

**Statement of
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February 3, 2004
House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations**

“Strategies for a New Long War: Analysis and Evaluation”

In the mid-1990’s, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, testified before Congress that the United States had reached a point of “strategic pause” in its relations with the rest of the world. No clear enemy existed with both the capability and the intent to strike US vulnerabilities overseas, much less at home. Consequently, he argued, the focus of US military thought and acquisition should be the type of force we would want to field in the year 2010. Later refinements pushed out the focus of technological research and doctrinal development to the year 2020. Every military staff and most military colleges devoted themselves to identifying “the next big thing” – using information technology to reshape the military to face an unknown “peer competitor” twenty years away, with a strategy that called for “domination” of any foe in any form of combat. If only we could dominate the battlefield with precision fires, maneuver, intelligence and logistics, the logic went, the enemy would be deterred from attack, and destroyed in short order if a fight were required.

At almost the same moment that the Department of Defense declared the near term horizon free of threats, Osama Bin Laden was meeting with his chief operatives to lay out ideas for an attack on the US homeland, and a new long war designed to collapse the American economy, will, and civilization. Americans might have been reassured by the failure of attackers to down the Twin Towers in New York in 1993, but Bin Laden was emboldened. While the Americans overlooked the developing threat and sought to build a freer and more prosperous world by enlarging free markets and democracy, Bin Laden and others worked feverously on a strategy to destroy moderate Muslim regimes, fracture the community of civilized nations, and collapse the “infidels” who supported modern Islamic leaders.

It was a strategy that almost worked. It might yet.

The Bush Administration has responded to this new strategic situation with a variety of short and mid-term programs, from military action to destroy terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, to diplomatic and law enforcement action to choke off the funding of terrorist training and operations worldwide. And they have published a family of national strategies – a set of nested concept papers, that lay out lines of thought as well as specific actions to address the new strategic situation.

This is a new approach to crafting and presenting policies for the future, and some, more comfortable with the narrow challenges of the past, profess themselves confused by the “proliferation of strategies.” But I for one am pleased to see a set of public plans laid out for review with the intent of coordinating our government, intimidating our enemies, and informing our citizens. That does not mean I agree on every point – but I do applaud the boldness of stating the ideas in a coherent manner and opening the field to analysis of plans and results.

In this paper, I will conduct such an analysis and offer a judgment on the strategies developed thus far, based on my thirty years of military experience, and sixteen years of crafting, studying, and teaching strategy at the national level.

What Is Strategy and How Does It Work?

We will begin with a brief review of the subject of national strategy, only because the term is so often abused and the fundamental ideas so often misstated. Most frequently, strategy is called a plan to balance ends and means.¹ But this definition, I conclude, is wrong – or at least incomplete.

1) The first component of a good strategy is a **clear concept of where the leader wants to go** – what end is to be achieved. Only in a well-defined war between well-defined enemies does a national level strategy have an endpoint. In times of peace (and quasi-war) the desired “end” is usually the management of a problem, not its solution

2) A good strategy is based on a concept of **cause and effect**: *IF I want X to occur, THEN I must do Y to make it happen.*

This seems a simple point, but it is at odds with most strategic teaching and practice today. Even experts and senior officials become so engaged in “operationalizing” the strategy (i.e., crafting policies and carrying them out), that they often forget this first critical piece. A successful strategy must be built around a forcing function – some concept that will cause the stated goal to be achieved. And if the goal is to keep a problem manageable rather than pay the price to solve it, then that should be stated up front.

3) Once this fundamental concept is in place, the **actions and resources** to achieve it – the **ways and means** – must be allocated. Here is where most of the action lies on a day to day basis. Tactics, operations, logistics, personnel training, education and management, organizational and doctrinal development, and coordination with others (intra-agency, interagency, interjurisdictional, and international), prioritization and budgeting – all lie in this part of the strategy. Action oriented leaders are naturally attracted to this process, and many outside observers (especially the media) look to this area alone to evaluate effectiveness. But without a good concept of cause and effect as a base, policy making can become disassociated from logic. The result is action, but not strategic action -- process without progress

4) A good strategy must **allow for a thinking enemy**. It must focus on success, not just action. It must reduce enemy capability and will, as well as reduce friendly vulnerability and strengthen our capability and resolve. This requires some system for measurement, periodic review and adjustment.

