age. The scale and pace of recent change have made traditional means of defining future military operations inadequate. Change will continue, requiring the Army to recognize change as the only real constant. As change remains a constant, answering the nation's call will remain the Army's mission-from war to military operations other than war (OOTW).
b. The complex strategic environment requires an Army that is flexible and adaptive. This twenty-first Century Army will be based on quality soldiers and leaders in versatile, mission-tailored units, enhanced by the power of information, superior technology, and effective battle command.
1-2. Information Age Army. The U.S. Army is establishing itself as a knowledge-based force more than equal to the challenges that exist in what many call the Information Age. With its keystone manual FM 100-5, and its new overarching operational concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, leading the way, the Army will produce leaders and systems able to assimilate thousands of bits of information to visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military action appropriate to the situation. Achieving force coherence through shared knowledge versus traditional means, such as graphic control measures or geographical demarcations, the Army of today and into the twenty-first century will meet the challenges of the Information Age and provide the means to control and dominate the battlespace in any situation. By using and protecting the use of information infrastructures (people, electromagnetic spectrum, computers) while influencing or denying a potential adversary's use, the Army will gain an unprecedented advantage on the battlefield and in OOTW. The Force XXI Army will be able to locate enemy forces quickly and precisely, whether those enemies are agrarian war lords, industrial armies, or Information Age peers. Force XXI armies will now know the precise location of their own forces, while denying that kind of information to their foes. Information about enemy units and friendly formations will be distributed among all committed forces-land, sea, air, and space-to create a common view of the battlefield and a shared situational awareness across the force. This shared situational awareness, coupled with the ability to conduct continuous operations, will allow Force XXI armies to observe, decide, and act faster, more correctly, and more precisely than their enemies. All dimensions of battlespace (land, sea, air, and space) and all battlefield operating systems (command and control, maneuver, fire support, etc.) will be linked digitally in future Information Age armies. Today's Army has asymmetrical capabilities. It is bounded by the past and the future in its doctrine and capabilities. It is maintaining current capabilities while modernizing the force, forming early twenty-first century and Force XXI operations capabilities.
1-3. Purpose. This concept, as an enabling piece for TRADOC Pam 525-5, describes the importance of information as the Army identifies requirements to dominate battlespace across the full range of operations and win the information war. It identifies information as an essential dynamic enabling dominant military power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the ways in which information will impact mission success as an integral part of joint, combined, multinational, or interagency operations. Additionally, the conceptual framework for planning and executing information operations (IO) is defined, along with the methodology for the conduct of these operations. This methodology enables a commander to acquire and control available information and to protect his ability to sense, process, integrate, decide, and act on such information while denying it to an adversary. It defines IO in terms of its role as integrated support to battle command and describes the operational capabilities necessary for planning and executing IO in military operations. Chapter 4 explores the implications for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers.
1-4. References. Appendix A contains a list of required and related publications.
1-5. Explanation of abbreviations and terms. Three key terms used throughout this pamphlet are information operations, information warfare and command and control warfare (C2W). The glossary contains other abbreviations and terms used in this concept.
a. Information operations. Continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations. Information operations include interacting with the global information environment and, as required, exploiting or degrading an adversary's information and decision systems.
b. Information warfare. Actions taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information system from exploitation, corruption, or destruction while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary's information system and in the process achieving an information advantage in the application of force. (Joint Pub 1-02) (proposed)
c. Command and control warfare
(C2W). The integrated use of operations security, military deception,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction
mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence,
degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting
friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. C2W applies across
the full range of military operations and all levels of war (CJCS
MOP 30). C2W is the military strategy that implements information
warfare (DOD Dir TS-3600.1)
At the military level, Mongol doctrine relied for success almost entirely on learning exactly where their enemies were, while keeping their own whereabouts a secret until they attacked. This enabled them, despite a chronic inferiority in numbers, to overthrow the finest, largest armies of imperial China, Islam, and Christendom... In one of their greatest campaigns, against the mighty Muslim empire of Khwarizm (located approximately on the territory of today's Iran, Iraq, and portions of the central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union), a Mongol army of some 125,000 toppled a foe whose standing armies amounted to nearly half a million troops, with a similar number of reserves. How could this happen? The answer is that the Mongols identified the linear, forward dispositions of their foes and avoided them. Instead, they worked around the defenders, making a point of waylaying messengers moving between the capital and the front.
Muhammad Ali Shah, the ruler of Khwarizm, took the silence from the front as a good sign, until one day a messenger, having narrowly escaped a Mongol patrol, made his way to the capital, Samakand. Muhammad inquired about the news from his army and was told that the frontier was holding. The messenger went on to add however, that he had observed a large Mongol army but a day's march from the capital. The shah fled and his capital fell swiftly. This news, when given to the frontier armies, led to a general's capitulation.
|J. Arqulla and D. Ronfeldt
Comparative Strategy, Volume 12, "Cyberwar is Coming," 1993
2-1. Changing military environment.
a. Recent operations such as Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope, have illustrated the effectiveness of a proactive and aggressive strategy to deny an enemy the capability or information required to command and control his forces. For instance, in the Gulf War the Iraqi forces were completely overwhelmed once the foundations of command were eradicated.
b. The impact of the speed and pervasiveness of data in the Information Age has potentially revolutionized the conduct of modern military operations and warfare. The key to information warfare is to gain a fundamental advantage or dominance over an adversary by leveraging, exploiting and, at times, controlling information. This information advantage could allow the Army or joint force commander (JFC) more freedom of action across the full range of military operations.
c. The Information Age has irreversibly impacted the fundamental approach to warfare.
(1) Battle command starts with competent commanders and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have developed an intuitive sense of battle gained from study and experience. The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) will permit leaders at every level to share a common, relevant picture of the battlespace tailored to their specific interests and needs. This common picture will greatly enhance situational awareness and ensure rapid, clear communication of the commander's intent and concept of operations.
(2) Precision weapons and increased accuracy in targeting systems have caused both our commanders and enemy commanders to increase the dispersion of forces on the battlefield. This weapons technology has advanced to the point where force concentrations and even contiguous battle lines are vulnerable to smart munitions, massed conventional fires, weapons of mass destruction, and high-tempo maneuvers. One impact of this technology is that it requires commanders to control their forces over much greater geographic areas. These modern weapons systems are increasingly reliant on detailed information to effectively target the enemy, as are the military forces to employ these systems.
(3) Military force projection requires state-of-the-art information technologies which will afford command and control over a seamless global architecture, where information can be passed between users securely and effortlessly in a manner transparent to the user.
d. U.S. national information strategy guides decisions and programs in the U.S. and influences attitudes and behaviors of friends, adversaries, and neutral parties.
(1) The U.S. deploys, employs, and maintains the military arm to deter actions by other countries or groups that will adversely impact U.S. national interests.
(2) National information operations are those interagency activities that are largely conducted through, among others, the Department of State, U.S. Information Service, embassies, and intelligence services.
(3) The successful conduct of military information warfare will partially depend on the ability of Army forces to conduct IO on a continuous basis as part of joint and interagency operations and the national information strategy. Successful conduct of IO activities across the spectrum of international relations, from peace to war, will enhance the possibility of success if and when leaders commit military force to an operation. The link between national and military systems and operations is more important than ever. Routine cooperation and coordination among all agencies prior to conflict or crisis is critical to success of interagency operations in all situations, from peacekeeping to war.
(1) Everything that occurs in a theater of operations is potentially subject to instantaneous scrutiny. Adversaries posture in hopes of causing reactions in the press without taking any real actions or risks. International news media broadcast detailed, graphic, live coverage of events around the world. This can influence strategic decision making and the direction, range, and duration of operations by all involved parties. The compressed presentations of military operations available through the GIE could confuse the public about our national military goals. The information can compress the perceptions of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, quickly bridging the gap in the public's mind between tactical operations and national military goals. A compression of the traditional levels of war presents a unique challenge to political and military leaders across the full range of operations.
(2) Through the GIE, news of military operations are broadcast real-time or near-real-time to the American public, allies, and adversaries. Unofficial public analyses, critiques, and commentaries can affect operations in progress. Debate can begin before military leaders or the National Command Authorities (NCA) have time to evaluate, form a perception, or develop a response to those events. Such debates can affect strategic goals, operational decision making, tactical execution, morale, esprit, and effectiveness of the forces involved. The GIE is such a significant source of information that it must be considered in all future military operations.
