System Components of Information Operations
by Major Arthur N. Tulak, US
Army, and Major James E. Hutton, US Army
This article discusses Army information operations
(IO) doctrine principles and how to apply them in peace operations.
Doctrinal concepts are applied to the general category of military
operations other than war (MOOTW) in general, and peace support
operations (PSO) in specific. Please note that this article is
not doctrine, but rather an analysis of doctrine as it is being
interpreted in the field.
While IOs component parts have been
exercised in combat operations and MOOTW, Army IO doctrine is
still relatively newUS Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information
Operations, was published in August 1996. Because the Armys
purpose is to fight and win the nations wars, IO doctrine
must be focused on combat operations. However, field units performing
contingency operations have had to apply IO in MOOTW environments
with varying degrees of success. This article will capture some
MOOTW lessons learned from Haiti, Bosnia and the Middle East so
unit leaders can apply these lessons to their own contingency
The most frequent noncombat missions requiring
IO have been peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE). Currently,
there is no doctrinal source focused on implementing IO in PSO.
This article discusses available doctrinal sources for Army IO
and its component disciplines, as well as an active collection
of observations from Task Force (TF) Eagle, and Operations
Joint Endeavor (OJE), Joint Guard (OJG)
and Joint Forge (OJF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina to provide
commanders and their staffs a comprehensive document that shows
how IO may be applied in PSO. The tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs) presented here provide a starting point for mission
analysis and course of action (COA) development for units tasked
to conduct IO. If your unit has identified lessons learned concerning
IO, or IO TTPs that work, please share them by contacting the
authors at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at DSN 552-2255/3035,
Fax DSN 552-9564/9583 or commercial (913) 684-9564/9583. Their
E-mail address is email@example.com or http://call.army.mil/call.html. Be sure
to include your phone number and complete address when contacting
their simplest form, [information operations] are the activities
that gain information and knowledge and improve friendly execution
of operations while denying an adversary similar capabilities
by whatever means possible."1
Army IO doctrine is an undeveloped area, with TTPs still emerging
and evolving during field contingency operations. FM 100-6 emphasizes
repeatedly that IO take place across the operational continuum.
However, Army doctrine focuses on combat operations, and leaders
faced with the challenge of employing IO in MOOTW find themselves
having to interpret doctrine and apply a different set of tasks.2
Throughout NATO peace operations in Bosnia, US forces in TF Eagle
have had to use a "trial and error" approach to IO planning.3 This article is built on content analysis of open sources and from observations
collected during PSO on the disciplines now encompassed by IO
The IO concept is a new approach to conducting
military operations that focus on controlling and exploiting information
to support operations and achieve a desired end state. IO synchronize
several information-based components, such as operations security
(OPSEC), military deception, electronic warfare (EW), psychological
operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA),
which were previously "stove-piped" and independent
of one another. By bringing all of these information-based operations
under one doctrinal framework, the Army ensures that all IO are
synchronized and mutually reinforcing, achieving synergy and unity
The new IO doctrine
applies an organizing architecture to the many activities that
focus on using information and information systems to support
military operations, and it details respective interrelationships.
FM 100-6 further defines IO as "continuous military operations
within the MIE [military information environment] that enable,
enhance and protect the friendly forces ability to collect,
process and act on information to achieve an advantage across
the full range of military operations. IO include interacting
with the global information environment [GIE] and exploiting or
denying an adversarys information and decision capabilities."4 The MIE is the military portion of the GIE which
consists of "information systems [INFOSYS] and organizationsfriendly
and adversary, military and nonmilitarythat support, enable
or significantly influence a specific military operation."5
IO comprises three interrelated components: operations; relevant
information and intelligence (RII); and INFOSYS. The Army uses
three operations to conduct IO: command and control warfare (C2W), CA and PA. Grouping C2W, CA and PA together as specific IO provides a framework to promote
synergy and facilitates planning and execution. All military activities
conducted as part of these operations are classified within the
two disciplines of C2-attack and C2-protect. C2-attack is offensive
C2W which is intended to gain control of the adversarys C2 information flow and situational understanding.