5) And finally, **strategy takes place over time**. This is more a question of establishing perspective than setting a timeline. The Cold War took 50 years. It might have taken a decade less, or two decades more – there was no way to anticipate the timeline. But the logic of our strategy did appear compelling, and included patience and the passage of time as critical elements of its success from the beginning.

¹ Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, The Joint Staff, Washington DC., defines terrorism as: “The Calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”

To summarize, we will use the following structure to evaluate national strategies in the remainder of this paper:

Framework for Analysis of Strategies
1) Does the strategy establish a clear end?
2) Does the strategy establish a clear and compelling cause and effect as a forcing function.
3) Are appropriate programs and resources provided for implementation?
4) Is the enemy considered? Is there a way established to periodically review whether we are being strengthened and the enemy weakened? Is the strategy periodically adjusted as a result?
5) And finally, is the strategy designed to work over time?

A Case Study in National Security Strategy: Containment

The intellectual framework we need to analyze today's family of strategies is better understood by looking at a well known, widely accepted, and wildly successful example: the strategy of "containment" with which we won the Cold War.

As with our situation today, the situation in which national strategists found themselves in 1950 was entirely different from what they expected.

At the end of World War II, many senior Americans expected the UN to prevent future war, the United Kingdom to patrol the world as before, and the US to return to a comfortable role as a partner focused on economic advantage.² But US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan shattered this comfortable view with his famous "long telegram" from Moscow, and a later article in *Foreign Affairs* by "Mr. X," in which he described the emerging hostile global ideology that put the survival of the US at risk, together with a potential response. Events along the "Iron Curtain," in Berlin, in China, and finally in Korea, convinced skeptics that strong action was required. Following the North Korean attack in 1950, staffers at the National Security Council, led by Paul Nitze, codified Kennan's ideas into a strategy that became known as "Containment."

*The core of containment was not a balancing of ends and means, but a concept of cause and effect. Communism was a fundamentally flawed idea, the strategy argued – because it misread the nature of man, it could only redistribute wealth and power, it could not create them. So **IF** the US could cut off Communist nations from new resources and populations, **THEN** the whole communist edifice would eventually collapse of its own internal contradictions.*

The actual employment of the strategy suffered from a variety of interpretations from the very start. Nitze favored a robust approach to containment, while Kennan favored a more benign form of diplomacy. The argument over how containment should be operationalized ricocheted through government offices, think tanks, and academia for years, and not just between liberals and conservatives or Democrats and Republicans. In the Reagan administration, Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Secretary of State Schultz played out differences not unlike those of Nitze and Keenan. And in the process, over a 40 year period when the fundamental strategic construct of engagement was set, but the way it was to be realized was endlessly debated, this

² Paul Nitze and Nelson Drew, NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, National Defense University, 1994.

debate – the debate over how the concept of cause and effect was to be operationalized – the argument over what ways and means were to be employed to achieve the ends envisioned – came to be regarded as the making of national security strategy itself.

More money to defense or to education? More carriers or peace corps workers? Conventional troops or nuclear weapons? Once the Containment Strategy was codified in 1950 by NSC-68, these questions over purchases and priorities constituted the whole of the strategic argument for the whole of the Cold War. And so arguments over balancing means and ends (or ways, means and ends as military strategists prefer to say), are taught today as the stuff of fundamental strategic analysis.

And to be sure, a whole family of strategic decisions did follow from this fundamental concept of strategic cause and effect. For example:

- Once the decision was made to fight the hostile ideology around its whole periphery, the decision followed to size the military and the government for the fight. Beginning in 1950, the US built a conventional military force large enough to surround the Communist world, and prepared to fight, either conventionally or with nuclear weapons if necessary. Deterrence, forward deployment, military alliances, and Mutually Assured Destruction were all part of a military strategy to support the strategy of Containment worldwide, as was the whole process of raising, training, equipping, educating and employing an enormous federal bureaucracy outside the military, ranging from the Department of State, to intelligence agencies, to a robust industrial base. The entire economy of the nation was involved..
- The strategy also included a decision to pay for the new standing military. In 1947, President Truman sought to reduce the defense budget to \$7 billion. Three years later it was seven times that size, and it continued to grow in keeping with the need to build a global force.
- Because of the need to field a large force and pay for it, and because Communism was as much a moral challenge as a physical one, NSC-68 included provisions to mobilize the will and resources of the American people.