2-2. Dangers. The end of the Cold War changed the alliances and geopolitical dynamics of international relations, causing a rise in regional instabilities. These changes, combined with the proliferation of Information Age technology, have made high-technology weapons; electronic warfare (EW) equipment; reconnaissance; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA); and information system elements more easily available to any country or organization around the world. Because of the perishable nature of information, commanders must understand the fluid nature of the information advantage in knowledge-based warfare and supporting operations. It is possible for a small dedicated C2W cell in an otherwise unsophisticated organization to create a temporary knowledge-based advantage over a militarily superior force, which can be translated into a military advantage. In the area of information warfare, one must assume that any adversary can attain some level of parity with friendly forces.
a. Adversary dependency. Executing IO will require a detailed understanding of the adversarial force and its supporting information system. The nature and configuration of the adversary's decision- making process, intelligence, information infrastructures and capability to wage knowledge-based warfare-whether high or low technology-are all widely variable. They all depend on the political, military, industrial, technological, economic, and related social factors. The relevance and potential payoff of any particular IO capability needs to be evaluated by commanders and applied differently, depending upon the adversary.
b. Adversary information capability. This capability consists of three distinct but interrelated elements.
(1) Adversary command and control (C2) system. The first element is the opponent's ability to maintain situational awareness and make decisions in the face of uncertainty. It includes the civil and military decision-making process, organization, and supporting information infrastructure.
(2) Adversary intelligence system. The second element of the adversary's information capability is its intelligence system, including RISTA systems with intelligence processing and reporting capabilities. This element includes the technical capability of adversary sensors to track U.S. and allied forces as well as the ability to collect, process, and disseminate that intelligence to adversary forces.
(3) Adversary C2W system. The final element is the adversary's capability to influence friendly information and attack the "national will" of the U.S. or allied populations. This element includes the capability to exploit (deny, distort, degrade, or destroy) friendly information and thereby deny U.S. and coalition forces effective battle command or support to battle command.
c. Information trends. The increasing proliferation of information technology provides potential adversaries, whether nation-states, organizations, or individuals, with the capability to conduct increasingly sophisticated information warfare against the U.S. Off-the-shelf technologies dealing with commercial sensing, processing, and communication systems and with military applications are readily available on the commercial market. Potential adversaries, however, do not need high-technology systems to conduct effective information warfare. For example, all countries have a media capability. The media will print or broadcast stories if interested or ordered.
d. Unbalanced information engagement technology. Given the array and sophistication of DOD's space-based sensor and communications systems, including RISTA and EW assets, the U.S. currently has the world's most sophisticated, yet vulnerable, information engagement capabilities. The U.S. may enjoy a measure of superiority in IO against relatively unsophisticated regional opponents. However, IO-related equipment can be developed or acquired within short time spans and at lower costs than other forms of military equipment. The Army must prepare for the eventuality when major adversaries arm themselves and their regional clients with information warfare tools with which to confront the U.S. and U.S.- participating coalitions. For now, in the technology area, the U.S. is likely to enjoy a large, favorable advantage in information engagement capabilities for most plausible operations. The increased dependence on digitization, however, introduces a vulnerability to disruption of the information engagement capability, even by unsophisticated adversaries.
2-3. Operational considerations and constraints. Many factors may restrict training and operations during all phases of conflicts and OOTW. Some of these include legal and social restrictions, psychological operations (PSYOP), the media, security, and training.
a. Legal and social restrictions include the following.
(1) Rules of engagement (ROE). The NCA and chain of command will establish specific actions that may be taken during phases of the operation and in response to actions of the adversary.
(a) The NCA must approve the theater PSYOP plan. To be effective, PSYOP planning must begin early in the planning process. U.S. Army PSYOP forces may only conduct PSYOP in support of U.S. national objectives.
(b) In peacetime, once the NCA has approved the initial PSYOP theater plan, DOD normally delegates approval authority for products and actions to the joint force commander or assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.
(c) In peacetime and in some other cases, PSYOP requires coordination with other services, other government agencies, allies or coalition partners, multinational organizations, and/or nongovernmental agencies.
(3) Electromagnetic spectrum and spectrum sovereignty. International treaties protect some parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. The military shares the spectrum with other nations and other national agencies. Military use of certain communications systems (for example, space communications, terrestrial broadcast) within or adjacent to countries may conflict with civil use or violate local regulations, U.S. laws, international treaties, or clauses in the United Nations (UN) charter.
b. Media. The Army supports the timely and accurate release of information to the media, as well as open and independent reporting, as the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. Although the Army authorizes the intentional omission or delay of some information to the media to preserve operational security, the principle of news media coverage is to provide maximum disclosure with minimum delay. The Army provides the most accurate information available in response to queries from the news media and will not intentionally provide inaccurate information to the news media.
c. Security. Information security regulations may restrict the sharing of some intelligence and operational information with allies or coalition partners in combined operations.
d. Training. Training with the
full range of IO measures in a field training exercise may not
be possible because of the potential for revealing sensitive tactics,
techniques, and procedures or disrupting commercial use of the
Advances in technology are continually changing the way warfare is conducted at a pace now greater than ever before. Microprocessing, miniaturization, communications, and space technologies have combined to permit almost real-time intelligence and information sharing, distributed decision making, and rapid execution of orders from a wide variety of forces and systems for concentrated effect.
3-1. Information-a new paradigm. This chapter introduces Information Operations as a catalyst for change and describes the information changes in each of the battle dynamics. It ties all the parts together, with information being the key enabler in future Army operations. IO focuses on the Army now and into the future. IO impact on battle dynamics is discussed herein, to include military information systems (MIS), the role of intelligence, and C2W-all operating within the global information environment (GIE).
a. Information leads to knowledge. Knowing the when, where, why, and how of military operations controls the tempo and synchronization of battles. The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) provides commanders specific knowledge of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T), coupled with a rapid and precise vision of the battlefield, to gain dominance in a battlespace and control the tempo of operations. Commanders and battle staffs will need to know and identify critical information since it will be impossible to protect all operational information in most circumstances. Ultimately, information dominance is necessary to win the war with the least expenditure of resources.
b. In the near future, situational awareness will be near real-time. Commanders and their staffs will view the battle plan and expected outcomes from their own and the enemy's viewpoint. The display will feature virtual images of artificial or real terrain and the lay down of opposing forces. Screens and digital displays may replace map boards, notebooks, binoculars, and compasses. Disks and tapes may replace storage boxes and file cabinets.
c. All leaders will have a relevant common picture of the battlespace. This picture and other corresponding information may be shared by not only friendly but also by potential adversary forces as well. However, friendly forces can gain and maintain the lion's share of key, essential information through all phases of an operation. By denying the adversary's view of friendly battlespace, and exploiting his use of the spectrum, commanders can dominate the battlefield.
d. The ability to generate and share information between soldiers, leaders and units propels the Army into the Information Age with its requirement to use and manage the information effectively. Also with this age comes information warfare (IW). Information warfare supports the National Security Strategy and seeks to achieve an information advantage by protecting one's own information system while exploiting an adversary's information system and/or denying him effective use of it.
e. IO builds on IW and C2W. Based
on intelligence, commanders use MIS and C2W within the GIE to
perform the function of battle command. This chapter addresses
each of these areas as they interact in the military information
environment (MIE) battlespace. (see Figure 3-1) The complex strategic
environment requires a force that is flexible and adaptive. As
a participant in the national information warfare strategy, the
Army will probably be called upon to deploy and employ its capabilities
for both direct and indirect actions. Occasions may arise that
would require the use of Army capabilities outside the MIE and
outside the normal command/unit organizational structure.
f. IO offers the commander the tools to acquire, manage, use, and protect information, as well as the capability to attack (deny, disrupt, and exploit) the adversary's information system. It combines joint/interagency systems (resources) with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to enable operations throughout all stages of force projection. As the use and exploitation of information becomes more critical in military operations, it is evident that IO is not just systems and TTP. As a total mind-set, the Army will adopt the means to achieve knowledge-based military superiority over an adversary to fight and win the information war.
g. The objective of IO is to achieve information dominance. This is done by enabling, enhancing, and protecting our use of information while influencing (degrading, controlling) an adversary's decisions and actions through manipulation of his information and information systems. IO will directly support the commander's intent and will be conducted throughout the full range of military operations and at all levels of command. IO will be developed and executed to provide commanders with knowledge-based military superiority over an adversary.
(1) The U.S. Army conducts operations in one or all of the stages of force-projection operations every day. When it becomes apparent that the situation is likely to progress to a state of conflict, the intensity of friendly IO rapidly increases in accordance with the commander's stated intent.
