Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, I am Mark Camillo, currently serving
as a Director in the Washington Operations Offices of Lockheed
Martin Corporation, working in the area of Homeland Security, here
in the National Capitol Region. Although my exposure to advanced
technologies, systems and services since joining Lockheed Martin
have added to the depth of my knowledge relative to public safety
and security, one of my previous assignments while serving in the
U.S. Secret Service will hopefully be of particular value to this
From 1999 through 2002, I served as the Secret Service Winter
Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. This
assignment entailed the designing, planning and implementing of
the Federal operational security plan for the Games.
Protecting Olympic games was not viewed as a new idea as the security
plan was being contemplated for Salt Lake. Protocols and traditions
passed on from previous Olympic security planners lent credence
to studying after action reports from previous games and visiting/interacting
with Olympic security officials who were either preparing or actually
executing their plan. Hence, traveling to observe an actual Olympic
event was extremely beneficial.
You might wonder what actual role the agency responsible for protecting
the President and other key Government Officials had for the Salt
Lake Games. The Secret Service had a significant role in the security
operations of the Games, due a Presidential Decision Directive
executed in 1998, which put the Secret Service in the lead Federal
role for operational security at National Special Security Events
(NSSE). When any event is designated a NSSE, the Service is joined
by the FBI, who has the crisis response lead, and FEMA, who has
the consequence lead.
LESSON LEARNED: HAVE A TEAM SELECTED WITH COMPLEMENTARY SKILLS
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE TO TACKLE AN EVENT OF THIS PORPORTION.
Although the Federal team mentioned in the NSSE “package” sounds
complete, they become integrated components, after joining the
state and local public safety planners, who have an equally vested
interest in a safe and successful event.
We learned in Utah that partnerships were also critical with the
Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC), who had the ultimate responsibility
for the Games, and other key planners such as the Military and
others in the public and private sector. The glue that held all
these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and mutual
Although Federal and State efforts to create sanctioned gatherings
were largely successful, SLOC never lost sight of the value of
communication and went to great efforts to ensure that all those
who represented the key entities had ample opportunities to communicate,
whether it was at a weekly scheduled meeting or a daily conference
phone call. What we found was that rumors or concerns could be
quickly put to rest, allowing more time to move collectively forward.
Many committees were formulated. Some were in a steering capacity,
and some were in a working capacity. The most prominent one was
the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. A State legislated entity
that had representation from all the counties affected by the Games.
Additionally, key Federal partners were participants, as well as
a representative from SLOC. Again, another example of promoting
partnerships with all key public safety stakeholders.
LESSON LEARNED: FORMING PARTNERSHIPS AT ALL LEVELS AND PROVIDING
THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMUNICATE REDUCED SUSPICION AND DISTRUST.
What might be viewed as a new approach to securing the 2002 Winter
Olympics was the inclusion of a very pronounced prevention and
preparedness theme to the security operations in and around the
official venues. Core components including physical infrastructure,
HAZMAT/Explosive Ordinance Detection and access control were
weaved into the general design plan of the venues. SLOC understood
worked in unison with the security planners to place security
elements where they provided most value. The security planners
studied existing site plans developed by SLOC in the early stages
to find ways to introduce security elements into the venues in
the least obtrusive way. With all security components operational
before the gates opened, the venues were transformed into “operationally
clean security environments” that provided in essence a
filter for preventing acts of terrorism or criminality within
LESSON LEARNED: HAVING A ROBUST PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY
AT THE OFFICIAL VENUES DRAMATICALLY REDUCED THE CHANCES OF TERRORISM
OR CRIMINALITY DISRUPTING THE EVENT.
With a very limited number of state law enforcement personnel
available, and a projected requirement of approximately twice the
size of the state law enforcement workforce for overall public
safety, a decision was made to turn to federal agencies for assistance.
