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  • Review the Basics of Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfare
  • Provide Examples of the Growing Body of Evidence
  • Discuss IS and NCW-related Experimentation


  • Purpose
  • Information Superiority
  • Network Centric Warfare
  • Thoughts on Experimentation

Information is Different

  • Develop Once - Use Many Times - and Simultaneously
  • Value is Not Created Until the End of the Last Mile

  • Value Enhancers

    Assured Availability
    Security and Confidence
    Context and Confusion
    The Wheat
    Accuracy and Completeness
    Value Detractors

    Lack of Interoperability and Disconnects
    Disruptions and Lack of Reliability
    Stovepiped Information
    The Chaff and Overload
    Poor Quality

  • A Vulnerability Created by One is a Vulnerability Imposed upon All
  • A Deficiency Created by One is a Deficiency for All
DoD-Wide Solution is Necessary to Create and Protect Value

Information Superiority: What is it?

Information from Sources
to People at Time and
Place in Format.DPG


Information on
Anywhere in
Real Time with
Zero Error
The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. DPG and Joint Pub 9-13

Different Perspectives, the Same Bottom Line: More for Us; Less for Them

Seamless Joint and Combined Interoperability

Two Sides of Information Superiority

Information Superiority

A Relative State
achieved when a
Competative Advantage
is Derived from the
Ability to Exploit an
Imformaiton Advantage

      The ability to develop and use information
                                                while denying an adversary the same capability

Elements of Information Superiority

Awareness & Knowledge



  • Battlespace Awareness results from the fusion of key elements of information which characterize the battlespace
    • Explicit Information (e.g. position of forces, geography, and weather)
    • Requires Little Interpretation
    • Can be communicated quickly and easily
  • Battlespace Knowledge yields predictive ability based upon interpretations based upon experience and a priori knowledge
    • Tacit Information (e,g,. capability and tactics of an adversary, local customs, intent)
    • Supporting facts can be easily transferred, the underlying organizing logic can seldom be transferred quickly and easily.

Requires a Knowledge-Based Workforce


  • Sharing Lies at the Core of IS & NCW
  • Entry Fee is the "Network" (the GIG)
  • Sharing Has an Organizational, a Behavioral, and a Technical Component
    • Interoperability v. Cooperability
    • Technical Component Enables
    • Organizational and Behavioral Components Generate Value

A Basic Paradigm Shift in Dealing With Information


  • Collaboration in the Information Domain Creates an Information Advantage
  • Collaboration in the Operational Domain Creates Value by Exploiting an Information Advantage to Create a Competitive Advantage
  • Collaboration Takes Places "on the Net"or is Reflected "in the Net"
  • The Ability to Share Creates New Forms of Collaboration
    • e.g., Self-Synchronization

Protect, Deny, and Exploit

• IO is Dynamic and N-Sided
- Blue, Red, Others (e.g. CNN)

The Objective is to Improve Blue's Relative Information Position


  • Purpose
  • Information Superiority
  • Network Centric Warfare
  • Thoughts on Experimentation

Network Centric Warfare

A Warfighting Concept
that Enables a Network Centric Force
to Significantly Increase Combat Power by Achieving

Attributes of Platform-Centric Operations

Attributes of Network-Centric Operations


Network Centric Warfare Translates Information Superiority into Combat Power

Information Advantage


Attributes of Platform-Centric Operations

Attributes of Network-Centric Operations

Networking the Force

  • A network-centric force is an interoperable force
  • A network-centric force provides Commanders with the capability to dynamically network (connect, share, and collaborate)
    • Sensors (regardless of platform)
    • Decision-makers (regardless of location)
    • Shooters (regardless of service)

Networking the Force

Sensor / Awareness Shooter / Transaction

Sensor Networks:
Joint Composite
Tracking Network
< 100 Users

Joint Data
(Link 16/11)
< 500 Users

Joint Planning
~1000 Users

Sensor Fusion



CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability
GCCS: Global Command and Control System
Variable Quality of Service

Networking the Force

  • A network-centric force has the capability to generate shared battlespace awareness

The generation of shared battlespace awareness requires
the robust networking of the blue force.