(2) During the early stages of conflict, IO maintains a high level of intensity. As the conflict escalates, IO rapidly intensifies to a level appropriate to the situation. This intensity, based on the commander's stated intent, will be maintained throughout the crisis. The C2W component of IO continues to intensify throughout the course of the crisis until the commander achieves the desired end state. IO objectives will be achieved through a set of integrated actions at each echelon.
h. Commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimum cost. The commander achieves overwhelming combat power by bringing all elements of combat power to bear quickly against the enemy, thereby denying him opportunity to effectively act or react. The effective application and sustainment of the maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership elements of combat power, empowered by information technology, will determine the outcome of operations. Leaders will integrate IO to enable maneuver, firepower, and protection capabilities in a variety of combinations appropriate to the situation.
i. IO will be conducted across the full range of operations-peace, OOTW, lesser regional contingencies (LRC)/major regional contingencies (MRC), and war-integrated within joint, multinational, and/or interagency operations and throughout all phases of force-projection operations and at all levels of war.
(1) IO will be executed by a disciplined soldier team focused on mission objectives and fully aware of the commander's intent. The ability to successfully extend and operate ones own C2 system into a theater of operations is key to successful IO.
(2) IO is consistent with joint doctrine in that the exploitation and denial of the adversary's information system and the protection of our own is called C2W and includes EW, operations security (OPSEC), military deception, PSYOP, and physical destruction. C2W is both offensive and defensive and is organized in the categories of command and control-protect (C2-protect) and counter-command and control (counter-C2), respectively. Each category includes the use of OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, and physical destruction, guided by intelligence. Army IO adds the elements of battle command (to include the establishment and operation of the friendly information system), interaction with the GIE (to include public affairs operations [PAO]), and intelligence operations to the joint C2W definition in order to define the scope of IO. In addition to expanding IW beyond the limited scope of C2W, IO places increased emphasis on the role of information security (INFOSEC) and counterintelligence (CI). This IO definition expands the categories to counter-C2, C2-protect, and information management. While clear applications of IO exist at the strategic level, this concept discusses the conduct of IO principally at the operational and tactical levels of war conducted by the army component and subordinate commanders.
(a) Strategic level. The initial focus of IO at the strategic level is on achieving national, alliance, or coalition objectives through intelligence collection and analysis and interaction with the GIE and selected C2W activities such as PSYOP, deception, and OPSEC. Military operations/exercises may be conducted and publicized in efforts to clearly articulate the national will and capability to respond with decisive military action. As military operations escalate, IO can be employed to disrupt the adversary's information systems, further demonstrating the national resolve and military capability. These information systems support not only combat forces but also the administrative, economic, and cultural infrastructure of an adversary.
(b) Operational level. The commander formulates the plans for IO as an integral part of the Army's portion of the traditional ground, air, sea, and space operations. The objective is to distort and control the adversary's perception of his battlespace by controlling or corrupting the information he uses, while providing the friendly commander with an unambiguous picture of his battlespace. The commander must fully use and protect his information system capabilities while exploiting and selectively denying the adversary his own system's proper function. This creates the opportunity to manipulate perceptions and actions or deny the adversary command and control of his forces and the overall situation. Through the use of counter-C2, operational forces seek to control the quality of the adversary decision process and the adversary's ability to execute force-level control. Operational commanders must consider how to deal with elements of the GIE, particularly the media and international organizations, and incorporate appropriate actions into their campaign plans.
(c) Tactical level. The commander accomplishes the mission through combined arms operations. He uses IO to disrupt or destroy enemy information systems, primarily through EW and physical destruction. These measures enhance the potential for friendly forces to defeat enemy forces in detail. The commander maintains access to his information system through OPSEC/INFOSEC and electronic protection (EP). He seeks access to the adversary's system through counter-C2 and manipulates both systems to create a knowledge-based battlefield advantage that can be exploited by military forces to achieve the mission objective. Commanders who successfully plan and conduct IO, significantly increase the potential of their force's combat power and control the tempo of the battle. IO is the means by which Army forces will fight and win the information war.
3-2. Meeting the challenge-the battle dynamics. Characteristics of recent operations have given us a glimpse of the nature of future warfare. This glimpse has evolved into what we have named battle dynamics. Two key elements permeate all the battle dynamics. First, in future joint land operations, force coherence and thus application of combat power can be achieved through shared knowledge of battlefield conditions versus traditional physical control means such as graphic control measures or geographical demarcation of areas of operations. The second element is our quality soldiers and their NCO and officer leaders and units trained and developed through technical and tactical training in virtual, constructive and live simulation. Using the IO thrust, as presented in TRADOC Pam 525-5, the battle dynamics are discussed below.
a. Battle command. Battle command is the art of decision-making, leading, and motivating informed soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions at the least cost to soldiers.
(1) The ability to reliably move information rapidly and to process it will likely change the way we command military operations. It will greatly influence force organization, command procedures, and staff systems. The ABCS concept reflects the Army's vision of future battle command. This system capitalizes on the power of our quality soldiers, enabled by what we now call Information Age technology. It recognizes the inevitable coexistence of both hierarchical and nonhierarchical or internetted information processes. The ABCS and software will use broadcast battlefield information, as well as information from other sources, and integrate that information into a digitized image that can be displayed graphically in increasingly mobile displays. These images will, in essence, depict a unit's actual battlespace. Collective unit images will form a battlespace framework based on shared, real-time awareness of the arrangement of forces in the battlespace, versus a rigid framework of battlefield geometry-phase lines, objectives, and battle positions. This system permits commanders at every level to share a common, relevant picture of the battlefield, scaled to their level of interest and tailored to their special needs. Simultaneously, commanders at the same echelon will have a shared perspective of their position in relation to adjacent units. Maneuver, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) leaders, horizontally and vertically linked by common information, will, for the first time, have a means to visualize how they will execute in harmony, integrated by a shared vision of the battlespace. Individual soldiers will be empowered for independent action because of enhanced situational awareness, digital control, and a common view of what needs to be done.
common picture will greatly enhance force-level dominance by enhancing
situational awareness and ensuring rapid, clear communication
of orders and intent, potentially reducing the confusion, fog,
and friction of battle. ABCS will include both hierarchical and
internetted processes. For example, key force-level control orders
normally associated with direct application of combat power will
likely remain in the hierarchical domain. Information on services
or other activities, including logistics, movement control, air
defense warning, intelligence, and other areas can be readily
accessed through pull-down information carousels (a nonhierarchical
format) (see Figure 3-2). Some battlefield functions, fire support
for example, will be exercised through both means. Above all,
the future battle command system will be a commander and soldier
system. It will be designed for command on the move. Such shared
information, where in some cases, subordinates have as much information
as commanders, changes the dynamics of leader-to-led through a
seamless tactical internet (TI) environment.
(3) The TI will greatly enhance all battlefield operations with the greatest potential payoff in intelligence, operations, and fire support functions. Rapid distribution of information such as direct broadcast satellite and broadcast intelligence is critical to all unit levels. Combatants can often directly coordinate their actions better through shared situational awareness than a higher headquarters can by directive command. Higher echelons will monitor lower nets, allow subordinates to fight the close fight, and concentrate on influencing the remainder of the battlespace in depth, height, width, or time.
(4) Advanced Army and joint intelligence systems that feed into ABCS will enable commanders to detect and track enemy forces throughout a given battlespace. This capability presents new opportunities for exploitation because information about enemy posture, position, and activity will be known earlier and in far greater detail than ever before.
(5) The existence of these advanced intelligence systems will not, however, replace soldiers. Soldiers will remain our greatest intelligence source. Information provided by soldiers must be integrated to confirm, corroborate, or deny the digitally portrayed common picture. In OOTW, commanders accessing intelligence data bases will have greater access to, and place greater reliance on, the counsel of civil affairs, PSYOP, and special operations forces (SOF) assets. Human intelligence (HUMINT) will often remain the only source of reliable information about the situation, even on the highly technical battlespace of tomorrow, especially in OOTW situations.
(6) Friendly force situational awareness will be brought about by the digitization of each weapons platform and individual soldier's equipment so that commanders will know the location of every fighting system, whether in a heavy force or a light force. This enhanced situational awareness will build confidence and agility into the maneuver of both mounted and dismounted elements. It will not, however, eliminate the necessity for standard drills, tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout the force.
(7) This future C2 system is predicated upon our exercising electromagnetic spectrum supremacy or superiority-a key element of information operations. While control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum is impossible, key portions must be commanded at the right time. Our use of information as the focus of operations will be a strength but is also a vulnerability. Protection of friendly information systems from myriad threats, while denying the enemy use of his systems, will be absolutely critical. In the future, full-dimensional information operations must be fully integrated into the planning, preparation, and rehearsal for every operation. Protection of information systems is a key and critical staff integrative function which normally cannot be separated out as specific staff functions. Commanders must be personally involved in determining the vital role all aspects of information operations can play in the successful execution of military operations in war and OOTW.