allows friendly forces to either destroy, degrade, neutralize,
influence or exploit an adversarys C2 functions. Successful C2-protect operations ensure effective friendly-force C2 "by negating or turning to a friendly advantage the adversarys
efforts to influence, degrade or destroy friendly C2 systems."6
Historically the Army planned
and executed the various C2W elements independently of one another.7 Successful C2W
operations support the Army objective of achieving information
superiority in any operational environment. Current IO doctrine
combines C2Ws five elements into one integrated approach that includes OPSEC,
military deception, EW, PSYOP and physical destruction.
PA. PA provide information about ongoing
operations to soldiers and the American public. PA enable commanders
to effectively work with the media and pull information that is
of value to them and their forces. PA facilitate media on the
battlefield to share the units operation with the public
and help keep soldiers informed through the command information
program, which explains the operations purpose and informs
soldiers and leaders of their expected roles.
PSO PA is a means to counter adversary propaganda and to overcome censorship.
In peace operations, where one or more of the former warring factions
(FWF) may oppose PSO force objectives, adversaries will exercise
censorship and propaganda programs aimed at the local populace,
using the media and other neutral players, such as nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs),
as the medium to transmit disinformation.8
In MOOTW, adversaries can also be expected to use an old Soviet
technique to "plant" disinformation in the local or
international media and then pick up the story to support its
propaganda efforts after it has been reported, repeating it in
the media it controls as a credible message obtained from a third
party source.9 By closely monitoring the various media, PA remains ready to defeat
enemy propaganda by whatever medium it is disseminated through.
The target of such disinformation or propaganda may be directed
at weakening coalition force unity of effort, similar to the Iraqis
divisive PSYOP campaign during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.
Accordingly, PA missions during PSO should:
Provide the commander with
assessments on media relations and media effects on operations.
Control media access to certain
parts of military operations.Prepare information/news releases.
Communicate directly with
the local media through press conferences to provide the PSOs
official position on operations.
Counter adversary propaganda
Communicate command information
to the deployed force in-theater, to families at home station
and to the American people.
Provide focused PA coverage
Coordinate with CA and PSYOP
cells to ensure consistency of public and command information,
civil-military information and PSYOP messages without any
compromise to PA credibility.
Make visual products and information
available to the media to tell the Army story.10
Schedule and coordinate media
events for the commander and other subject-matter experts.
CA. CA operations secure
local acceptance of US forces by establishing the relationship
between the military force, local civilian authorities and interested
international organizations, NGOs and PVOs.11 Successful CA operations support IO through their daily interface with
key organizations and individuals operating in the MIE.
CA performs an important liaison function between
the military force, local civil authorities, international organizations,
NGOs and PVOs established in the area of operations (AO). CA also
provides the commander a means of shaping his battlespace by synchronizing
their actions with those of the military force. CA accomplishes
three key tasks in peace operations:
Provides liaison between the
military force, local civil authorities and engaged international
organizations, NGOs and PVOs in the AO.
Builds and maintains local
and regional public support for the military force and its
Provides information to the
military force by interacting with international, regional
and local civilian organizations and civil government.
Once the military force has created and sustained
the necessary preconditions for effective civil governance, CA
supports the successful transition from military operations to
a self-sustaining peace maintained by those civil organizations
and agencies who will remain active long after PSO forces depart.
Additionally, CA builds
public support for the military force and its objectives, which
affects the legitimacy of supporting political institutions and
the political underpinnings of the peace operation itself.12 By building public support for the military force, CA reduces the threat
from acts of civil disobedience and civil disturbance and enhances
force protection. Civil-military operators publicize CA activities
to leverage their effects beyond the immediate audience. By exploiting
existing local media through press conferences, talk shows and
local newspapers, and by leveraging their participation in civilian
governmental leader forums, CA fosters support foror at
least a tolerance ofthe PSO force and its mandate.13
In OJE, OJG and OJF, CA units were tasked
to publicize their activities in the local and international press,
as well as to provide information to the local population.