To summarize:

Strategy Evaluation: Containment
<p>1) Does the strategy establish a clear end? Containment did establish a clear end – the end of communism -- the destruction of the hostile ideology</p>
<p>2) Does the strategy establish a clear and compelling cause and effect as a forcing function? Yes, it did establish a clear and compelling cause and effect as the forcing function.</p>
<p>3) Are appropriate programs and resources provided for implementation? Resource levels and support varied over time, but adequate funding for the strategy was agreed to in principle for the entire 50 years of its existence.</p>
<p>4) Is the enemy considered? Is there a way established to periodically review whether we are being strengthened and the enemy weakened? Is the strategy periodically adjusted as a result? The strategy proved very elastic regarding enemy measures and counter-measures – actual execution was adjusted frequently, without hurting the coherence of the strategy itself.</p>
<p>5) And finally, is the strategy designed to work over time? The designers of the strategy expected it to work over time. Communist leaders were dangerous but not suicidal. So we could afford to take our time – to win without preemptive action or precipitating a war.</p>

To be sure, the strategy was adjusted many times over the next five decades. But its key decisions and structures were put in place early on. And it was possible early on to identify the underlying concepts as adequate, even if the employment of that strategy varied in quality over the years.

For Comparison: A Brief Evaluation of the Clinton Strategy

When President Bill Clinton took office in the first heady days after the end of the Cold War, he identified three primary threats to the nation:

- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- The resurgence of old totalitarianism in newly democratic countries
- Excess military spending that robbed the nation of resources required for other priorities.

After an 18 month delay, his administration produced a national strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The underlying assumption was that rich democracies do not fight each other. *So the national strategic concept was that **IF** the US would use its national level resources (to include its military, its position at the UN, etc) to promote justice, freedom and prosperity around the world, **THEN** America would be safer and more prosperous as a whole.*

The National Military strategy was designed to compliment this strategic concept with an approach called “Shape, Prepare, and Respond:”

- Using military forces in particular to engage other nations and shape their development toward democratic ideals;
- Preparing military forces for the future by saving money now (keeping the size small and holding down acquisitions), while planning for a “Revolution of Military Affairs”(RMA) that would produce a military force both cheaper and more effective in the long run;
- And maintaining adequate forces to respond to crises as they emerged.

Beginning in November of 1996, The Clinton administration added a refinement that both clarified the national strategy, and significantly expanded its scope. After implying as much for four years, the administration explicitly identified securing and expanding US national values as a matter of US survival. This raised the stakes for every US interaction overseas, and placed the Department of Defense and others on a virtual wartime footing in support of every aspect of engagement.

As it turned out, the Clinton strategy was a bit naïve about the power of economic and political incentives to change political opportunists and deeply rooted hatreds. Additionally, the requirement to defend our values everywhere all the time as a survival issue made prioritizing very difficult. The resulting burden of global engagement on deployed troops was greater than anticipated, even as the RMA turned out to be more expensive than expected – requiring even further limits on manpower and stretching our modernization programs to stay within budget.

Additionally, in a move not unlike the current development of multiple subordinate strategies, the Clinton administration identified a number of emerging security needs at the federal level, and addressed them with a variety of Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs);

- PDD 18 and 37 laid out an approach to counter proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
- PDD 39 looked at the challenge of Transnational Threats (whether crime, drug trafficking, or the threat of terrorism).

- PDD 56 established a set of interagency committees to address different domestic crises (“Complex Contingencies”) in order to practice for crises in peace, and promote rapid cooperation in emergencies.
- PDD 62 and 63 established the intellectual and organizational framework to designate and (eventually) promote the protection of facilities identified as “Critical Infrastructure”.
- And PDD-63 established new organizations and initial thoughts about how to promote public-private partnerships in pursuit of improved cybersecurity for the nation.

These PDDs began the organizational efforts of what came to be called federal homeland security, but the task identified was massive, and the resources devoted to these new duties were never adequate.