(8) Future military information systems technology will provide the means to acquire, use, and manage information in unparalleled volume, speed, and accuracy. This technology may revolutionize our approach to battle command. The commander must bring the requisite ability, experience, and wisdom to convert information to battlespace knowledge and, ultimately, to understanding. Understanding is represented in and communicated through the commander's intent and the concept of operation. The commander and staff can access all desired information on a certain region, adversary, ally, or partner. The commander or his staff will tailor their requirement to the immediate need and thus eliminate the slower process of combing through a broad intelligence product prepared at higher echelons to answer all needs. This intelligence architecture is already being field tested and empowers subordinates to better use resources and coordinate efforts at the lowest tactical levels. Pull-down intelligence on demand will be the norm. While technology will be a significant aid in battle command, the constant dynamic change in the situation requires the adaptability, judgment, and intuition only the human dimension-the commander-can bring.
b. Battlespace. A joint concept, battlespace, is closely associated with the components of battle command. Battlespace is a concept that facilitates the type of innovative approach to warfighting required of leaders in future battles. We must dominate this battlespace in war, normally with a minimum number of our own troops in it.
(1) Battlespace involves the ability to visualize the area of operations and the way that forces interact, be it in combat or in a humanitarian relief mission. The size, shape, and density of a unit's battlespace are variable and influenced by METT-T. IO recognizes the increase in the commander's battlespace as a consequence of the Information Age. The spatial expansion of the future joint battlespace will result in service-specific functional battlespaces intersecting and overlapping. In terms of visualizing an area of operations and how forces or other elements interact, battlespace has equal utility in OOTW.
(2) In the physical sense, the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and engage the enemy determines its battlespace. Future technology will greatly expand battlespace, both in the physical and electronic dimensions. Advances in C2 and RISTA technologies will similarly expand the commander's effective vision. Technical improvements in maneuver weapons systems, such as advanced optics, increased ranges, recognition capabilities, and digital electronics, will have a dramatic impact on tactical battlespace. Advancements in stealth, metallurgy, propulsion, and suspension technology will result in faster, lighter, more lethal, and more survivable fighting systems. Advancements in camouflage (low observables), lightweight communications devices, and soldier protection will fully leverage individual soldier capabilities.
(3) Based on enhanced situational awareness through ABCS, the potential operating tempo of friendly forces will allow them to outpace any adversary in both mounted and dismounted warfighting environments.
(4) IO influences battlespace by providing the commander the means required to better visualize the battlespace while blinding or shaping an opposing commander's vision. Battlespace then becomes a function of the commander's ability to use information provided by the previously described command system and employ his warfighting systems to achieve the necessary balance to ensure success.
(5) Overmatches in the elements of combat power-maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, enabled by information-will prove essential to maintaining the edge against potential adversaries.
c. Depth and simultaneous attack. Depth and simultaneous attack will enable the commander to directly influence the enemy throughout the width, height, and depth of his battlespace, to strike, then to rapidly defeat an enemy. Indications of these possibilities were evident in both Just Cause and Desert Storm. By massing the effects of long-and short-range area and precision fires and by integrating IO designed to blind, demoralize, and defeat the enemy-concurrent with rapid combined arms ground and air maneuver-a larger and less agile enemy force can be quickly and decisively defeated.
(1) Using the ABCS and Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS) to integrate battlefield information, twenty-first century commanders will have the capability to see the entire battlespace in depth, identify key targets-particularly moving and short-dwell targets-and attack with a wide choice of joint, as well as Army systems, whenever and wherever the commander desires. Depth and simultaneous attack means will vary greatly. They will include joint air operations (including Army aviation), ground maneuver units, joint precision fires, information operations, and SOF. These various means of attack and others will be horizontally and vertically integrated by a fully digitized joint and combined arms target-acquisition, hand-off, and strike system defense information infrastructure. This spectrum of battlespace will provide from soldier to commander immediate visual information to greatly reduce mission fratricide.
(2) Along with battle command and battlespace, successful depth and simultaneous attack increases demands on signal support and intelligence systems, to include HUMINT capabilities. Long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)-with communications relays, high-resolution video, filmless/digital cameras, and follow-on generation, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) technology-will be employed at the lowest tactical levels. These multipackage UAVs will be linked to a variety of other sensors and ground stations. Indeed, networks of distributed, multipurpose sensors will populate future battlefields.
(3) A key component of depth and simultaneous attack will be measures taken to win the information war. These measures will include the establishment of electromagnetic-spectrum supremacy or superiority through nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse generators, space-based information denial systems, and computer viruses. EW preparations will normally precede, but may take place concurrent with, sea, ground, and air operations. Additionally, television and other communications media will provide a means to defend or undermine the will of entire populations. Another method of attack will be to access the enemy battlefield computer systems and manipulate information. Ideally, through successful information operations, adversaries might be forced to exercise command through nineteenth century means, while U.S. forces operate state-of-the-art, twenty-first century systems.
d. Early entry.
(1) Actions during predeployment will be critical to success. The early entry commander will be able to see the battlefield using information gathered from national systems, HUMINT, and other sources linked directly to the tactical operations center. He must be able to plan the extension of C2 systems from the power-projection platforms (installations) into the theater of operations.
(2) Information technology will provide deploying units access to the latest intelligence and information in the theater of operations to continue active involvement in planning and logistics data for follow-on units. Deploying early entry units require home station, en-route, and in-theater communications that are secure, reliable, flexible, and deployable. C2W will provide the early entry force with an out-of-theater capability to command and control the attack on the threat force and protect itself during the vulnerable lodgment stage of military operations. C2W can be used to disrupt the threat's ability to respond and provide the entry force with the necessary time to establish sufficient combat power to protect itself in the lodgment area. Early entry forces must have reliable signal support capabilities and understand the current threat data for weapon systems with embedded target recognition capabilities for proper combat identification and optimum system performance.
e. Combat service support. Reduced resources for DOD logistics and applications of electronic management and signal support systems will support the formation of strategic alliances between Army logistics mechanisms and civilian industry (including allied industry).
(1) At the strategic level, the civil sector will assume more responsibility for functions such as warehousing, maintenance, and materiel management than they have in the past. These forged links between the sustainment base and the Army will negate the need for Army-managed stockpiles and allow a true producer-to-foxhole sustainment system.
(2) At the operational level, Army experiences in Southwest Asia were invaluable. With over 40,000 containers that were shipped to the theater, 22,000 had to be opened to determine the contents. Split-based logistics overcame old logistical problems and leveraged commercially available technology for total asset visibility. The Army will continue to adapt, with little or no change, the successful techniques, procedures, and materiel innovations of the commercial sector to meet its logistical support requirements.
(3) At the tactical level, CSS units can carry less and deliver the right supplies more efficiently because of shared knowledge supported by reliable signal support systems. This equates to an on-time inventory whereby the right supplies are available at the right time. Similar signal support capabilities can support emerging technologies such as telemedicine. CSS units will have the ability to "push" the correct supplies to appropriate units because they have visibility as to what the unit needs. New information technology will enable logistics managers with enhanced situational awareness and provide the capability to quickly redirect resources, whether in transition or stationed, to immediately adjust to shifting battlefield priorities and requirements.
f. Mastery of the many changes associated with the five battle dynamics described herein- principal among them battle command-will result in the emergence of Force XXI, a twenty-first century U.S. Army fully prepared to meet the challenges of the future. Force XXI will be the world's preeminent joint land fighting force, and the way it fights will define the nature of post-Industrial Age warfare.
3-3. Force-projection operations. U.S. Army units follow a general pattern during force-projection operations. These patterns are becoming less and less sequential based on increased operations tempo. Activities of one stage will often blend with another in space and time. Commanders require up-front signal support planning and continuous detailed intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlespace, to include an operational understanding of how the adversary uses information. Because of the fluid nature of force projection, the national and joint intelligence system must continually monitor and assess the effectiveness of IO and act or react to potential dangers as well as identify adversary physical, control, or cultural/psychological centers of gravity. A critical intelligence mission in IO is to identify the capabilities of the adversary to conduct counter-C2. IO will be done with information and information exploitation systems as part of joint, multinational, and interagency operations. To ensure effective integration of IO, component commanders must tailor forces early, based upon the mission assigned by the combatant commander or JFC and available resources. IO will ensure information support to battle command by being performed continuously in all stages of Army force-projection operations, from mobilization, predeployment activities, deployment, entry operations, operations, postconflict or postcrisis operations, redeployment, and demobilization. IO becomes a key enabler throughout the battlefield framework in protecting the commander's use of information while influencing an adversary's decisions. Key to IO is the ability to extend reliable signal support from the force-projection platform (installation) into the theater of operations, which includes knowing where and what allied/friendly equipment versions are in an adversary's possession within the MIE battlespace.