We were faced with challenges such as different job classifications
(Officer vs. Agent) and commissioned authority. Also, equally challenging
was drawing from all over the United States, which potentially
meant assigning a Deputy U.S. Marshal from Miami to a security
post on the side of a mountain, or placing a U.S. Park Ranger from
Wyoming at a checkpoint in an ice skating venue. The solution to
this problem was identifying representatives from each agency who
worked in advance with the Olympic planners to match skills and
interests with Olympic security assignments. Consequently, Federal
officers who had skills and abilities conducive to the alpine venues
were assigned accordingly. Distance learning CDs were developed
and forwarded to pre-selected officers to prepare them for their
assignments. Cold weather gear was also procured and issued once
Officers arrived for duty. This also added to boosting morale since
most assignments lasted on average of three weeks.
LESSON LEARNED: ONCE SECURITY POSTS ARE IDENTIFIED, MATCHING OFFICERS
WHO HAVE THE REQUISITE SKILLS, EXPERIENCES AND PROVIDING EQUIPMENT
GREATLY INCREASES JOB PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION.
Theater of Operation
What distinguished the Olympic activity across the nine Utah counties
was whether an event was an official venue or possibly a related
event of a cultural significance that would also draw a mass
gathering of participants and/or spectators. When determining the
of a venue, SLOC maintained an official venue list. This consisted
of the ten competition venues and approximately four other venues
that were critical to the functioning of the Games. When determining
the resources needed for the Olympic security plan, the funding
required was matched to the official Olympic venues. Consequently,
there were no surplus resources for discretionary usage. With
valid concerns raised by those local authorities who’s “Olympic
events” could be viewed as possible terrorist targets,
last minute efforts were made to find resources that would provide
enhancement to their respective security plans.
LESSON LEARNED: REVIEW ALL EVENTS EITHER IN PROXIMITY TO THE OFFICIAL
VENUES OR IN THE REGION AND DETERMINE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IF EXISTING
SECURITY RESOURCES CAN ADEQUATELY SECURE THE EVENT. PUBLIC OFFICIALS
MUST WEIGH THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A LACK OF ADEQUATE SECURITY
WHEN ENCOURAGING THE HOSTING OF AN OLYMPIC RELATED EVENT.
The use of the Military seems at face value like an obvious solution
when there is a large requirement for personnel or equipment.
Requests made to the Defense Department would presumably be met
enthusiastic response to assist in the Olympic Mission. This,
however, was not the case. Reviews of U.S. Military personnel and
in previous U.S. hosted Olympics revealed support that in retrospect
could not be justified. The Salt Lake Winter Olympics was armed
with a supporting team of Military professionals primarily from
both the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Utah National
Guard (UNG). Legislation provided tight controls over what could
be provided. In some cases, specialized support was provided
in areas like air space security, but generally speaking, the greatest
areas of support provided for operational security were in the
areas of equipment assistance and explosives detection support.
Both of which became critical to the enhancement efforts set
motion after the attacks of September 11th. While the Title 10
forces (JFCOM) had strict rules prohibiting their involvement
in law enforcement functions, the Title 32 Forces (UNG) had more
in the area of law enforcement support. The flow of military
communication and support increased significantly when a Joint
Task Force – Olympics
was ultimately established.
LESSON LEARNED: THE MILITARY CAN PROVIDE VALUABLE SUPPORT, BUT
HAS RESTRICTIONS ON THE TYPES OF DUTIES THEY CAN PERFORM. HAVING
A COMMAND LEVEL OFFICER WITH DECISION- MAKING AUTHORITY ON SITE
IS IMPERATIVE IF THERE IS ANY EXPECTATION THAT MILITARY SUPPORT
WILL BE PROVIDED. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PLANNERS SHOULD JOINTLY
REVIEW REQUESTS BEFORE ASSISTANCE IS AUTHORIZED.
In closing, I hope my comments and the six noted lessons learned
provided value to the hearing. I applaud the Committee’s
efforts to bring to light past security practices that might
be useful for future Olympic games.
I would be happy to answer any questions.