Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
1 July Through 31 December 2003
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this
report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section
721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which states:
The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress
an annual report on -
(1) The acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding
6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development
or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced
conventional munitions; and
(2) Trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."
(b) Submittal dates
(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this section shall
be submitted each year to the congressional intelligence committees
and the congressional leadership on an annual basis on the dates
provided in section 415b of this title.
(2) In this subsection:
intelligence committees has the meaning given that term in
section 401a of this title.
(B) The term "congressional leadership" means the
Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representative
and the majority leader
and the minority leader of the Senate.
(c) Form of reports
Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms
Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the
Intelligence Community (IC). As directed by Section 721, subsection (c) of
the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details
of the IC's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings
for the Congress.
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization
Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities
(solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional
weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2003.
We have excluded countries that already have established WMD
and ACW programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little
WMD acquisition activity of concern.
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Iran is also working
to improve delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued
to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During
the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities
in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe. Iran's nuclear program
received significant assistance in the past from the proliferation
network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that
Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program,
in contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT). During 2003, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous
nuclear fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian purposes but with clear
weapons potential. International scrutiny and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards will most likely
prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly
for its weapons program as long as Tehran remains a party to the
NPT. However, Iran could use the same technology at other, covert
locations for military applications.
Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy program to
justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire
the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this fuel cycle
would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, such
as the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor that Russia is continuing
to build at the southern port city of Bushehr. However, Iran does
not need to produce its own fuel for this reactor because Russia
has pledged to provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime
of the reactor and is negotiating with Iran to take back the irradiated
spent fuel. An Iranian opposition group, beginning in August of
2002, revealed several previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities,
sparking numerous IAEA inspections since February 2003. Subsequent
reports by the IAEA Director General revealed numerous failures
by Iran to disclose facilities and activities, which run contrary
to its IAEA safeguards obligations. Before the reporting period,
the A. Q. Khan network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's
older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient
models, and components.
The November 2003 report of the IAEA Director General (DG) to
the Board of Governors describes a pattern of Iranian safeguards
breaches, including the failure to: report the import and chemical
conversion of uranium compounds, report the separation of plutonium
from irradiated uranium targets, report the enrichment of uranium
using both centrifuges and lasers, and provide design information
for numerous fuel cycle facilities. In October 2003, Iran sent
a report to the DG providing additional detail on its nuclear program
and signed an agreement with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany
that included an Iranian promise to suspend all enrichment and
reprocessing efforts. On 18 December 2003, Iran signed the Additional
Protocol (AP) to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement but took no steps
to ratify the Protocol during this reporting period.
Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation
from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China
over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming
self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance
during 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise.
Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the
Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs)-including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud
C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8)-as well as a variety of large unguided
rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had
begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant
SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the
development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally
said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic
missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely
a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also
pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it
continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise
from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve
an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran may have
already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve
agents-and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them-which
it previously had manufactured.
Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive
BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials,
equipment, and expertise that could be used in Tehran's BW program.
Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small quantities
of BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to
seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies,
primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought
high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use
items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal
In March of 2003, coalition forces took action under Operation
Iraqi Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in
Iraq. A large-scale effort has been under way to find the answers
to the many outstanding questions about Iraq's WMD and delivery
systems. We are not yet at the point where we can draw comprehensive
or final conclusions about the extent of Iraq's prewar WMD program.
In March 2003, Libya approached the United Kingdom and United
States expressing interest in coming clean about its WMD programs.
In the course of discussions and visits, the Libyans made significant
disclosures about their nuclear, chemical, and missile-related
activities and minor disclosures about biological-related activities.
A team of US and UK experts traveled to Libya in October and early
December to receive detailed presentations and to visit a number
of Libyan facilities. After extensive discussion during the three
weeks of meetings, our experts were shown covert facilities and
equipment and were told of years of Libyan efforts to develop weapons
capabilities. In late December, the Libyan Government announced
its intention to eliminate its nuclear and chemical weapons programs
and MTCR class missiles as part of an effort to rejoin the community
Progress with the Libyans was made in four strategic areas:
Nuclear. Libya admitted to nuclear fuel cycle projects
that were ultimately intended to support a nuclear weapons program,
including uranium processing and enrichment. The team was given
access to more than 10 sites connected to Libya's nuclear activities
and examined a large amount of specialized nuclear equipment. Libya
pledged to voluntarily eliminate its nuclear weapons program, abide
by its IAEA safeguards agreement, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and to act as though the Additional Protocol was
in force, which requires adherents to provide information about,
and the right of access to, all aspects of a Member State's nuclear
fuel cycle activities and facilities. Libya's disclosures revealed
that the A. Q. Khan network had provided Libya with designs for
Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced
and efficient models, and components.