Increased Awareness

A network-centric force increases battlespace awareness
by overcoming the limitations of standalone sensors
through employment of sensor networks

  • Sensor Networks enable Commanders to
    - Rapidly generate Battlespace Awareness
    - Syncronized with operations
  • Components of Sensor Networks
    - Space, Air, Sea, Ground and Cyberspace
       Based Sensors
  • Operational Capabilities
    - Improved Data Fusion
    - Dynamic Sensor Tasking
    - Universal Sensor Recruitment

Increased Battlespace Awareness

Current Capabilities to Generate Engagement Quality Awareness
Against Adversary Forces Across Various Battlespaces

Threat Trends

Signiture and "Volatility" Trends Stress
Both Sensing and Engagement Time Lines



Stationary Transient
Operational "Volatility"

Increased Awareness

Payoff of Sensor Fusion


Cooperative Engagement

Sensor Network

E-C2 Hawkeyes

Sensor Data Fusion Decreases
Time Required to Generate
Engagement Quality Awareness

  • Generates engagement quality Battlespace Awareness with reduced timelines
  • Fuses multi-sensor data
  • Quantum improvement in track accuracy, continuity, and target identification
  • Extends detection ranges


Benefits of Real-Time Fusion

Competitive Advantage


Attributes of Platform-Centric Operations

Attributes of Network-Centric Operations

Competitive Advantage

Task Force XXI AWE


      - Where Am I?
      - Where Are My Buddies
      - Where Is te Enemy?

Increased Combat Effectiveness

    Before/After OPTEMPO  Lethality  Survivability
• Plan Development (Div)   72 vs 12 hrs.    
• Call for Fire   3 vs 0.5 min.    
• Deliberate Attack (Co)   40 vs 20 min.
• Hasty Attack (Co)*   39 x 112 Red Loss  
• Defense in Sector*   Loss vs Win  
• Movement to Contract*   91 vs 128 Red Loss  
Source: Army Digitization Overview -
BG William L. Bond, 20 may 98

     The Bottom Line is:

The EXFOR Division killed
over twice the enemy in half the time,
over three times the Battlespace,
with 25% fewer Combat Platforms
using Information Age Technology.

Task Force XXI AWE Integrated Report:
Post-NTC Modeling of Opportunities
Source: Military CIS '98 -
BG William L. Bond, 20 April 1998

Counter SOF

  Navy Component Commander's
Number One Problem
Network-Centric Warfighting Concept:

• Land-Sea engaggement network
  - Shared awareness
  - Increased engagements
• Efficient resource allocation
  - Weapon-target pairing
  - Self-syncronization
• Multi-service solution
  - Coordination at "the seams"

Source: NWDC Briefing to DRB for RMA
              Oversight - 14 Jan 99
              FBE Delta Quick Look Report

FBE Results and Implications

    Before/After  Self
 OTEMPO  Lethality
• Avg Decision Cycle   43 vs 23 min.  
• Mission Timeline   50% Decrease  
• Shooter Effectiveness   50% Increase  
• Assets Scrambled   15% Decrease  
• Leakers   10x Decrease  

     The Bottom Line is:

FBE Delta demonstrated the potential
for a networked force provided with shared
to self-synchronize and to accomplish the
CSOF mission in half the time and to reduce SOF
leakers by an order of magnitude.