3-4. Friendly information systems. The disposition of friendly forces will be rapidly and accurately disseminated and portrayed through the use of digital technology reporting (voice, data, imagery, and potentially video). Reliable signal support, accurate and timely collection, processing, dissemination, and display of friendly and adversary situations will enable the commander to see and communicate throughout the battlespace. The commander will be able to rapidly and clearly communicate his intent and concept of the operation throughout the chain of command. Future battlefield information systems will enhance the commander's situational awareness, while the Information Age technology increases the lethality and survivability of his force. These systems will need to be designed using the latest security techniques to protect IO hardware, software, and processes from future adversaries.
a. Digitization will enable increased awareness and coordination over a wide area, allowing the commander to send and receive the near-real-time information he needs in the most effective and efficient format. Digitization will also assist in combat identification and enhance situational awareness through precise friendly and threat signature definition and updating of weapon system recognition software programs. The direct connection between the global grid of communications and the digitized battlefield will allow precision strike operations against high-value targets. The result will be greater dispersion, avoidance of contamination, controlled tempo, precision strikes at greater ranges, a highly synchronized attack, and automated target hand off. Digitization will enhance full-dimensional warfare and greatly facilitate collection, management, and dissemination of information to give commanders the ability to better command in battle.
b. Battle command will require a well planned, secure, reliable, and integrated joint signal support system that supports the chain of command. It must link all elements hierarchically and horizontally internetted in the collection, management (process and display), and dissemination of information, while denying an adversary access to his own and friendly information. The commander sets the parameters of the systems to select and process data, based on specific information requirements. These requirements are derived from the commander's intent and concept of the operation.
3-5. Adversary information systems. The adversary's information infrastructure, decision-making process, and information engagement systems are the primary targets of IO. The adversary's information systems include both the technical means by which the adversary collects, processes, disseminates, and displays information, as well as the doctrinal, cultural, and political aspects of his C2 and decision-making process. The adversary's information systems include his ability to conduct information engagement.
3-6. Intelligence. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information. It is an operative in planning and executing IO. In support of IO, intelligence provides the following CS functions to the commander: intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlespace (IPB); battlespace picture enhancement; C2W targeting; and C2W battle damage assessment (BDA). A principle objective of IO is to create an inequality between the effectiveness of the friendly commander's decision making process and the adversary's equivalent process.
a. Continuous IPB. The effectiveness of IO is predicated on a continuous, thorough understanding of the adversary's C2. IPB includes the doctrinal understanding of how the adversary makes decisions and the technical assessment and understanding of the adversary's information means. At all levels of war, intelligence is an operational tool that assesses and exploits the vulnerabilities of the adversary's information system and gathers information about the adversary's command structure and operations.
b. Relevant common picture (adversary/threat). The commander's ability to increase the quality of his decisions and compress his decision process is directly related to his ability to visualize the current situation. The intelligence system will provide the commander with a relevant estimate of the current threat situation upon which he can base his decisions.
c. Support to IO and C2W planning. The detailed understanding of the adversary's vulnerabilities to IO places the role of intelligence in a position to develop operational plans to achieve the commander's IO objectives.
d. Battle damage assessment. The ability to assess the effectiveness of an action is critical in any form of warfare. IO poses a unique challenge in terms of BDA because the results of an action are not limited to outwardly physical manifestation. Intelligence provides commanders with the ability to assess the effectiveness of their IO in addition to the operational capability to determine when IO and C2W operations have created a knowledge-based vulnerability that can be exploited. Sophisticated technical means and human-technical systems give future commanders a greatly improved BDA capability.
3-7. Global information environment.
a. The commander should be aware of and actively involved with the GIE. The overall plan incorporates elements of the GIE considerations and plans. Elements of the GIE will be present and may conduct their activities in a particular area of operation. As part of the public affairs media strategy, such conditions will require deliberation with the media to determine what is not to be prematurely revealed outside the military units involved in the operation. Participating in the GIE includes:
(1) Access to certain parts of military operations.
(2) Access to adversary/neutral information not in friendly information system.
(3) Preparing information releases.
(4) Communicating directly with the local population to build an understanding of friendly intention.
(5) Channeling open public broadcasting to areas otherwise subject to propagandized news.
(6) Countering adversary's propaganda.
b. The GIE has the effect of expanding the battlespace (especially at the operational level of war) to global proportions. The operational commander's battlespace potentially extends from a continental U.S. (CONUS) base installation, to the CONUS port (air or sea) all along the lines of communications (LOC) to the region or area of operations and all the way to the close battle.
c. Current and future technology will force commanders to operate on the battlefield with media present and capable of reporting first-hand and in real time. The inherent challenge is for commanders to understand the immediacy of the impact of media coverage so they can anticipate adjustments to their plans and operations. The media coverage of the development of plans and the conduct of operations may impact and influence strategic decisions in a more profound and immediate way than in the past. Public affairs operations enable the commander to effectively operate with the media. Commanders must also have a better appreciation for the dynamics of media coverage such as personal interviews, live versus taped reports, film versus written dispatches, methods of transmission, and so on.
d. The elements of the GIE and the military will require interaction in order to facilitate the exchange of information. This interaction is a manpower-and transportation-intensive activity. Commanders and their staffs must consider this during their planning. A failure to provide the necessary support may result in a loss of valuable information between agencies, loss of media adherence to established procedures, and redundancy of efforts. All these impact on the conduct of military operations.
3-8. Command and control warfare. IO will force the adversary into a reactive mode by operating inside his decision cycle. By causing the adversary to react, friendly forces can begin to control his actions. The engagement portion of IO is an integration process that pulls together various assets and techniques of the five primary C2W components: OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction. These components, together with counterintelligence and INFOSEC, will reduce the adversary's C2 capabilities (counter-C2) while protecting friendly information capabilities (C2-protect).
a. Counter-C2. The counter-C2 process in IO must begin prior to hostilities as part of the continuous IPB, to include the adversary's:
(1) Decision-making process.
(2) Primary and alternate methods of communications.
(3) Locations of information sites.
(4) Types of information systems hardware.
(5) Psychological profiles of key leaders.
b. Methods and advances in analysis of the battlespace will help evaluate the adversary's combat capabilities and determine the source and magnitude of his combat power. Based on the combat potential of the adversary, the commander will direct an appropriate counter-C2 response. The commander's response may include elements of the primary C2W components.
(1) Physical destruction. In the context of C2-attack, weapon systems must be able to seek, identify, disable, and destroy sensors (RISTA assets), processors (human and automated data storage and analysis), communications (signal assets), and C2 nodes (command posts). When sensors, processors, communications, and C2 nodes are targeted, the effect is denial and delay of information.
(2) Electronic warfare. Electronic attack capabilities allow operational commanders to exploit, deceive, degrade, disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors, communications, C2 nodes, and counter-C2 assets. Spectrum supremacy and delay, denial, or distortion of information in the adversary information system are the objectives.
(3) Operations security. The intent of the commander drives target selection and battle plan of counter-C2. Counter-C2 operations require OPSEC beyond that provided other mission activities. Overall, OPSEC protects the sources of friendly information useful to the adversary. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement requires truth projection as an essential OPSEC task for PSYOP forces. In OOTW, it is critical that U.S. missions and roles be clearly understood by all participants.
(4) Military deception. The goal of deception is to influence adversary decision makers by distorting, concealing, and falsifying friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions prompting him to misallocate resources. Deception operations should mislead the opposing military commander, prompting him to plan and conduct his activities in a manner that unwittingly serves the friendly commander's objectives.
(a) Deception is the routine use of IO and schemes of maneuver such as feints and demonstrations mislead the opposing force (OPFOR). A deception operation is the use of real and/or physical and electronic deception devices to present a specific false picture to the OPFOR commander.
(b) Deception operations may be used in both categories of C2W (protect and counter) at all levels. A phony command post or tank company will divert and delay opposing force RISTA and deny the OPFOR commander opportunities to maneuver against real targets. This will protect real critical nodes and counter the OPFOR commander's ability to collect, analyze, and act upon real data.
(5) Psychological operations. PSYOP capabilities and operations are planned programs of products and actions designed to influence selected friendly, neutral, and/or hostile target audiences' attitudes and behaviors in support of the U.S. national objective and commander's intent. PSYOP can target either specific decision-making systems or the entire information system of the target audience, while influencing key communicators/decision makers. The methodology of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives. This makes PSYOP critically important to peacetime, OOTW, and warfare.
c. C2-protect. The purpose of C2-protect in IO is to maintain friendly capabilities for effective battle command by negating or turning to friendly advantage adversary counter-C2 actions. Future C2-protect capabilities will focus on effectively preserving friendly IO at all levels of command.
(1) Operations security. OPSEC is essential for C2-protect. It is specifically used to protect the physical and intellectual assets used to enable battle command. It must function continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only current locations, configurations, and actions but also the tactics, techniques, and procedures of information systems employment and operations.