Chemical. The Libyans showed us a significant quantity
of sulfur mustard that was produced at the Pharma 150 plant near
Rabta more than a decade ago, as well as aerial bombs designed
to be filled with sulfur mustard agent. Libya also showed us equipment
in storage that could be used to outfit a second CW production
facility and dual-use chemical precursors that could be used to
produce mustard and nerve agent. Libya reiterated its commitment
to complete its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and
requested assistance in destroying chemical warfare stockpiles.
Biological. Libya disclosed past intentions to acquire
equipment and develop capabilities related to biological warfare,
but it remains unclear
if these activities were offensive or defensive in nature. At the team's
request, Libya took us to a number of civilian medical-, biotechnical- and
agricultural- related research centers that have a "dual-use" potential
to support BW-related work. The team was given access to scientists at these
Ballistic Missile. Libya provided extensive information
on its Scud missile inventory, its efforts to develop longer-range
missiles, and the assistance it obtained from North Korea and other
Nuclear. After announcing in early 2003 its withdrawal
from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT
Treaty) and its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities
at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994
US-North Korea Agreed Framework, North Korea announced in early
October 2003 that at the end of June it had completed reprocessing
all of the 8,000 spent fuel rods previously under IAEA safeguards.
They also said that all the plutonium derived from that reprocessing
(an estimated 25 to 30 kilograms) was being used for increasing
the size of its nuclear deterrent force. After announcing in early
2003 that the 5 Mwe reactor at Yongbyon had resumed operation,
in October 2003 the North said that future spent fuel from the
reactor will be reprocessed.
In late April
2003 during the Six Party Talks in Beijing, North Korea privately
to "transfer" or "demonstrate" its
nuclear weapons. North Korea repeated these threats at the Six
Party Talks in August 2003. In December 2003, North Korea proposed
freezing its nuclear activities, including not exporting nuclear
weapons, in exchange for rewards. We continued to monitor and assess
North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts amidst diplomatic efforts
to arrange a second round of Six Party Talks.
Ballistic Missile. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient
in developing and producing ballistic missiles and continues to
procure needed raw materials and components from various foreign
sources. In the second half of 2003, North Korea continued to abide
by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998 but
announced it may reconsider its September 2002 offer to continue
the moratorium beyond 2003. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2- potentially
capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized
payload-may be ready for flight-testing. North Korea has demonstrated
a willingness to sell complete ballistic missile systems and components
that have enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities
earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire
the basis for domestic development efforts.
Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang
continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially
be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing CW program. North
Korea's CW capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities
of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agent, using its sizable,
although aging, chemical industry. North Korea may possess a stockpile
of unknown size of these agents and weapons, which it could employ
in a variety of delivery means.
Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention but nonetheless has pursued BW capabilities
since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment,
supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North Korea's
BW program. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions production
infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents
and may have some such weapons available for use.
Nuclear. Syria-an NPT signatory with full-scope
IAEA safeguards-has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar.
Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements
on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance
has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides
opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities, and we are
monitoring Syrian nuclear intentions with concern.
Ballistic Missile. During 2003, Damascus continued
to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket
motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant
missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment
and assistance-primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also
continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition,
Syria was developing longer-range missile programs, such as a Scud
D, and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek
CW-related technology from foreign sources during the reporting
period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin,
but apparently has tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve
agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements
of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production
equipment. Syria probably also continued to develop a BW capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Damascus's Soviet-era
debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued
to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria
requires to replace its aging weapons inventory.
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of the 33 designated
foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide
have expressed interest in using CBRN; however, most attacks probably
will be small-scale, incorporating improvised delivery means and
easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological
substances. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to
favor long-proven conventional tactics, such as bombings and shootings,
the arrest of ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated
that international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting
to conduct chemical and biological attacks.
Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the
September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian
and government targets to CBRN attacks.
One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated
readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early
Usama Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional
was "a religious duty." In 2003, an extremist cleric
who supports al-Qa'ida issued a fatwa that purports to provide
a religious justification for the use of WMD against the United
Al-Qa'ida and associated extremist groups have a wide variety
of potential agents and delivery means to choose from for CBRN
attacks. The success of any al-Qa'ida attacks and the number of
ensuing casualties would depend on many factors, including the
technical expertise of those involved, but most scenarios could
cause panic and disruption.
groups of mujahidin associated with al-Qa'ida have planned "poison plot" attacks
in Europe with easily produced chemicals and toxins best suited
to assassination and
small-scale scenarios. These agents could cause hundreds of casualties
and widespread panic if used in multiple simultaneous attacks.
- Analysis of an al-Qa'ida document recovered in Afghanistan
in the summer of 2002 indicates the group has crude procedures
for making mustard agent, sarin, and VX.
- Both 11 September attack leader Mohammad Atta and Zacharias
Moussaoui-arrested by the FBI before the 11 September attacks-expressed
interest in crop dusters, raising our concern that al-Qa'ida
has considered using aircraft to disseminate BW agents.
is interested in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or "dirty bombs." Construction
of an RDD is well within its capabilities as radiological materials
are relatively easy
to acquire from industrial or medical sources.
Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities in
Afghanistan show that al-Qa'ida had conducted research on biological
agents. We believe al-Qa'ida's BW program is primarily focused
on anthrax for mass casualty attacks, although the group most likely
will pursue opportunities to produce and use other biological agents
in smaller-scale attacks.
Information from 2003 details the construction of a terrorist
cyanide-based chemical weapon that can be made with easily available
items, requiring little or no training to assemble and deploy.
The plans are widely available to any terrorist. Such a device
could produce a lethal concentration of poisonous gases in an enclosed
Usama Bin Ladin
and other al-Qa'ida leaders have stated that al-Qa'ida has a
duty to acquire nuclear weapons. Documents recovered
in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom show that al-Qa'ida
was engaged in rudimentary nuclear research, although the extent
of its indigenous program is unclear. Outside experts, such as
Pakistani nuclear engineer Bashir al-Din Mahmood may have provided
some assistance to al-Qa'ida's program. Bashir, who reportedly
met with Bin Ladin, discussed information concerning nuclear weapons.
Al-Qa'ida has been seeking nuclear material since the early 1990s,
according to the testimony of a government witness-Jamal Ahmad
Fadl-during the 2001 trail on the al-Qa'ida bombings of the American
Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Fadl claimed that al-Qa'ida pursued
the sale of what they believed was enriched uranium in Sudan in
the early 1990s. This effort may have been a "scam" operation,
and there is no credible evidence al-Qa'ida actually acquired the
uranium. Al-Qa'ida has been the victim of other nuclear "scams" in
the past, but it probably has become sensitized to such operations
in recent years, in part due to media coverage of nuclear smuggling
and scam operations.
we are alert to the very real possibility that al-Qa'ida or other
groups might also try to launch conventional
attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure
of the United States to cause panic and economic disruption. In
a video aired by Al-Jazirah in September 2002, senior al-Qa'ida
members said they had contemplated striking nuclear power plants
early in their decision making on targets but dropped the idea
for fear it would "get out of control."
During 2003, Russia's struggling defense, biotechnology, chemical,
aerospace, and nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise
funds via exports and transfers. Some Russian universities and
scientific institutes also showed a willingness to earn funds by
providing WMD or missile-related teaching and training for foreign
students. The Russian Government's efforts to stem proliferation
remained an important element of US bilateral dialogue with Russia.
Nuclear. Russia continues to play a key role in
constructing light-water nuclear power reactors in Iran, China,
and India. Moscow has pledged to supply fuel to the Bushehr reactor
in Iran for the life of the reactor and is negotiating with Iran
to sign an agreement on the return of the irradiated spent fuel
Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during the reporting
period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related
goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India,
and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials
from Russian entities helped accelerate Iranian development of
the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has
supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase
Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.