In short, the combination of stated strategy and directed organizations turned out to be both more problematical and more expensive than anticipated. And the public strategy was blind to a series of threat developments (specifically the threat of Islamic terrorism) that really required some entirely new strategic concepts, ways and means. The international aspect of the strategy was well grounded in theory, and appreciated by many other nations who saw it as cooperative in nature. But the resources were inadequate to the task. So despite some notable successes in the short term, the strategy could not succeed in the long run without considerable new expenditures – most of which were carefully scheduled to come due after President Clinton left office.

To summarize:

Strategy Evaluation: Engagement & Enlargement
<p>1) Does the family of strategies establish a clear end? President Clinton’s Engagement strategy was really a way to reorder the world power structure, not a way to engage or defeat a particular threat.</p>
<p>2) Does the strategy establish a clear and compelling cause and effect as a forcing function? Engagement did establish a clear concept of cause and effect, but that concept was theoretical, not proven. In fact, engagement caused some resentment in some places, and the “democratic peace theory” upon which it was based is now in question.</p>
<p>3) Are appropriate programs and resources provided for implementation? Resource requirements turned out to be considerably greater than anticipated. The strain on the military was particularly noticeable.</p>
<p>4) Is the enemy considered? Is there a way established to periodically review whether we are being strengthened and the enemy weakened? Is the strategy periodically adjusted as a result? The strategy was designed specifically to overcome the resistance of opponents through a variety of regimes and multilateral actions. The ability to tailor approaches by nation was a strong point of the strategy. And the Clinton administration should receive credit for recognizing that potential domestic security challenges would require a different, more interagency response. But identifying issues to US values as survival challenges made reforming the world a life-and-death issue, and prioritization nearly impossible.</p>
<p>5) And finally, is the strategy designed to work over time? The concept of a time line did not exactly apply to this strategy, since engagement was seen as an end unto itself. The strategy did consider time in that it was intended to last until a sufficient number of nations accepted free markets and democracy to make those concepts the norm around the world. But the project was essentially open ended, continuing until the very nature of the international system was reformed.</p>

In the final analysis, this last point colors the overall analysis of the strategy. If the goal was to keep nations engaged and talking rather than fighting, then perhaps “Engagement” can be considered a success. But the language of the strategy seemed to promise a global revolution of major proportions, so the strategy raised more expectations than it could deliver. In the process, it expended a considerable part of the intellectual capital and physical resources of the military chasing marginal improvements in the US security posture around the world. And beyond that, the chances of profitable engagement with the dangerous fanatics at that moment conspiring to attack the US in its homeland were non-existent. The strategy that attempted to shape a new world in a “moment of strategic pause,” ultimately proved inadequate in a world already being shaped by the twisted logic of fanaticism.

An Overview of the New Family of Strategies

As previously noted, I find the family of strategies issued by the Bush administration to be a big step forward in public accountability. Certainly, many of the government’s plans and strategies remain secret as they should. But this approach of nesting strategies gives an excellent view of what the administration considers important, what it is willing to do to achieve those important goals, and what it is not. In this section we will conduct an overview of most of the strategies, and then examine whether and how they work together to advance US national interests.^{3 4}

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

The Bush administration’s strategic approach began in an entirely new context:

- A new technical revolution gives big weapons to small people.
- A new global revolution means big challenges not subject to traditional solutions.
- A new terrorist revolution means big new enemies with a small footprint.
- A new ideological conflict stakes a claim to one fifth of the world’s population and poses a major danger to survival in the long haul.

Developed in the aftermath of 9-11, the strategy must both advance US interests in the world, and address a survival threat to the nation and Western Civilization.

So this administration has developed an entirely new approach to deal with this situation. The goal appears to be not destroying an enemy (as in the Cold War), or reforming the world (as with the Clinton administration), but managing the threat.

The major goals identified for overseas are not new, but the focus is: the new emphasis is to take actions by others into account in shaping our interaction with them. This approach is much more accommodating to those who cooperate with us than those who oppose us. And the focus of our assistance is not primarily on the most needy nations (as in the past), but on those most likely to reform. The strategy is not intended to reshape the international system, but to advance and secure America’s position in that system.

³ This paper does not consider the 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy, as such an evaluation requires a special level of financial expertise.

