Achieving
Information Superiority
by Patricia M. Barwinczak
Much like the printing press in the 17th century, computers
have become the catalyst for economic, cultural and political
change on a global scale. The global information environment (GIE)
is characterized by the exponential growth of the microchip's
computing power, the availability and affordability of high-speed
information technologies and global computer network proliferation.
The US military has been integrating advanced information technology
(IT) into its operations and now it is almost totally dependent
upon computers, computer networks and high-speed digital communications.
Despite governmentwide consensus that the information revolution
is having a profound impact on our society, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has not fully articulated this impact in a way that
provides clear guidance for military planners. Terms such as information
warfare, information operations (IO) and information superiority
have been used in DOD directives to address the operational and
strategic importance of information systems (INFO-SYS), both human
and technological. However, confusion persists over how these
concepts will advance our national security interests and, most
important for the military, what operational, technical and institutional
requirements they necessitate.
This article posits that the global availability of sophisticated
IT will lead to a condition of sufficient equivalence with
respect to US and adversary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR), command and control (C2) and force application
capabilities. It further suggests that the United States will
attempt to resist the use of lethal force by applying techniques
to affect the enemy's INFOSYS to achieve a political-military
advantage. This strategy may change the way we use, or even preclude
the use of, traditional force elements by shifting the central
focus of military strategy from force attrition to GIE competition
for superiority in the military information environment (MIE)
that enables the accomplishment of national security objectives.
Further, this article discusses how the information revolution
is likely to affect our military power relative to future adversaries,
and offers a basic construct for thinking about how IO will allow
the military to gain and sustain an information advantage vis-à-vis
future adversaries. The goal is to attain greater understanding
of IO's potential military utility and how information superiority
can change US defense operations and strategy.
The Information Revolution: National Security Implications
How will the US military protect its political and economic interests
in a world that is being transformed by the information revolution?
As other societies assimilate advanced IT into their commercial
affairs, they will also integrate these technologies into their
military forces and planning. Unconstrained availabilityand
ever-decreasing cost of highly sophisticated sensor and imaging
technologies and advanced communications and computerswill
make it possible for motivated adversaries to essentially "catch
up" with the United States' ability to "see" the
battlespace and command, control, communications and computer
(C4) ISR connectivity of command. Future effectiveness
in warfare will be increasingly dependent on the relative capabilities
of opponents to use advanced INFOSYS and efficient decision processes
to effectively integrate the following political-military functions:
- Observecollect relevant information and intelligence
(RII).
- C2use collected information to make
good situational/battlespace decisions and communicate those
decisions to their forces.
- Executeconduct missions in support of national/organizational
objectives.
- Supportmeet manpower, equipment and logistic
mission needs.
More important, potential adversaries will develop asymmetric
strategies to corrupt US INFO-SYS in an attempt to circumvent
our advantage in conventional force application.
Currently, the United States enjoys overall superiority in its
conventional warfighting information architecture and force elements
versus any potential adversary. However, given trends that can
already be identified, the future international security environment
is likely to challenge that superiority.
Decreasing US advantage in military RII. The United States
will continue to increase its dependence on extremely rapid and
interconnected INFOSYSmilitary and commercialand
to upgrade the MIE that supports its tactical capabilities. We
must assume that some future adversaries already have access to
militarily significant information technologies, such as navigation
and high-resolution imagery, and to global media and computer
networks. These mostly commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) information
assets could provide future enemies with their own clear battlespace
view. Similarly, future competitors will be able to acquire and
apply commercial IT to develop highly integrated and secure C2
networks that thoroughly connect the command structure vertically
and horizontally. Given the dual-use nature of information technologies,
their contribution to advancing the military capabilities of future
opponents cannot be limited or controlled by arms control agreements.
Many militarily critical information assets will reside in space
or be airborne, and the competitor who controls the "high
ground" will have a major strategic advantage. Threats to
US space- and air-based platforms and sensors will be significant
as countries develop antisatellite or precision surface-to-air
weapons capable of destroying or disabling information-collection
platforms. Weapon development or procurement is likely to be a
key competitive strategy for potential adversaries.
The US intelligence community has evidence that potential adversaries
are pursuing strategies that focus on attacking and exploiting
US INFOSYS. Computer network-based attacks will be a serious threat
and future adversaries are likely to use computer network approaches
to degrading US information advantages wherever and whenever possible.