By providing information to the
civilian leadership and population, CA personnel must reinforce
established information campaign themes to ensure consistency
and unity of effort throughout all axes of the information campaign.
More important, CA activities influence and control indigenous
infrastructure and interface with key organizations and individuals.14
CA, PSYOP and PA elements are able to use the same communication
media with essentially the same messages but to different audiences.
CA and PSYOP address local populations, while PA personnel address
friendly forces and national and international news media. PA,
PSYOP and CA all communicate information to critical audiences
to influence their understanding and perception of the operation.
Information campaign planning and execution across the three disciplines
"must be synchronized, and the messages they communicate
must be truthful and mutually supportive to ensure that credibility
is not undermined."15 A coordinated MOOTW IO plan incorporating both
PA and CA is critical for building legitimacy for host nation,
coalition, US and world support.
From an operations standpoint,
CA provides another collection means for the commanders
critical information requirements (CCIR) through liaison and interaction
with local civil authorities and international organizations,
NGOs and PVOs in the AO. In PSO, the CCIR are often obtained through
other than conventional information-gathering entities. CA information-gathering
activities in peace operations must encompass the complete spectrum
of cultural, social, political and economic issues within the
AO to provide the most accurate and up to date human intelligence
(HUMINT).16 However, in conducting information-gathering
activities, CA personnel must avoid appearing to be intelligence
agents, or risk degradation of their primary mission. During OJE,
OJG and OJF, CA personnel enjoyed greater freedom
of movement because they were exempted from the "four-vehicle
convoy rule" and could travel in two-vehicle convoys. This
facilitated their ability to both gather and disseminate information.
RII. RII is defined as
"Information drawn from the [MIE] that significantly impacts,
contributes to, or is related to the execution of the operational
mission at hand....[RII] serves as the currency of IO."17 Intelligence is "the critical sub-element of relevant information
that focuses primarily upon foreign environments and the adversary.
In support of friendly operations, intelligence helps produce
a common, current and relevant picture of the battlespace that
reduces uncertainty and shortens the commanders decision-making
understanding, built from RII shared throughout the force, is
referred to as the relevant common picture (RCP). "Relevant
information drawn from the MIE supports the creation of situational
[understanding] that contributes directly to effective C2 during all stages of the decision and execution cycle."19 The CCIR and priority intelligence requirements
drive information-collection processes and assets.
include personnel, machines, manual or automated procedures and
systems that allow collection, processing, dissemination and display
INFOSYS cover all links in the chain of actions and procedures
that turn information into knowledge which will support the commanders
decision-making process, maintain an accurate view of his battlespace,
coordinate operations and shape the MIE. INFOSYS disseminate a
highly accurate battlespace RCP, giving leaders greater situational
understanding. INFOSYS provide the means to share the RCP throughout
the friendly force. "Relevant information drawn from the
MIE supports the creation of situational [understanding] that
contributes directly to effective C2
during all stages of the decision and execution cycle."21
Role of IO in PSO
In PSO, the enemy
is not one of the warring factions, but the conflict itself.
Diplomatic considerations predominate over purely military requirements
and impose constraints on the force.22
PSOs most common characteristic has been the necessity to
observe the principles of legitimacy and restraint.
Although US forces conducting PE operations may have to apply
lethal combat power during the initial stagesor as the result
of acts which violate the terms of the imposed peacethe
principles of restraint and legitimacy limit the efficacy of lethal
combat power. Restraint requires that forces "apply
appropriate military capability prudently" with due regard
for collateral damage.23 In peace operations, lethal force is the instrument
of last resort. "When force must be used, its purpose is
to protect life or compel, not to destroy . . . the conflict,
not the belligerent parties, is the enemy . . . the use of force
should be a last resort and, whenever possible, should be used
when other means of persuasion are exhausted."24
Restraint is usually codified in rules of engagement (ROE) that
restrict the use of conventional military force.
The focus of PE operations is
to compel or persuade the FWF leaders to abide by the terms of
the cease-fire, peace agreement, international sanctions or resolutions.