⁴ This paper does not consider the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism because the level of enemy action and the certain existence of classified plans in augmentation must surely be causing modification on a daily basis. For example, just 5 days before this testimony the Secretary of Defense changed his long standing policy against expanding ground forces and allowed expansion of the Army by 30,000 troops over the next 4 years. Discussing these wide changes in policy orally can be very profitable. Analyzing them in writing when only part of the fact are known is more problematical.

This is not a coldly selfish strategy. In fact, the new strategy professes to benefit all who are friendly to free markets, democracy, and the rule of law. But while the Clinton strategy sought to benefit the world and secure the US in the process, the Bush national strategy seeks to benefit the US, producing a more peaceful and prosperous world in the process.

Evidence of this focus would include:

- The strong support for free markets in every nation.
- A strong emphasis on new investment policies opening markets to outsiders.
- A requirement that those who desire the advantage of cooperation with the US develop transparent financial systems so investments can be tracked.
- And a new emphasis on the rule of law as a prerequisite for US engagement, not a product of it.

The national security strategy clearly considers the threat of “terrorism with a global reach,” but is not driven by this consideration alone – the goal is a strong, secure, prosperous and competitive America. But the clear recognition that modern technology can be used by a new type of vicious enemy requires a new approach to security: “proactive counter proliferation”

The fundamental argument is that given the new catastrophic threats abroad (biological war, covert use of nuclear weapons, etc.), we cannot delay action until a clear threat turns into an attack. Logic demands that we be ready to preempt if we have good intelligence and are confident that the danger is real.

Although the willingness to consider preemption has garnered great attention, this is not the core of the new strategy. Only in exceptional cases is preemption anticipated. But the acknowledgement of such potential cases is a major break with the past, and the administration is sensitive to charges that it is acting as a “rogue nation” based on its strength and not international law. The solution is to expand the accepted international doctrine of “imminent threat” to justify preemption in special cases. This careful distinction has not mollified critics.

In particular, it is important to understand that preemption is not “the new strategy.” Preemption is merely part of a larger, more traditional strategy that seeks to expand the US circle of friends overseas. But two items really are new:

- Giving first priority for US assistance to those making successful efforts to help themselves.
- Expressing publicly a readiness to act unilaterally and preemptively to meet major threats to the US, to include regime change among selected enemies if appropriate

So the new US National Security Strategy, really looks like this: ***IF** we put US interests first, focusing on areas and issues where those interests are most endangered, working with others where possible but independently if necessary, **THEN** enemies will decline and friends will increase, and both the US and the world as a whole will benefit.*

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

Nested within the new national security strategy is a fundamental decision: engage in a Global War on Terrorists with Global Reach – but do so by attacking the terrorists and their support physically, without either mobilizing the American people, or engaging the hostile ideology.

The strategy barely mentions Islam or the radical theology which underlies the motivation of our most dangerous enemies, attempting instead to make war on their actions. It does so with a layered program of actions:

- Defeat Terrorists & their Organization specifies that we will use force to Attack, Destroy, Degrade, Disorganize, Disperse the enemy. This is an extremely proactive use of force to kill terrorists and keep them on the run
- Deny Sponsorship, Support, Sanctuary suggests that these proactive measures will be pursued whether host nations like it or not.
 - Those willing and able to defend themselves will be helped.
 - Those governments willing but weak will receive support.
 - Those reluctant to cooperate will be “convinced”.
 - Those unwilling to cooperate will be coerced.
- Diminish the Underlying Conditions calls for an international effort to assault the political and economic conditions encouraging individuals to embrace an ideology hostile to the US and its interests. Note especially that:
 - The US calls on the international community to assist in this effort.
 - The strategy does not address the underlying religious arguments that prove such a powerful motivator for many of those who have attacked us.
- Finally, Defend US Citizens & Their Interests at Home Abroad makes it clear that the Global War on Terrorism will be waged globally.