Leveling the lethal playing field. The US advantage in
precision-guided weapons, long-range and mobile advanced-strike
platforms and stealth technology will significantly shrink in
the next 25 years. Since the Cold War's end, proliferation of
advanced weaponry has become a more serious threat as former Soviet
militaries attempt to fend for themselves. Competitors are likely
to focus their acquisition strategies on procuring longer-range
ballistic missiles, stealthy cruise missiles with advanced guidance
and target recognition technologies and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Ballistic missiles are likely to be deployed on mobile
ground-based platforms and sea-based systems. Sophisticated air
defenses will be acquired to deter and combat US and allied air
campaigns, but procurement of expensive high-tech fighter aircraft
and strategic bombers will be a low priority.
Photo
Cutline: The days are long gone when the spread of information
technology could be significantly slowed by the seizure of illegal
exports in actions like this joint US-German operation in 1986
(inset). The problem is compounded by the ability of potential
adversaries to acquire sophisticated weapon systems from countries
with active arms industries. Below, one of the three Russian-built
Kilo class sub-marines purchased by Iran passes through the English
Channel. (Click to see Photo)
As recent events have demonstrated, nonproliferation efforts
will not keep advanced or nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC)
weapons out of the hands of those countries that want them and
can afford them. NBC warheads could be deployed on short-, medium-
and long-range missiles. For instance, a few dozen NBC weapons
could have as much utility in a theater war as a few thousand
current warheads. These weapons could also critically degrade
C2 because high electromagnetic pulse (EMP) burst weapons
could degrade or destroy US space assets and ground-based electronic
and power systems, causing a devastating impact.
A few future competitors will be able to acquire most of the
advanced technology weaponry they need to challenge the United
States in terms of weapons' range, lethality and precision as
a peer or near-peer competitor. We can expect significant qualitative
improvements to adversaries' military capabilities as they integrate
commercial IT into their force structure. This will increase their
effectiveness against US forces and afford the adversary an increased
chance of success with fewer, but more powerful, weapons.
The combination of decreasing cost and increasing quality of
weapons available may give adversaries sufficient equivalence
with respect to their ability to apply lethal force against US
and allied interests. For example, a combination of integrated
air defense systems, lethal and precise ballistic and cruise missiles
and a small number of NBC weapons may prove extremely effective
in preventing the United States from achieving its military objectives
and potentially, due to the political consequences, from even
engaging the enemy.
Increasing focus on INFOSYS. Despite the potential
positive effects and greater understanding of foreign cultures
and politics that global access and interactive media may bring,
information globalization access will not negate the underlying
reasons for conflict. Competition for resources or politicians
intent on broadening their economic and political power bases
will still precipitate crises and conflicts. Twenty to 30 years
in the future, there will still be nation-states willing to go
to war over threats to their economic, political and sociological
structure. However, future wars may center on attacking and defending
information and INFOSYS as opposed to deploying lethal forces
into regional theaters of operation. INFOSYS themselves will have
become the most valuable military asset for modern socie-ties,
and protecting the integrity and availability of information will
become so politically and economically important that threats
to it may precipitate armed conflict. For example, an information
war could be precipitated by a dictator or non-state actor trying
to control GIE access in an attempt to dominate the world's information
sources. The theater of war could be global and may be fought
on land, sea, air and space. Numerous scenarios could be postulated,
with the competition focused on control and exploitation of information
as the slogan "information is power" becomes applicable
on a global scale.
Attacks on US INFOSYS via global networks have already occurred,
and it has been extremely difficult to find the source of these
attacks. Use of computer "hackers" and other nonlethal
techniques for affecting information and INFOSYS are being used
by military competitors because they are inexpensive and can achieve
military objectives without provoking an overwhelming retaliatory
response. Some competitors will employ highly mobile and lethal
special forces armed with compact computer support to affect ground-based
INFOSYS using specialized techniques. For those countries that
cannot afford or decline the use of sufficient equivalence
in conventional force structure with the United States, strategies
afforded by information-age approaches to warfare may offer adversaries
alternative means of "victory." In the future, the term
"peer competitor" as it is understood today may be irrelevant
to the outcome of conflict.
The trends described herein suggest three factors that converge
to affect warfare's general conduct:
- Universal IT availability that could provide competitors with
qualitatively similar ISR and C2 capabilities.
- Acquisition of long-range, precision-strike weapons, NBC weapons
and WMD providing for roughly equivalent force application capabilities.
- Development of strategies and capabilities aimed at affecting
enemy information assets.
This last factor will become increasingly prevalent as the first
two trends come to pass and sheer US firepower becomes less of
a deterrent to potential adversaries. As future competitors level
the playing field to compete with the United States with respect
to their ability to observe and react to battlespace situations
and force application capabilitiesassuming they are
successful at pulling those capabilities together into an integrated
operational concept for employing forcesthe cost
of conventional mass destruction may be too high for either side
to pay. The focus of US and adversarial targeting strategy will
shift to INFOSYS and decision processes that support the effective
use of these capabilities. In other words, the information enabling
those capabilities becomes the focus of the competition.
