

**Statement of
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February 3, 2004
House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment and comments on America's strategy to defend our homeland.

While serving as the Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College, I taught America's future national security leaders that a well-defined and clearly articulated strategy was the key to success. However, as a realist who has spent many years inside the beltway, I also told my students that it is quite common in this town for leaders to confuse plans and spending programs with strategies. Perhaps this is because plans and programs are far easier to write than national strategies. And frankly, there are many in this town who say programs are more important than strategies. I disagree.

It is, unfortunately, all too common in American politics to spend first and ask questions later--the DC version of "ready, shoot, aim." Consider the facts. America has been spending considerable sums of money on homeland security since 1996, but the National Strategy for Homeland Security was not published until the summer of 2002. And some, including the principal author of that document publicly admitted that it was closer to a plan than a strategy. In the words of Secretary Ridge, "It gives us a list of things to do." It was a useful document, but it did not provide the strategy that so many of us had been awaiting.

In preparation for this hearing, I examined six strategies published by the Bush Administration since the summer of 2002: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. These are all useful documents. Some provide strategies for certain sectors, and most provide good plans. However, none provide a national strategy for defending the American homeland that is all-encompassing in terms of missions and participants.

That is what is missing, a single unifying theme that integrates *all missions*--from deterrence, prevention and pre-emption, to incident management and recovery, and *all participants*--from the President to the police officer, from Members of Congress to mayors, and from a cabinet secretary to a soldier to a county public health officer, and a corporate CEO. That is what's missing, the single thread that ties this all together.

Some would question whether such a strategy is possible, or useful. I will tell you it is possible, it would be useful, and there is certainly precedent. In 1947, George Kennan provided America

with a strategy that guided eight Presidents, twenty Congresses, and ultimately provided victory in the Cold War. It was a strategy that could be boiled down to a single word: containment. That single concept, and the philosophy behind it, guided policy and spending programs for forty years. Today, no one has yet to offer a single unifying strategy for the challenges we face.

Of the six documents I examined for this hearing, only two provide major elements of a single unifying strategy for securing the American homeland: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America and The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

The key elements from the National Security Strategy are:

- Disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations
- Wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism
- Protect against and deter attack

The key elements from The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism are:

- Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach
- Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists
- Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit
- Defend the United States, our citizens, and our interests

I endorse the key themes of both strategies. They both place a higher priority on taking the war abroad, rather than focusing on defense within our borders. They both address the issue of fighting a war of ideas and conditions that can be exploited by terrorist organizations and both talk of protecting and defending the homeland. These are most certainly elements of a homeland security strategy, yet they do not provide a single unifying strategy.

Many question whether it is possible to develop a concise yet broad strategy such as *containment* in the Cold War or *Europe first* in World War II. However, I believe it is possible and I believe the American people, and particularly the 10 million Americans directly associated with homeland security deserve such a strategy.

Let's face it, how many in this town and this nation have read the six documents mentioned above? Not many I suspect. But if few have read all of these documents, how can they successfully develop and implement plans and programs to defend our homeland? It would be like going to the Super Bowl without a game plan.

To design a single strategy for homeland security, one must begin with assumptions, and these assumptions are far different from the Cold War, or perhaps, any other time in our history. Strategists talk of *ends, ways and means*. Most agree that the *ways* and *means* have changed dramatically. During the Cold War, preemption was considered taboo, because it was a euphemism for first use of nuclear weapons. Whether or not you agreed with the President's decision to oust Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, preemption is clearly an option of American security policy in the 21st century. In Afghanistan, it was an Army--that for decades had prepared for large tank battles in central Europe and the deserts of Southwest Asia--found its soldiers riding into battle on horseback, using laser designators and satellite radios to guide 500

pound bombs being dropped from airplanes built in the 1960s to fight a nuclear war. The *ways* and *means* have definitely changed. I am not, however, sure, that most understand the change in the *end-state*.

When America entered World War II, we understood that Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan could be defeated. When the Cold War began, we believed that a containment of Soviet expansion would eventually lead to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. But who today truly believes we can defeat terrorism?

In 1967 the President of the American Medical Association stated that the end of infectious disease was possible through the use of vaccination and antibiotics. Obviously he was mistaken. While it may be possible to eradicate some infectious diseases, just as it may be possible to eliminate al Qaeda, winning the war against terrorism is as likely as winning the war against infectious disease. The best we can realistically hope for is to contain the frequency and severity.

A strategy to defend the homeland is far more complex than winning the war against al Qaeda. We must understand this is about a permanent change in the international security environment. We must think long-term and we must seek an end-state that is realistic. The technological genie is out of the bottle--small actors can now threaten a super power. **This fact will not change.**

Therefore, a single unifying strategy for defending the American homeland must contain the following elements.

- Relentless pursuit, on a multilateral basis when possible, of individuals and organizations who threaten our homeland ... this includes those who support them
- Renewed and aggressive programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear and biological weapons
- Concerted effort to win the war of ideas, particularly important in the information age
- Development of standards for prevention, mitigation and incident management programs that are fiscally sustainable for the long-haul
- Understanding that over-reactions by Congress and the Administration could cause more long-term damage to the American economy than terrorists

For more than two years I have been searching for a single word or phrase that could capture these four elements. The single word capable of providing an overall strategy for defending the American homeland is not new. I borrowed it from 1947 and George Kennan, however, the philosophy behind the strategy of *containment* in the 21st century is far different.