IO may be among the most critical and acceptable means of achieving
stated objectives within the ROE constraints.25
Army peace operations doctrine recognizes that the "non-violent
application of military capabilities, such as civil-military information
and [PSYOP] may be more important" to achieving the desired
end state.26 Restraining
the use of lethal combat power and conducting effective IO can
enhance both domestic and international legitimacy perceptions
of the peace operation.27
Legitimacy must be the
hallmark of all peace operations. Legitimacy is a condition initially
derived by the peace settlement and the international legal mandate
authorizing the PE force to "keep peace." Sustaining
this legitimacy means sustaining the perception of the legality,
morality and correctness of all PSO force actions in the eyes
of domestic and world public opinion and of the populace and FWF
civil-military leadership. Legitimacy requires impartiality in
dealing with the FWF and other actors with interests in the conflict.
In PSO, the peace operation forces impartiality is critical
to the operations success and legitimacy. The PSO force
must demonstrate impartiality in all its dealings with the FWF,
showing no favor to either side. Key to sustaining perceptions
of impartiality among the FWF is the concept of transparency
of operations, which allows the FWF to monitor the PSO forces
actions as a confidence- and security-building meas-ure.28
In PE operations, transparency of operations must be balanced
against the friendly forces security and force-protection
Photo Cutline: US and Croatian
soldiers work out a solution to locating and marking minefields.
(Click to see Photo)
Peace operations are carried
out under the glare of public scrutiny via the media operating
in the GIE. Employing "transparency of operations" serves
to amplify this condition. The GIE consists of all organizations
and systems outside of the militarys control that process
and disseminate information to national and international audiences.
The news media comprise only a portion of the GIE, but one that
can produce strategic-level implications from tactical-level events.
Referred to as "the CNN effect," the dramatic visual
presentation of tactical events "can rapidly influence publicand
therefore politicalopinion so that the political underpinnings
of war and [OOTW] may suddenly change with no prior indication
to the commander in the field."29
The strategic effects resulting
from the broadcasting of tactical events via the GIE were clearly
seen in adversary use of television images in the battle of Mogadishu
in Somalia during United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM)
II, and the thwarted landing of the USS Harlan County in
support of United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In the former
case, the televised image of Somalis dragging a dead US soldier
through the Mogadishu streets resulted in a strategic change of
national policy and US forces withdrew precipitously.30
In the latter case, the televised image of an orchestrated mob
on the docks in Port-au-Prince prevented the insertion of US and
Canadian forces by ship, leading to their complete withdrawal
from the theater of operations.
In PSO, FWF elements and other
adversaries opposed to the peace settlement will conduct IO targeted
at US forces and US public and world opinion. Avoiding risk, adversaries
will posture for the press, attempting to cause reactions through
the resulting media reports, aimed at affecting strategic- and
operational-level PSO force decision making and the international
community that supports it.31 Adversaries will embellish reporting of actual events or stage incidents
for the media to broadcast to the other parties to the dispute,
their allies and nations contributing to the PSO force to achieve
strategic effects.32 Public perception can put political pressure on nations to modify their
participation in the PSO effort. Thus, adversary IO can strike
at the strategic level and attempt to fracture the multinational
Other "actors" are
present on the PSO "battlefield" and may intrude into
the MIE, causing serious PSO disruption. FWF elements operating
in the MIE may consist of more than just their armed forces and
may include local police forces, local and regional political
and religious groups, terrorists and criminal syndicates.34
Additionally, other international organizations operating outside
the MIE, such as the UN, NGOs and PVOs, may conduct independent
IO which can affect the PSO force. Effective liaison with nonmilitary
supporting organizations can prevent contradictory or nonreinforcing
information efforts and present a unified IO effort.