The benefits of this shift in strategy are likely to be recognized
sooner by those adversaries who choose not to compete with US
conventional force capabilities. These competitors will be the
first to develop offensive means to degrade our information advantage.
Whether competing against a peer or a nonpeer adversary, the use
of techniques to disrupt an adversary's INFOSYS and protect our
own will shift the central focus of military strategy from force
attrition to a competition for MIE superiority to attain national
security objectives.
IO: Achieving Information Advantages
How does the US military plan to employ IO strategies in future
conflict? The information revolution's impact on future military
capabilities will be significant. As the military strategy target
focus shifts to information resources that enable national power,
IOthose actions that affect the enemy's information
and INFOSYS (offensive IO), and protect friendly information and
INFOSYS (defensive IO)will begin to take on much
greater importance. It is imperative that DOD articulate how IO
relates to its larger goal of achieving an information advantage
in future security environments.
A composite DOD definition of information superiority
would be along the lines of "the ability to collect, process,
synthesize and share vital information to a far-greater extent
than an adversary can." This could include efforts to disrupt
or exploit enemy systems. Information superiority should be understood
as the dynamic relationship between adversary and friendly information
capabilities and the respective offensive and defensive information
operations affecting the applicable MIE that enables national
security objectives to be accomplished. According to the National
Military Strategy 1997, in the section titled "The StrategyShape,
Respond, Prepare Now," information superiority "is not
an inherent quality but, like air superiority, must be achieved
in the battlespace through offensive and defensive information
operations."
Viewing information superiority as a dynamic state of affairs
between adversaries allows it to be measured as a relative condition
in which one side has a greater ability to influence or affect
the MIE in support of its own national objectives. This condition
could be fleeting or sustained throughout a conflict, and its
geographic boundaries could be local, regional or global. Thinking
about how IO can enable us to achieve a relative MIE advantage
allows planners at all echelons to develop strategy and identify
operational, organizational and technical requirements. By assessing
our ownand a potential adversary's MIEwe can
determine the offensive and defensive IO strategies that should
be implemented to successfully influence or control any environment.
The "information superiority" concept requires us to
gain detailed intelligence on information target sets to develop
an information order of battle. We need to know the adversary's
INFOSYS and processes the same way we know the enemy's ground-,
air- and sea-based force elements. Because the intelligence challenge
is daunting, we must begin to take an organized communitywide
approach to addressing this challenge. Friendly and adversary
information target sets include, but may not be limited to, the
following categories:
- Intelligence collection, transmission and fusion.
- Civilian decision makers and military commanders and their
C2 control links and facilities.
- INFOSYS that support force execution, weapon development and
production, and force mobilization and support functions.
After gaining understanding of the friendly and adversary MIE,
IO strategists and planners must determine inherent friendly INFOSYS
vulnerabilities and assess the adversary's IO potential for attacking
those vulnerabilities. They must concurrently understand which
friendly capabilities are required to meaningfully influence,
disrupt, deny or destroy an adversary's ability to gain information
superiority.
A full appreciation of one's own MIE, as well as the enemy's,
and the offensive and defensive capabilities available for affecting
that environment is required to determine what it will take to
achieve information superiority in specific scenarios against
specific adversaries. An enemy with an effective, survivable C2
architecture and ISR system, minimal yet modern military
forces and a clever strategy for exploiting US INFOSYS could challenge
US war-fighting superiority. We need to think "out of the
box" about what IO can offer in terms of future competitive
strategies. Much work needs to be done to develop effective campaign
plans focused on how to achieve an information advantage over
future enemies.
This article posits that changes brought on by the information
revolution may shift the central focus of political-military competitions
from attrition and threat of attrition to strategies for gaining
and sustaining a relative advantage over the strategic, operational
and tactical information assets that enable the accomplishment
of national security objectives. The term information superiority
has become popular within DOD to emphasize the importance of developing
our information and INFOSYS that have enabled the United States
to have the most powerful military in the world. But information
superiority must be understood as the result of offensive and
defensive actions against the MIE of both adversaries. The United
States must plan to counter adversary actions against its own
MIE, and to execute IO against the high- and low-tech INFOSYS
that will enable future adversaries to wage war against us. MR
Patricia M. Barwinczak is a senior analyst
at Science Applications International Corporation, McLean,
Virginia. She received a B.A. from Cornell University
and an M.S. from American University. She served as Net
Assessment director, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and the Joint Staff and has held numerous positions in
national security policy analysis, focusing on the revolution
in military affairs and long-range planning issues, strategic
nuclear doctrine, arms control and counterproliferation. |
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