It is unrealistic and even naïve to believe that we can permanently end terrorism or terrorist threats to our homeland. One of the candidates for President recently stated in a television advertisement that he could prevent attacks on the American homeland--a preposterous idea that he quickly withdrew. Nevertheless, in the case of defending our homeland, we all hate to admit that which is true. We cannot defeat terrorism. We cannot win the War on Terrorism.

Unconditional surrender by the Germans and Japanese ended the threat. That is not possible today. Secretary Ridge has stated that there will be no victory parades. He is absolutely correct. Therefore, let us make our strategy reflect this reality. We should seek to control certain factors, or better yet, *contain* the threat from terrorism.

We must *contain* the capabilities, global reach, and financial resources of terrorists and terrorist organizations. We must *contain* the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly those weapons that most threaten our survival, nuclear and biological. We must *contain* the spread of hatred with our own offensive campaign in the war of ideas. We must *contain* the vulnerabilities of this nation. And we must seek to *contain* our response to these new threats. We must not overreact.

Some will comment that this is a defeatist strategy. I say it is realistic. We cannot stop every determined truck bomber, but we must prevent a mushroom cloud over an American city or a catastrophic biological attack on the nation. We can't kill, capture, or deter every terrorist, but must *contain* them by limiting their capabilities, their global reach and financial resources.

We cannot prevent the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. Chemical agents, including industrial chemicals are far too easy to produce or buy. Radiological material for use in a dirty bomb has already proliferated beyond control. It exists in most hospitals, laboratories, and even at many large construction sites around the world. However, we must *contain* the proliferation of nuclear weapons and biological weapons. Programs such as Nunn-Lugar are great investments in homeland security.

The Wahabi sect of Islam supports schools, organizations, and special programs (some in our own country, particularly in our prisons) that are registered with the IRS as 501 (c) 3 charitable institutions that preach hatred and violence against America and Americans. We cannot end all coordinated information campaigns against the US, but we must retaliate with our own offensive campaign to *contain* this contagion of hatred, disinformation, and instigation.

We are a free and open nation. That makes us a target rich environment for terrorists. We must take prudent and fiscally responsible action to reduce these vulnerabilities and implement realistic and measurable prevention and incident management programs. The measurement part is critically important. If we don't set standards and goals, how can we measure progress?

One distinguished group of Americans released an often quoted report last year calling for an *increase* in spending on security within US borders that would approach \$100 billion over five years. But we have yet to establish standards and measurable goals for such programs. How did they determine these numbers? How would Congress allocate and prioritize spending? It would be a great for pork. It would send money to every Congressional district. But would it make us more secure?

The press has a field day when a college student smuggled a few box cutters on an airliner, but do we really want a security system that is 100 percent successful? If so, it will take us hours to get through an airport. A system that is 80 percent effective is not an attractive target--even to a

suicide bomber. A system that stops four out of five attackers is a strong deterrent, a system we can afford, and if it is part of a layered defense, it will provide the security required. A passenger and cargo screening system, backed up by hardened cockpit doors, thousands of armed sky marshals, armed pilots, and passengers who have not forgotten Todd Beamer and his compatriots is the type of security system we need and can afford.

Finally, we must not allow Congress or the Administration to overreact. This will be most difficult during election years. On some days, the hyperbole, hype and hollow promises of some politicians frighten me more than terrorists. Following the President's State of the Union address, a prominent Democratic leader stated that less than five percent of cargo entering the US is currently inspected. She demanded that 100 percent of cargo that comes into this country by sea, and 100 percent of the cargo carried on domestic and international flights be inspected. That is a recipe for economic disaster. That is what I mean when I say the US government could do more damage to the American economy than terrorists.

It is important that I maintain my nonpartisan status, so let me go on the record that I have heard equally troubling statements from Republicans, such as spending billions of dollars securing our borders. According to the Department of Homeland Security, there are 7,000 miles of borders and 95,000 miles of shoreline in this country. Understanding that we are in this for the long-haul, how could we ever hope to seal these borders against terrorists? Imagine the costs. It is not economically feasible. We must *contain* our impulse for overreaction. Programs such as these will make us no more secure and divert money away from programs that could. This tendency for impulse spending and regulation will be most likely during election years and immediately following attacks.

And yes, there will be more attacks. We must never forget the words of Ramsey Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 bombing of the world Trade Center. After his arrest in 1995, he was being flown into New York City for arraignment. John O'Neil, the FBI's Chief of Counter Terrorism pointed to the World Trade Center towers and said, "They are still standing." Yousef answered with, "We are not done yet."

Mr. Chairman, al Qaeda is not done yet, and more importantly, we need to understand there are others out there who will one day follow in al Qaeda footsteps. We are in this for the long-haul. We must have a single unifying strategy that responds to the realities of the 21st century.

Containment is the strategy that provides the common thread to all others associated with defending the American homeland. It is a strategy that provides guidance for actions and spending. It is a strategy that is attainable and affordable. *Containment* is both the strategy and the end-state we seek.