(2) Psychological operations. PSYOP can be used by the commander to influence an adversary force or terrorist (criminal) group and the respective adversary indigenous population involved in the conflict. In the C2-protect area, PSYOP focuses on influencing adversary forces not to use or to use incorrectly counter-C2 systems. PSYOP can also degrade counter-C2 systems in various ways by influencing key decision makers and commanders. A PSYOP primary objective is to counter the adversary's hostile propaganda. PSYOP focused on counterpropaganda will gain the friendly commander freedom of movement.
(3) Electronic warfare. EW uses EP and electronic attack (EA), in consonance with electronic warfare support (ES), to degrade or destroy the adversary's information engagement and supporting information systems.
(4) Deception. Deception must be applied in support of C2-protect to negate or exploit the adversary's counter-C2. Deception diverts the focus of the adversary's counter-C2 activities, causing expenditure of valuable adversary intelligence, EW, and destruction assets while the friendly information systems remain intact. The importance of deception expands as the intensity and sophistication of the operation increases.
(5) Physical destruction. Within the context of C2-protect, targeting of an enemy's counter-C2 assets directly enhances the survivability of the friendly information system and infrastructure upon which effective battle command depends.
(6) Information systems security. Commanders who rely on information systems to achieve knowledge-based military superiority over the threat must understand their vulnerabilities to being attacked through their own information systems and must develop means to protect these systems. This vulnerability increases as the dependence on commercial C4 systems increase for global connectivity. In addition to protective measures and safeguards, commanders must be capable of isolating attacks on their information system and still be capable of executing their missions. In order to reduce vulnerability to threat C2W, commanders must first be able to identify when they are being attacked and then be capable of responding to the attack or isolate the attack and be capable of accepting degradation of their information system. INFOSEC is the combination of communications security (COMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), and transmission security (TRANSEC). INFOSEC strives to protect automated information and communications systems, the software that drives them, and the information they process. COMSEC will protect information as it is being communicated from exploitation by adversary intelligence assets. COMPUSEC will protect automated information systems. TRANSEC protects the patterns of who is talking to whom.
(7) Counterintelligence (CI). CI operations are a way to thwart the adversary's attempt to use HUMINT resources to obtain information or target vulnerabilities in the friendly information system. The CI effort also provides important information to help focus the friendly OPSEC and INFOSEC activities to protect against specific threats and threat activity.
d. Integration. IO requires integration. An important part of IO planning is to ensure that scheduled and reactive actions support achievement of the overall objective and that they are mutually supportive of the commander's intent and concept of operations.
(1) The intelligence data required for IO must be identified and continuously updated as the situation changes. The phase of the operation and changing intent of the friendly commander will change the priority of counter-C2 and C2-protect targets as the situation develops.
actions for battle command, intelligence, counter-C2, and C2-protect
may directly conflict and must be coordinated for mutually supporting
roles. The higher the level of integration, the more effective
IO will become.
4-1. Domains. For the Army to win the information war, the TRADOC domains (doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers) must be pulled together. The impact of IO upon each domain is addressed in this chapter.
a. As stated in TRADOC Pam 525-5, Information Age technology will have a profound impact on both the doctrinal process and on doctrine itself. Many doctrinal implications from the GIE will take years to be fully understood and developed.
b. IO are both evolutionary and revolutionary. The first modern information war, as described by many authors, was Desert Storm. There will be other conflicts and, as in the past, the Army will build on the doctrine that already exits. However, a concerted effort is required to integrate and tie the parts together. This concept starts to tie all the IO documents together and lead to further doctrine development in the Army and the joint force. Commercial and private support of military operations in peace, conflict or war presents a unique challenge for protection as well as exploitation. Communication systems, computer systems, and satellite systems, as well as technical assistance and maintenance, are considerations for the operational and tactical commander. Many of these systems and capabilities are controlled by private commercial organizations (with government contracts), nongovernment organizations, and government agencies. The commander must weigh the risks and opportunities involved with the use of these systems in their operations. Planning, preparation, and execution of operations with all these organizations presents a unique challenge to military commanders and staffs.
c. Several shortcomings exist in doctrine.
(1) Methods and procedures for conducting IPB must be expanded and developed to support the unique and complicated process of seeing and targeting the adversary's information and C2 systems in IO.
(2) Methods and procedures to incorporate the capabilities of the other services and agencies (governmental and nongovernmental) must be incorporated into the IO plan which should include its contribution to other services.
(3) The tools of IO provide the commander significant capabilities to affect an adversary prior to physical engagement. ROE must be expanded to reflect these new capabilities.
(4) Information technologies have contributed to the density of DOD civilian and contractor personnel near the engagement area. A unique challenge exists, especially in the area of battle command and early entry.
a. With a seamless Army training program as outlined in TRADOC Pam 525-5, data bases will be available to the soldiers routinely to address lessons learned from previous operations, worldwide political and demographic information, or expert individual specialty training requirements. It will be a classroom without walls. The capability to interconnect virtual live and constructive simulations for unit training across the full range of military operations is necessary and should be embedded in our units and in our equipment. Increasingly, entry level skills will require a higher level of computer literacy, especially for officers. NCOs will also require more technical skills earlier in their career development. Units will continue to concentrate their training on mission-essential task lists (METL). Deployment training packages will be available to meet diverse future combat and OOTW operation.
b. With real-time intelligence/communications, a digitized battlefield; positive position of assets and personnel; and individual, unit, and self-development IO training should be integrated into appropriate training cycles.
c. IO should be integrated into battle labs, exercises, simulations, and models. Conversely, the use of models and simulations originally designed for training should be evaluated as tools to support the conduct of IO. For example, a command post exercise driven as a corps battle simulation could also be used to drive a realistic deception operation.
d. Awareness training in IO (to include all elements) should be integrated in all officer training schools (officer advanced course and above) and NCO training schools (advanced noncommissioned officer course and above) curricula.
e. Command and General Staff College and War College curricula should include the study of IO as an aspect of modern warfare. Since senior leaders should also be effective communicators, the GIE portion of this training should include an awareness of the GIE, its impact on operations across all levels of war, and media interview techniques.
f. Training of the military personnel responsible for the fielding and maintenance of new technologies will be equally as important as the equipment itself. Sensitivity and classification of some information activities could make them difficult to integrate into training. It may be prudent to protect our own IO capabilities during training. Training therefore, may become increasingly more sensitive and also more classified.
4-4. Leader development. The traditional methods for identifying and incorporating capabilities are not as responsive as necessary for the training of leaders, at all levels, who will plan and execute IO. Lessons learned gathered from exercises, experiments, and current operations, should be consolidated and assessed. Where applicable, revised doctrine publications and TTP should be developed quickly and disseminated to organizations and leaders. This will ensure a continuous flow of information to facilitate understanding the concept, fielding and operation of the systems. It also provides information to the appropriate TRADOC organizations, Force XXI, and joint venture partners to be institutionalized in training, organizational design, and materiel development. Specific leader development initiatives include:
a. A progressive and sequential set of skills should be developed for officers and NCOs for integration into appropriate schools and courses.
b. The commander or director is responsible for IO training.
c. Senior mentors of the battle command training program (BCTP) should emphasize IO in the division and corps level BCTP. The importance of IO should be stressed in other leader development courses.
4-5. Organizations. The future Army will be smaller with highly tailorable organizations for operations. In order to win the information war, the Army should reorganize its information processing and dissemination.
a. The Department of the Army needs a central operational organization to develop, support, coordinate, synchronize and help execute IO throughout the Army.
b. The commander must effectively task-organize his staff resources to plan, conduct, and execute IO. Traditional staff functions and relationships may be redefined.
c. Fire support coordination for physical destruction in support of IO will be conducted through the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD).
d. Coordination of EW actions as a component of IO will be accomplished through the electronic warfare officer.
e. Frequency deconfliction, a major consideration in IO/C2W planning, requires coordination through the commander's communications and electronics officer based upon requirements levied by intelligence, C2W, and friendly communications elements.
f. Experimentation is required to identify the type and number of staff necessary for IO at division, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC). A requirement exists to address the need for a dedicated cadre of IO officers/NCOs.