Taken together, this is an extremely proactive strategy: ***IF we Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend a wide range of enemies and potential attackers worldwide, THEN attackers will be so reduced that we will all be safer.***

The logic holds up in a mechanical, absolute evaluation: reducing and eliminating enemies means fewer enemies in the long run. But the key motivating factor for our most dangerous enemies seems to be religious. The failure to recognize and address this fact, while smoothing relations with moderate believers around the globe, leaves a glaring hole in our strategic logic. It also means that the single most important metric to measure our success over time – the reduction in the scope and impact of radical teachings – will not be considered for evaluation.

The implications of this strategy for resources are significant but not explicit. Perhaps this is to be expected. NSC-68 included in 1950 size and budget estimates for the forces to be employed for the strategy of Containment, but these estimates remained classified for 25 years. Perhaps the Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and other classified documents contain similar estimates. And perhaps keeping them classified is a good idea – no reason to let the enemy know what burden he is placing on our economy. But this is an expensive part of the strategy family, and the absence of any public estimate of needs and costs leaves the administration in the position of saying “just trust me” to the Congress and the people. Perhaps a requirement for periodic reports to Congress on resources needs would be advisable.

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

The last administration did work hard to counter the proliferation of WMD, using a wide variety of approaches, from establishing international regimes, to pressuring governments to give up their programs, to paying foreign scientists to do other work. The new National Strategy to Combat WMD continues these approaches, but makes one profound change. It commits the US to direct action to secure or destroy WMD that pose a direct threat against the US. In the President’s words, “We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Key issues include: Interdiction, Deterrence, Mitigation, and Defense (both proactive and preemptive)

Of course, Interdiction and Deterrence are not new in this game, but *the explicit threat to hold all who work on such programs personally responsible is new*. So is the emphasis on proactive defense (to include missile defenses), and preemptive defense (again an extension of established international law concerning “imminent threat”). There is no question that under this strategy, the administration is prepared with operational capabilities to neutralize threats overseas should negotiations fail.

These bold warnings about overseas action are matched by a list of responsibilities for consequence management at home, and the assignment of the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct and coordinate Federal efforts. The actual list of actions is a bit short and mundane for practical application, but the significance of including preemptive action and homeland security as elements of a strategy to counter WMD is great. Clearly the administration is taking this threat very seriously, and staking out a position of resolve – no one should be surprised at subsequent preemptive action.

In this regard, publishing the strategy and putting potential WMD proliferators on notice may well be part of the strategy itself.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security

This is really a plan for action, not a strategy. Its emphasis is on organization, responsibility, accountability, and preventing unintended consequences – all ways and means rather than ends. The underlying construct is for managing the problem of terrorism, not constructing a logic of cause and effect to eliminate it. And the principle tool of management is to be the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

As the subsequent Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection makes clear, many federal agencies beside DHS will have key roles in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks in the US. But by virtue of the 22 agencies selected for consolidation, the new department establishes a set of priorities at the national level. These include: Intelligence and Warning; Border and Transport Security; Critical Infrastructure Protection; Response to Catastrophic Threats; Emergency Preparedness & Response; and Domestic Counterterrorism. Not surprisingly, this list corresponds closely to the organization of the new department, which itself foreshadows the core of the administration’s budget request for homeland security. The result is a sort of “strategy by organization,” where the critical cause-and-effect relationship that defines the administration’s strategy for homeland security may be distilled from its actions and priorities. ***IF the new agencies within DHS are properly resourced and accomplish their missions, THEN the survival of the nation will be assured, even if the safety of all individual citizens is not.***

This is a rather convoluted way of discerning exactly how this part of the family of strategies works, and the entire enterprise would be greatly improved if the administration would simply lay out the need to prioritize the security of its citizens, and explain its vision for doing so. But perhaps this is politically untenable – I notice that the administration’s critics have not laid out their priorities either.

Three other areas receive special emphasis in the Homeland Security Strategy:

- **Federalism:** The strategy repeatedly emphasizes the constitutional limitations on what the federal government can direct and control. While individual federal agencies have significant power, the primary exercise of that power will be through establishing standards, grant programs, and incentives for state, local and private cooperation. Command and control of Homeland Security is largely a local issue, and this strategy means to remind and reinforce on this subject.