The adversary IO examples previously
discussedMogadishu, Somalia, and Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
demonstrate that technological and military prowess are not requirements
for effective IO, especially in MOOTW. Potential adversary IO
in MOOTW will seek to integrate all elements of its power and
capabilities to target friendly forces. The likely adversaries
US forces may face in MOOTW will not be concerned about information
superiority. Rather, they will seek only temporary advantages
at critical points and times. The likely adversary in MOOTW will
see Western concepts of laws of conflict as an unnecessary handicap
and will have few qualms or cultural aversions about using deception,
trickery, civilian-run enterprise or the media when implementing
an IO campaign.35 In MOOTW, friendly forces should expect that
adversary IO efforts will include all possible venues and media
they can manipulate, to include PSYOP and psychological warfare
(PSYWAR) directed at friendly forces and propaganda for domestic
consumption; statecraft and public diplomacy used to generate
media events that serve IO objectives; censorship of domestic
and international media; and misuse of all media to transmit propaganda
and PSYOP to all audiences.36 Thuggery, coercion, brutal force and extortion may be employed to ensure
the local populaces cooperation and passivity with the agenda
of the adversary leadership. Potential MOOTW adversaries include:
Paramilitary or police forces
overtly or covertly opposed to the presence or objectives
of US or friendly military forces.
Organized military forces
who are overtly or covertly opposed to the presence or objectives
of US or friendly military forces.
Political, religious or social
factions/groups, inside or outside the theater of operations.
If any of these groups are overtly or covertly opposed to
the presence or objectives of US or friendly military forces
on a specific military mission, they may be motivated to actively
try to deny, degrade, influence or exploit the friendly C2
target set to oppose US/friendly objectives.
The Dayton Peace
Accord (DPA) approved by the political leadership of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia and
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) brought about a cessation
of hostilities in the Bosnian civil war; directed the FWF to withdraw
behind a 2-kilometer zone of separation (ZOS); and authorized
international PE operations in the republics of the former Yugoslavia.37 In December 1995, acting under the UN Charters
Chapter VII, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized member
states to establish a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR)
to carry out the DPA military provisions.38 NATO was designated as the multinational peace
forces controlling authority, which included military forces
from both NATO and non-NATO nations.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the multinational
coalition that comprised IFOR and the stabilization force (SFOR),
respectively, initially conducted PE operations to separate the
FWF and impose the DPAs military provisions. Although
IFOR successfully established the ZOS, and the DPAs
military provisions have largely been achieved, the PE component
and SFOR remained prepared to apply lethal combat power to compel
compliance. Even with the transition to SFOR, the primary purpose
of all Bosnian operations remained the continued implementation
of DPA military provisions involving the Entity Armed Forces
(EAF) and maintenance of peace necessary for the diplomatic and
economic instruments of power to operate.39 However, with the military provisions largely achieved, the emphasis
on SFORs military operations shifted to facilitating the
accomplishment of DPAs civil provisions.
When OJG began in December 1995, the US Armys IO doctrine
was not yet codified in a single document. However, the IO components
were pres-ent, and IFOR conducted IO daily. During the initial
operations in OJE, the IO components of C2W,
PA and CA were all applied to attain information superiority.
PA was used to compel compliance with the DPA when the
TF commander threatened to release information documenting noncompliance,
obtained from ground and aviation ZOS reconnaissance, CA and PSYOP
teams and the Joint Military Commission, to the international
The first US forces IO
campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina began to follow the new IO doctrine
in October 1996. Then Major General Montgomery C. Meigs, the 1st
Infantry Division (Mechanized) [1st ID(M)] incoming commander
and Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) commander, coordinated
with the US Armys Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA)
at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to assist in IO campaign development
for the MND-N AO.41
Another unique MND-N information campaign feature was that it
supported a multinational division.
To orchestrate the 1st ID(M)
IO, LIWA provided officers, civilians and noncommissioned officers
to form the Division IO Cell. Doctrinally, the Army forces and
land component commander (LCC) are supported by a LIWA Forward
Support Team (FST) to form the IO Cell. "When deployed, the
LIWA FSTs become an integral part of the commands IO staff.