Chemical and Biological. During the second half
of 2003, Russian entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology
equipment, chemicals, and related expertise for countries of concern
with active CBW programs. Russia's well-known biological and chemical
expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance
in areas with CBW applications.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued
to be a major supplier of conventional arms. In 2003, Russia was
an important source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria
and India. Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology
and equipment to India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs.
Moscow continued negotiations with New Delhi for a package deal,
which includes a refurbished aircraft carrier with a MiG-29K air
wing, as well as a lease of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and at least
one Akula-class nuclear attack submarine. During 2003, Russia continued
work with India on the PJ-10 antiship/land-attack cruise missile.
Export Controls. Despite progress in creating a
legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia's export controls,
lax enforcement remains a serious concern. To reduce the outward
flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise,
top Russian officials must make a sustained effort to convince
exporting entities-as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to
oversee them-that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those
who violate the law will be prosecuted.
late April 2003 during trilateral talks in Beijing, North Korea
privately threatened to "transfer" or "demonstrate" its
nuclear weapons. It repeated these threats in August 2003 at the
Six Party Talks. In December 2003, North Korea proposed to "freeze" its
nuclear activities, including not transferring nuclear weapons,
in exchange for rewards.
Ballistic Missile. Throughout the second half of
2003, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related
equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to the
Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high
priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment,
and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related
technology were one of the North's major sources of hard currency,
which supported ongoing missile development and production.
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation
posture through commitments to multilateral nonproliferation regimes,
promulgation of expanded export controls, and strengthened oversight
mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies
remains of great concern.
Nuclear. China has taken some positive steps during
the reporting period. In September 2003, China stopped at the China-North
Korea border a shipment of chemicals that could have been used
in North Korea's nuclear program. China also decided in late 2003
that it would apply for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), indicating that it intends to embrace the policy of full
scope safeguards (FSS)-which is required for NSG membership-as
a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
Ballistic Missile. China is not a member
of the MTCR, but in October 1994 it pledged not to sell MTCR Category
I ground-to-ground missiles.
Although Beijing continues to take some steps to educate firms
and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations -
offering an export control seminar in September 2003 for officials
and companies from China and other countries - Chinese entities
continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related
projects during the second half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance
has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant
SRBMs and has supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant
MRBMs. Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped
Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production
of ballistic missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use
missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several
other countries of proliferation concern-such as Iran, Libya, and
The United States imposed sanctions on a number of Chinese entities
during the reporting period, including the China North Industries
Corporation (NORINCO) and the China Precision Machinery Import/Export
Chemical. Evidence during the current reporting
period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related
production equipment and technology to Iran.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During 2003, China
remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to
Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate
with Beijing for China to build frigates for Pakistan's Navy and
to cooperate in developing the FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach entities
in Western Europe, South Asia, and the United States to provide
needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators
and associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare
parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific
equipment, and specialty metals. Although West European countries
strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to
successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe.
In addition, several West European countries remained willing to
negotiate ACW sales to India, Pakistan, and other countries in
order to preserve their domestic defense industries. North Korea
approached Western European entities to obtain acquisitions for
its uranium enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum tubing-enough
for 4,000 centrifuge tubes-was halted by German authorities.
Some West European entities remained an important source for the
proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training.
The relatively advanced research of European institutes, the availability
of relevant dual-use studies and information, the enthusiasm of
scientists for sharing their research, and the availability of
dual-use training and education may have shortened development
time for some WMD and missile programs.
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable
technologies continued to be more available around the world, new
sources of supply have emerged that made the challenge of stemming
WMD and missile proliferation even more complex and difficult.
Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread
to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may
be able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the
capability to weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their
chemical industries into pesticide production, they also advanced
toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional
nonstate actors became more interested in the potential of using
biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious
damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile
designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of concern
developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to
In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states,
that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related
technology, might have followed North Korea's practice of supplying
specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries
or by going one step further to supply such expertise to nonstate
actors. Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers,
knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and missile-related
materials and technology could act outside government constraints.
The exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and its role in supplying
nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea illustrate one
form of this threat, but commercial purveyors of dual-use technologies
who routinely seek to circumvent international export control regimes
to deliver WMD-related equipment and material to WMD-aspirant countries
are of grave concern as well.