4-6. Materiel. The IO materiel alternatives include product improvement for current systems and/or provide nondevelopmental systems using off-the-shelf technology. The emphasis is on systems that are designed to horizontally and vertically internet the organizations in the battlespace. A key aspect of this IO protection function must be built into our weapons systems during the design phase of weapons development. This internet is designed to speed up the processing, dissemination, and ultimately the decision-making cycle. The ultimate objective is higher-quality, higher-confidence decisions. Emphasis must be on protecting fielded and to be developed systems. Required improvements are intelligence, counter-C2, C2-protect, and friendly information systems.
a. Intelligence. This concept is dependent on near-real-time tactical and operational intelligence. Required intelligence improvements include:
(1) All-source analysis and dissemination systems. The intelligence staffs and organizations must have seamless access to intelligence and data at all levels, from tactical to national. Local intelligence must be able to pull intelligence from higher echelons, tailor the product, and horizontally and vertically disseminate the product to multiple users. Processing and distribution centers must be linked by standardized wireless local area networks (LANs) connected through global grid wide area networks (WANs) with transparent gateways to forces involved in joint, coalition, and interagency operations. Processors must accept input from multiple sources and provide tailorable and timely products to assist in force integration/coordination, operations orders generation, target management, PSYOP campaign planning and integration, theater air defense management, airspace management, total asset distribution operations, information management analysis, and logistics analysis.
(2) Integrated RISTA must provide the commander near-real-time information about the adversary disposition and battlespace to support situation development. Future RISTA systems capabilities must include processors that fuse independent sensor data and provide unambiguous terrain and target information that can be directly acted upon by commanders. The Army requires future RISTA systems capable of meeting the challenges of the Information Age. These include:
(a) Cellular phones, satellite communications equipment, digital communications devices, and navigational systems using the Global Positioning System (GPS). Low-cost encryption devices, coupled with these commercial systems, present a significant military challenge.
(b) Tactical very high frequency (VHF) combat net radios continue to be the dominant communications system for conventional ground forces. Increased use of advanced modulation techniques, such as frequency hopping or direct sequence spread spectrum, as well as encryption devices, increases the security of these radios.
(c) High-frequency (HF) radios can be expected to grow in use for medium and long-distance communications as technology makes systems more reliable and user friendly. Advanced technologies, such as burst transmission, and adaptive communications techniques, such as automatic link establishment, make HF a more attractive option. Continued and innovative use of the HF spectrum presents a significant military challenge.
(d) UAVs/remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) carrying multiple sensor packages and radar reconnaissance platforms represent a significant threat to the friendly commander's battlespace. Future Army RISTA systems must be capable of detecting and locating such systems.
(e) Future Army RISTA systems must be capable of detecting and locating the adversary's passive and active intelligence collection and sensor systems.
(3) The future Army needs friendly weapon and information system sensors capable of reprogramming threat signature profiles and modifying security/defensive methods quickly.
(4) Space-based Army total force RISTA sensors will be connected to microprocessors and small communications terminals also embedded in the sensor system. The data generated by these sensors will be relayed to ground-processing facilities by means of a global communications grid of military and commercial systems.
(5) Digitization of the battlefield, broadcast intelligence dissemination, graphic intelligence summaries, and the integrated intelligence system-of-systems are critical tools to collect, process, disseminate, and display a common view of the friendly and adversary situation. Intelligence dissemination and processing systems must be able to eliminate or combine multiple data on the same event into a single piece of pertinent information.
(6) Commanders' intelligence staffs will need automated tools to analyze the adversary information/C2 structure, identify vulnerabilities, and predict the outcome of alternate targeting strategies.
b. Counter-C2. The objective of counter-C2 is to deny the adversary the ability to make good decisions and execute those decisions by denying, delaying, or distorting the adversary's information flow. In order to accomplish the objective, future counter-C2 systems will require the following capabilities:
(1) Friendly ground-based and aerial remote jammers (UAV/RPV, artillery delivered) are needed to provide a precision smart jamming capability to neutralize an adversary's ability to transmit and use information. In order to accomplish this, friendly commanders require jamming systems that can perform priority disruptive strikes directed against an adversary to deny him the capability to effectively use the EM spectrum. Stealth intrusive jamming or manipulation actions must be transparent to the adversary and directed against the information systems that deny and/or delay vital information between critical nodes.
(2) The Army requires investigation of directed-energy weapons (DEW) (high-power lasers, high/low power radio frequencies, and particle beams) which could provide a means to degrade or otherwise negate adversarial communications or RISTA capability.
(3) Electronic attack (EA) and other counter-C2 capabilities will be applied to negate the performance of enemy UAVs and RPVs carrying multi-sensor packages.
(4) Future total force counter-C2 systems must be capable of degrading and/or neutralizing an adversary's ground-based and aerial intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), acoustic, and/or electro-optical sensor capabilities.
(5) Future counter-C2 systems must be designed to detect, locate, and render inoperable advanced targeting systems such as improved countermortar/counterbattery systems.
(6) At the lower end of the cost spectrum, major growth can be expected in tactical employment of night-vision devices such as thermal sights, image intensifiers, and low-light-level television. Retrofitting of new sensors on existing weapon systems will provide substantial low-cost upgrades in targeting capabilities. Future C2-attack systems must be designed to negate these targeting capabilities. The objective will be to impair or destroy the optics, rendering the system useless for night operations.
c. C2-protect. C2-protect is the ability to defend the friendly information system. It requires the following capabilities:
(1) C2-protect requires advances in survivability measures such as sensing enemy counter-C2 attacks, hardening geographic dispersal, split-based operations, mobility, self-protection reactions on combat/command platforms, and redundancy in information systems to ensure the commander can obtain information throughout the battlespace.
(2) Integrated power-projection platforms are required which support peacetime training, mobilization, force projection, split-based operations, and redeployment with organic protection.
(3) Future capabilities and processes in INFOSEC need to focus on the protection of automated information and communications systems, the software that drives them, and the information they process. This will require multilevel security protection for automated information systems as well as virus detection and virus protection software. Automated information systems need to be capable of having graceful degradation (vice catastrophic failure) in mission performance in an active threat information warfare (IW) environment.
d. Friendly information systems. This concept requires the components of a seamless, real-time information architecture of military and commercial means that can provide the warfighter at all echelons the information he requires anywhere in the battlespace with a high degree of security.
(1) The following summarizes the capabilities required to effectively and efficiently exchange information for IO.
(a) Digital data exchange will increasingly complement in importance voice, as the primary information exchange mechanism on the battlefield. As such, a commander must view communications in terms of information exchange requirements versus communications alternatives.
(b) Digitization of the battlefield (common format, rapid processing, and timely transmission) will increase awareness and coordination over a wide area, enabling the commander to obtain the near-real-time information he needs in the most effective and efficient format. Digitization of the battlefield will provide the warfighter and commander with: a common view of the battlefield; situational awareness; battlefield synchronization; C2 on the move; horizontal integration; combat identification; and help prevent fratricide.
(c) Communications must embody horizontal integration. That is, communications must provide integration across battlefield areas, branch unique systems, and across service and interagency lines; it must cross functional communications at the required levels; it must cross organizational boundaries-joint, multinational, interagency, and within the Army-when and where required; it must be characterized by digitized data exchange at the appropriate rates. Critical C2 data must be processed, displayed, and routed automatically across organizations and functions. The communications net also needs the capability to monitor and support the commander's battlespace needs from home station to the soldier and media representative on the front lines. Commanders should think in terms of networks connecting many nodes rather than individual links connecting pairs of nodes.
(d) To achieve effective domination of the battlespace, commanders must have access to communications that inherently feature multilevel/compartmented security and interoperability with joint forces, civilian agencies, and combined or coalition forces.
(e) Commanders must be provided access to real-time, battlefield situation assessment, broadcast reporting. Broadcast communications will be most useful to the friendly force in transmitting weather, location, contamination, intelligence, force status, sensor, and logistics data.
(f) Communications architectures must be designed to support mission planning and operations with multiple, continuous intelligence and logistics links to the deployed force home station, major Army commands (MACOMs), logistics agencies and joint/national intelligence agencies. Deploying early entry units require home station, in-route, and in-theater communications that are secure, reliable, flexible, and deployable. These forces are highly dependent on CONUS-based intelligence derived from national or theater based sensors and must have assured and survivable communications to numerous agencies.
(g) Space-based communication links from national/installation level to tactical level are central to support force projection, sustainment, force integration, and split-based operations. Redundant or backup links, including quick-launch, orbit spares, and terrestrial systems will ensure a backup capability in case the primary space links are interdicted. A global communications grid of military and commercial systems linking power-projection bases within CONUS to mobile front line forces is essential. In the future, these assets will allow global communications while enhancing strategic deployment, sustainment, and tactical operations.
(h) HUMINT collectors will require specialized equipment for rapid, efficient, and secure dissemination of HUMINT for incorporation into IO. This equipment should incorporate low probability of intercept and detection technologies.
(2) Future power projection platforms must support split-based operations and information distribution throughout the joint force structure during mobilization and deployment in force projection. The capabilities required are as follows:
(a) CONUS power-projection platforms must be modernized by means of updates to existing base automated information and telecommunications infrastructures, so they can support split-based operations.