Source: Fleet Battle Experiment Delta Quick Look Report
An Assessment of IT-21 Warfighting Value-Added

EFX '98 Sharing and Collaboration

Deployed Footprint 1500-2000 vs. 100-300
Deployment Timeline 10-15 Days vs. 1-2 Days
Air Lift Required 25 C-17 Loads vs. 2-3 C-17 Loads
Virtual Collaboration:
Moving Information - Not People

Source: EFX '98 Final Report

Network Centric Attack Ops

F15-C Air Ops: Active Missle Counter Tactics
Without JTIDS / With JTIDS

  • Information Advantage
  • OODA Loop
  • Kill Ratio

  Voice Only vs. Shared Tactical Picture
  Baseline Compressed with Self-Synchonization
  3.30:3 vs. 8.11:1

    The Bottom Line is:

JTIDS Operational Special Project
demonstrated networked air crews
fighting with shared awareness
could increase combat power by
over 100%

Source: JTIDS Operational Special Project - Report to Congress

Network Centric Operations

Summary of Emerging Evidence

Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment
         Faster, precision maneuver for lethal, evasive engagement of enemy
         ground force based on shared battlesspace awareness & tactical

Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Delta
         Internetting of AEGIS and Firefinder radars for counter-battery fires.
         Aggressive prosecution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) threat based
         on shared awareness and rapid, self-synchronized engagement

Expeditionary Force Experiment (EFX)'98
         Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) Enroute Bombers
         linked into tactical info grid for beyond-line-of-sight retargeting Reduced
         Joint Air Operations Center (JOAC) forward footprint

JTIDS Operational Special Project
         Attack Operations with Tactical Data Links

Operation Allied Force


  • Purpose
  • Information Superiority
  • Network Centric Warfare
  • Thoughts on Experimentation

From Concept to Capability

Organizing Logic for Experimentation

  • IS and NCW Concepts Provide an Organizing Logic for Concept-Based Experimentation Based upon
    - Elements of Information Superiority
    - Attributes of a Network-Centric Force

  • - Hypotheses
    - Metrics (dependent variables)
    - Key Independent Variables ("treatments" and "conditions")

Evidence of Conversion

  • The AOACMT Hypothesis
    - "IF we can establish a multi-spectral, cross-cued sensor network -- linked by
        a responsive decision mechanism to precision engagement means -- THEN
        we will be able to ..."
  • and the Decomposed Version
  • Represent Evidence of Intellectual Convergence with respect to Core IS and NCW Concepts and Metrics
  • But We Need to Complete the Convergence
    - Separate Means from Ends (e.g. Sensor Networks from Awareness)
    - Develop Common Understanding of Key Cross-cutting Concepts and
       Metrics (e.g. Shared Awareness)

Experimental Space

Experimental Space

Power of IS / NCW Core Concepts

  • They Get at the Fundamentals
  • Facilitate Sharing of Experimental Results Across
    Missions and Contexts
  • Enable Creation of a Useful Body of Knowledge
  • Bottom Line: More Bang for the Experimental Buck

Experimental Space

Impact of NCW

  There is a growing body of evidence that

- Shape security environment
- Deter aggression or abort conflict
- Neutralize or degrade an adversary's capabilities
- Across the spectrum of conflict

- Preemptively foreclose adversary COA
- Shock and Awe (Paralyze, Shatter, Disintegrate)
- Increased Speed and Lethality
- Reduced Risk and Increased Survivability

NCW Characteristics and Capabilities
- Increased Battlespace Awareness and Knowledge
- Adaptive C2 Approaches and Organizational
- Self-synchronizing Forces

NCW Enables
an Isoquantal Shift

Adapted from: "An Evolutionary Cornerstone for
JV2010" 3/9/99. Prepared for the J6 by Roy Evans.

Illustrative Metrics

Experimentation Lessons "Recorded"

  • There is a Learning Curve
    - What Future Technology Can Do
    - How to Co-Evolve MCPs

  • The Value of the "Pre" and the "Post"
    - Importance of Focus
    - Value of Analysis

  • Projecting Futre Technology is Necessary to Stay Ahead of the Power Curve
    - Information Superiority Advanced Technology Plan


  • IS & NCW translates into Combat Power
  • It is All About Creating and Leveraging an Information Advantage

  • Sharing and Collaboration are the Key Processes

  • "The emerging evidence for Network Centric Warfare as the intellectual basis
    for Joint Vision 2010 is compelling"    General Hugh Shelton, CJCS, June 22, 1999

  • IS and NCW Core Concepts Provide an Effective Organizing Logic for Concept-Based Experimentation