To facilitate planning and execution of IO, LIWA provides IO/C2W operational support to [the LCC] and separate
Army commands and Active and Reserve components. . . . LIWA acts
as the operational focal point for land IO/C2W
by providing operational staff support to . . . land component
commands."42 The MND-N (TF Eagle) was a joint and combined force subordinate
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a struggle of ideas competing for legitimacy
and/or supremacy. On this "battlefield," information
is the weapon that is wielded through many forms to include propaganda,
PSYOP, PA and CA.43 Although IFOR and SFOR did not face off against
an "adversary" in OJE, OJG or OJF,
the FWF leadership and populace were occasionally uncooperative
and at times bellicose toward both IFOR and SFOR. During OJG
and OJF, IO served as the primary means by which SFOR achieved
effects in changing attitudes and reducing the barriers to implementing
the DPAs civil aspects. The SFOR Information Campaign
Plan was built on these seven pillars:
Displaced persons, refugees
and evacuees (DPRE).
Election results acceptance.
The role of police in a democracy.
Common institutions supported
by the DPA.44
IO support battle command in
PSO by helping the commander impose control over the battlespace
and shape it to achieve "situational dominance."45 Through the nonlethal capabilities of IO, SFOR
attacked the FWF leaders legitimacy when they attempted
to block the DPA implementation. SFOR IO targeted the adversary
leaderships decision-making process and C2,
giving SFOR "the potential to control the adversarys
decision-process tempo and even cause it to collapse."46 Through a coordinated information campaign,
SFOR could and did target the popular support base of adversary
leadership and persuade the general populace to support the peace
agreement and SFOR objectives.47
TF Eagle often found IO proved to be the most effective nonlethal
element the division could employ. During OJE and OJG
in Bosnia, NATO and coalition forces employed IO to know where
the FWF were and what they were doing at any given time.48
The situational dominance IFOR and SFOR exercised over the FWF
was achieved by establishing and maintaining information superiority
over the FWF civilian and military leaders and other potential
adversaries. The division employed its reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, targeting and acquisition (RISTA) assetssupplemented
by nontraditional intelligence collectors and HUMINTto maintain
an information advantage over the FWF.49 MR
1. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information
Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO],
27 August 1996), iv.
2. The term military operations other than war, which
is used throughout this article has been supplanted in some circles
by Support and Stability Operations (SASO). For MOOTWs definition,
see Joint Publication 1-02 and the Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, downloaded from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.
Additionally, FM 100-6 devotes only three pages to a discussion
of the unique considerations for OOTW, a rather broad category
of military operations, of which peace operations are merely a
3. LTC Stephen W. Shanahan and LTC Garry J. Beavers, "Information
Operations in Bosnia," Military Review (November-December
4. FM 100-6, 2-3.
5. Ibid., 1-4.
6. Ibid., 2-5.
7. Ibid., 3-0.
8. COL Ronald T. Sconyers, US Air Force, "The Information
War," Military Review (February 1989), 48.
9. FM 33-1, Psychological Operations (Washington,
DC: GPO, 18 February 1993), 2-2.
10. For an overview of PA missions, see FM 100-6, Figure
3-5 and "Coordination and Support Tasks" on page 3-15.
11. International organizations exerting global or extraregional
influence, include the International Committee of the Red Cross
and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Nongovernment organizations are transnational organizations of
private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council of the UN. Private volunteer organizations
are typically nonprofit organizations involved in humanitarian
efforts. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Force Capabilities, Joint Publication 3-33, GPO,
12. Pamela Brady, "Joint EndeavorThe Role of Civil
Affairs," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1997), 47.
13. Bruce Castka, "The National Support Element in Hungary,"
Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1997), 48-49. See also, COL
Michael D. Starry and LTC Charles W. Anderson Jr., "FM 100-6:
Information Operations," Military Review (November-December
14. COL Brian E. Fredericks, "Information Warfare at
the Crossroads," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1997),
15. FM 100-6, 3-12 and 3-14.
16. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington,
DC: GPO, 11 January 1993), 6-2 and 6-3.
17. FM 100-6, 4-0.
18. Ibid., 4-3.
19. Ibid., 4-1.
20. Ibid., 5-0.
21. Ibid., 4-1.
22. FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations
(Washington, DC: GPO, 31 May 1995), 8-14.
23. FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: GPO,
30 December 1994), 17.
24. Ibid., v and 17.
25. FM 100-6, 6-17.
26. FM 100-23, v.
27. Ibid., 18.
28. Ibid., 16.
29. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14
June 1993), 1-3.
30. Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars," Parameters
(Autumn 1994), 38.
31. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet
525-69, Concept for Information Operations (Fort Monroe,
VA: GPO, 1 August 1995), 5.
32. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations (Washington,
DC: GPO, 29 April 1994), VII-8.
33. FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations
(Washington, DC: GPO, 24 November 1997), 2-18.
34. FM 100-6, 1-3. See FM 100-23, v and 83-85 for a partial
list of IOs, NGOs and PVOs relevant to peace operations.
35. MAJ Erin Gallogly-Staver and MAJ Raymond S. Hilliard,
"Information Warfare: Opposing Force [OPFOR] DoctrineAn
Integrated Approach," News From the Front! Center
for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS (September-October
36. Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) is the planned use of
propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary
purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior
of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement
of national objectives. See also Joint Publication 1-02, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Related Terms, as amended 15 April
1998, 349 and 350.
37. The official name of the Dayton Peace Accord is
the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace, or GFAP.
38. FM 100-23, 15, states that resolutions approved by a
competent authorizing entity such as the UN Security Council expresses
the political objective and international support and defines
the desired end state for peace operations.
39. The Entity Armed Forces (EAF) are composed of the military
forces and specialist police units of the two "entities"
of Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Bosnian-Croat Federation and Bosnian
Serb Republic (Republika Serpska). The Bosnian-Croat Federation
includes the Croatian Home Defense Council forces and Bosnian
army. The term "former warring faction" (FWF) refers
to the three entities of Bosnians (Muslims), Serbs and Croats.
40. CALL, Initial Impressions ReportOperation Joint
EndeavorTask Force Eagle Initial Operations (May
41. LTC Stephen W. Shanahan and LTC Garry J. Beavers, "Information
Operations in Bosnia," Military Review (November-December
42. FM 100-6, B-3.
43. COL Ronald T. Sconyers identified the "war of information"
as comprising "the true battle area" in MOOTW in "The
Information War," Military Review (February 1989),
44. CALL, Initial Impressions Report, April 1998,
45. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
(Washington, DC: GPO, 27 September 1994), 7-3.
46. MG David L. Grange and COL James A. Kelley, "Information
Operations for the Ground Commander," Military Review
(March-April 1997), 9.
47. LTC Dennis M. Murphy, "Information Operations on
the Nontraditional Battlefield," Military Review (November-December
48. MG David L. Grange and LTC James A. Kelley, "Victory
Through Information Dominance," ARMY (March 1997),
49. The term RISTA is used here deliberately, as opposed
to the new term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), because the new term does not emphasize the target acquisition
systems that support RII development.
Major Arthur N. Tulak is chief,
Actual Operations Branch, Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A.
from the University of Southern California and an M.S.
from Southwest Missouri State University and is a graduate
of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He
has served in a variety of command and staff positions
in the Continental United States (CONUS), with the 8th
Infantry Division in Germany and the 7th Infantry Division,
Fort Ord, California. His experience in information
operations (IO) includes CALL deployments to Operations
Joint Guard and Joint Forge in Bosnia,
where he documented the application of IO in peace enforcement
Major James E. Hutton is a CALL military analyst at
Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from Oklahoma State
University and an M.A. from Webster University. He has
served in a variety of command and staff positions in
CONUS and Germany, including chief of plans and operations,
G3, National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California;
deputy public affairs officer, NTC; assistant S4, 41st
Field Artillery (FA) Brigade, V Corps, Babenhausen,
Germany; S1, battalion maintenance officer and battalion
operations officer, 4th Battalion, 27th FA Regiment,
Babenhausen; and commander, HHS Battery, 4th Battalion,
27th FA Regiment, Babenhausen.