(b) Improved information systems consisting of both military and civilian components will link logistical asset sources to the distribution system in the theater of operation and CONUS (split-based). Emerging logistical tools such as total asset visibility, with assured communications, will perform such actions as immediately and automatically ordering required materials; identifying its location; and tracking its delivery through inventory accountability, transfer, and pre-positioned stockage. Units and personnel will be tracked through the distribution system in CONUS into and within the theater of operations. These activities are critical to the force projection army and are safeguarded through C2- protect.
(3) Information management. The power of the computer will enhance processing and display of information at all levels of command. Arranging and pre-positioning data in an organized, graphic, menu-driven format will allow the warfighter to spend less time interpreting raw data and more time using the information in situation evaluation and decision making. Rapid and efficient data processing and porting techniques must be developed to support battle command on the move. The capabilities required to support this concept are:
(a) Future information systems must consider mobility, transportability, seamless interoperability, and transparency to the user. Dissemination systems must incorporate C2-protect capabilities because of Army reliance on them.
(b) Expert system information processing and automated decision aids are needed to facilitate coordination and synchronization of IO. Source data automation techniques using automatic identification technology (AIT), data compression, symbolic representation, and similar transport and processing methods are needed to expedite the exchange of vital battle command information. New architectures must be designed to facilitate automated, machine-to-machine data exchanges for sensors embedded in major items of equipment to monitor performance and status.
(c) Integrated video and imagery capabilities, voice synthesis, voice recognition, and interactive voice command technologies that facilitate rapid display and absorption of detailed information will be used to increase the efficiency of the man-machine interface with the information systems.
(d) A common data base accessible by planners at all echelons must be available. A common suite of data elements, along with the standardized definitions, must be developed and used by all elements of the GIE, to ensure that the correct information is shared, with the same definition for each. It must have a multilevel security filter for combined and coalition warfare. It must be capable of integrating information from multiple data bases and provide secure and non-secure, but accessible, data from national through tactical levels in a joint, combined and interagency operational environment.
(e) A common suite of reports need to be developed for use across the Army, joint and multinational information systems, to ensure that a common picture is disseminated to all users. Once these reports are passed, using the common data elements, users can configure the portrayal of the information in any manner they desire.
(f) Computer and information displays must use standardized graphics to depict locations of adversary and friendly forces, contamination hazards, logistics status, orders, and commander's operational intent. Displays must be lightweight and flat for use in tactical environments.
(g) A requirement exists for the relative value of the parts of the command information system to be reprioritized as the intent of the friendly commander changes. Prioritization of the system parts for each phase of the operation will be used for successful degradation planning and the evaluation of the effect of an attack on single or multiple parts of the system versus the actions necessary to negate or eliminate the attack.
a. As the front-line sensors, the twenty-first century land warrior will employ highly lethal weapons systems, advancing sensors, and robust life support systems which require a powerful integrated command, control, communications, and computer interface to a worldwide data network.
b. Applications operating on the future warfighter's computer provide a powerful individual platform for receiving critical intelligence updates and other mission-related, time-sensitive information.
c. Successful IO reduces the likelihood, duration, and intensity of combat for soldiers. However, the collateral effects of specific friendly and enemy counter-C2 and C2-protection systems will generate requirements for individual protection equipment, specifically for DEWs.
d. New additional skill identifiers
may be required for key IO leaders and soldiers. The complexity
and cross battlefield operating systems (BOS) nature of IO suggests
that experts may need to be developed to man staff positions.
DOD DIR 3600.1, 21 December 1992 (TS)
DOD Operations Security Program
MOP-6, 3 March 1993 (S)
Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy-6, Electronic Warfare
CJCS MOP-30, 8 March 1993
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy-30, Command and Control Warfare
CJCSI 3211.01, 1 June 1993
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01, Joint Military Deception
CJCSI 6212.01, 30 July 1993
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6212.01 Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems
Joint Publication 3-13
Joint Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Operations (Draft)
Joint Publication 3-53, 30 July 1993
Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
AR 525-20, 31 July 1992
Command and Control Countermeasures (Counter-C2)
Multiservice Procedures for Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures
Staff Organizations and Operations
System Acquisition Policy and Procedures
Army Combat Developments
Materiel Objectives and Requirements
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) Electronic Warfare Susceptibility and Vulnerability
Information System Security
AR 381-11 (C)
Threat Support to U.S. Army Force, Combat and Material Development
AR 525-15 (S)
Software Reprogramming Target Sensing Weapons Systems
Battlefield Deception Policy
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Battlefield Information Services (BIS), June 1993 (DRAFT)
Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) System Management Techniques, August 1993
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Due to the wide variety of Army forces' missions across the full range of military operations, the term "adversary" is often used in this paper in lieu of enemy. The term enemy is reserved to indicate adversaries engaged in lethal operations against U.S. forces.
The certainty, electronic transmission capability when needed throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical areas of operations.
The art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers in their organizations into action to accomplish missions. Includes visualizing current state and future state, then formulating concepts of operations to get from one to the other at least cost. Also includes assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight (FM 100-5).
Five major interrelated dynamics that define significant areas of change from current operations to Force XXI operations; dynamics are battle command, battlespace, depth and simultaneous attack, early entry, and combat service support.
Components of this space are determined by the maximum capabilities of friendly and enemy forces to acquire and dominate each other by fires and maneuver and in the electromagnetic spectrum (TRADOC Pam 525-5).
center of gravity
Hypothetical point of equilibrium for an object, activity, or mental state.
common relative picture of the battlefield
The aggregate of data that is shared among all friendly forces on the disposition of friendly and enemy force. This data is used to build a tailored relevant graphic display for the warfighter that increases in detail shown as the echelon served is closer to the soldier. Commonly called situation awareness.
command and control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, computers, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (Joint Pub 1-02).
command and control system
The combination of personnel, equipment, communications, computers, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. The basic functions of a command and control system are sensing valid information about events and the environment, reporting information, assessing the situation and associated alternatives for action, deciding on an appropriate course of action, and ordering actions in correspondence with the decision (Joint Pub 1-02).
command and control warfare
The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. C2W applies across the full range of military operations and all levels of war (CJCS MOP 30).
counter-command and control (counter-C2)
Those measures taken to prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system (adapted from CJCS MOP 30).
command and control-protection (C2-protect)
those measures taken to maintain effective C2 of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system (adapted from CJCS MOP 30).
Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile services, organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism (Joint Pub 1-02).
Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. It includes the three major subdivisions of electronic attack, electronic protection, and EW support. EA is the use of either electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. EP is the protection of friendly combat capabilities against the undesired effects of friendly or enemy use of EW. ES involves actions tasked by, or under the direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition (Joint Pub 1-02).
Any collection or combination of measures to prevent or mitigate damage or disruption to an aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, installations, or necessary support. (Proposed)
global information environment (GIE)
Individuals, organizations, or systems whose activities include gathering, processing, or disseminating information.
the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation (Joint Pub 1-02).
the future time period when social, cultural, and economic patterns will reflect the decentralized, nonhierarchical flow of information; contrast this to the more centralized, hierarchical social, cultural, and economic patterns that reflect the Industrial Age's mechanization of production systems.
Visualization of future system where commanders/units can continually access/update a common data base of relevant information (for example, logistics, intelligence, movement).
Continuous military operations within the Military Information Environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations. IO includes interacting with GIE and, as required, exploiting or degrading an adversary's information and decision systems.
That degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition.
A term generally applicable to military and civilian installations, fabrications, or facilities for sensing, originating, transferring, processing, and storing data which may be used for the support and control of military forces or government (Not defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as a single term. Borrowing from the definition of system.).
information system security
A composite of means to protect telecommunications systems and automated information systems and the information they process (AR 380-19). Consists of communications security (COMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), and transmission security (TRANSEC).
Actions taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information system from exploitation, corruption, or destruction while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary's information system and in the process achieving an information advantage in the application of force.
The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02, DOD usage. NATO usage adds "concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.")
land warfare university
A comprehensive and rigorous Army education system for training and leader development; it encompasses all TRADOC education and training programs, institutions and systems; it is not only an Army-sponsored university but is also multiservice and multinational, supporting a wide variety of joint and international education programs; includes individual, unit, and institutional education and training TRADOC Pam 525- 5.
military information environment
Military environment contained within the Global Information Environment consisting of military and non- military information systems and organizations that support, enable, or influence military operations.
military information systems
The aggregate of systems that support the commander's situational awareness, assists in decision making, provides the relevant common picture, and supports military operations
FOR THE COMMANDER:
|OFFICIAL:||JOE N. BALLARD
Major General, GS
Chief of Staff
WILLIAM M. GUERRA
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Information Management
S1; H3; H1; CD
H2; J1; J3; S3; G
LAMTF Exer Coord
TRAC - Ft Leavenworth
TRAC - WSMR
TRAC - Ft Lee