- **Cost:** The administration is determined that homeland security not break the federal bank, and it emphasizes that future costs are likely to be shared equally with state and local jurisdictions, and private industry (each entity paying about 1/3 of the anticipated \$100 billion annual cost.)
- **Accountability:** The goal of making every element of the entire system accountable for both its effectiveness and its efficiency is excellent, but easier to promise than to achieve. With the strategy in place now for nearly two years, the number of individuals held publicly accountable for poor performance has been low.
- **Restraint:** To the administration's credit, the natural tendency of federal agencies to grow themselves and constrain others is recognized, and a specific caveat emplaced that "America and American Freedoms" must remain unchanged. Provisions for specific, periodic reviews in this area would have been useful.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

This strategy has been the most difficult to craft, and remains the most problematic in the administration's entire family of strategies. The reasons are twofold:

- Offensive tools are advancing more rapidly than defensive tools in the area of cyber security. The fear of an unexpected "Cyber Pearl Harbor" rises daily.
- But the government does not own or control the vast majority of assets at risk, nor can the government secure resources critical to the nation without the cooperation of public and private agents who frequently have little short term incentive to do so.

In short, the federal government can exercise leadership in this area, but success depends upon private action. Crafting a cause-and-effect relationship under such circumstances is nearly impossible. So this document is more a national exhortation than a national strategy.

On the other hand, the strategy makes an excellent effort to organize mission impossible. Protective actions are categorized and addressed in five areas: federal government; state and local government; major industry; small business; private user. Because of the structure of the internet and information revolution, federal directives can only be issued to federal agencies. But the list of recommended actions provides an excellent backbone for action by any organization or individual seeking to secure his own assets and contribute to the cyber security of the nation.

The strategy makes heavy use of "Information Sharing and Analysis Centers" (ISACs) – public-private partnerships encouraged by the federal government but sustained by members of the private sector. ISACs provide a forum where carefully screened professionals can share information with the federal government to improve their security, without conducting meetings that would trigger provide sensitive information to terrorists through our open press.

Other major elements of the strategy include creation of the following:

- **National Cyberspace Security Response System:** A network of overlapping networks that ties together strategic and tactical analysis of events and trends from the DHS operations center to the network of ISACs, and on to state, local, and private entities that have expressed interest and expertise. This formal network linking informal networks attempts to provide federal coordination for a huge variety of non-federal networks, their plans and operations. It is a massive and frustrating effort, clearly demonstrating the difficulty of securing assets when you can only encourage, and not control
- **National Cyberspace Security Threat & Vulnerability Reduction Program:** The idea is to create a better process for identifying cyber threats and vulnerabilities, and alerting the public

in general and some participants in particular to the danger. This would collect at a single federal agency the responsibilities and capabilities now exercised by a variety of software designers, vendors, service providers, etc. This effort took a major step forward just last week when the cyber security division of DHS announced a new federal alert system that will make the government the trusted source of computer-security information.

The strategy expresses the intent to expand such program internationally, but little progress has been made in this direction thus far.

In short, the strategy recognizes the need for new organizations, plans, resources, and does consider the ever changing nature of enemy attacks – it is written to respond to constantly changing enemy actions for the foreseeable future. But it essentially substitutes information sharing for information control, making a virtue of necessity.

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure

No strategy provides a better example of the new strategic realities than this one. Given that every locality thinks that its facilities are critical, this strategy provides a major service in identifying the subject as “large scale damage, casualties, damage to national prestige, morale, confidence,” prompted by attacks on:

- Eleven critical infrastructure sectors: Agriculture and Food; Water; Public Health; Emergency Services; Defense Industrial Base; Telecommunications; Energy; Transportation; Banking and Finance; Chemicals and Hazardous Materials; Postal and Shipping.
- Five key asset categories: National Monuments and Icons; Nuclear Power Plants; Dams; Government Facilities; Key Commercial Assets.

This definition is at odds with many state, local and private definitions, and even some other federal offices. Merely by issuing this definition, the strategy begins to force a consensus on what receives priority for protection, eventually moving all jurisdictions toward the three objectives it identifies:

- Protection for the most critical infrastructure.
- Protection against high risk specific threats.
- A program of continual evaluation and cooperation at every level.

As with other nested strategies, the principles in CIP are: federal guidance; decentralized execution; information sharing.

Specific actions accomplished by the strategy include:

- Assigning responsibility within the federal government for protecting federally owned infrastructure.
- Assigning lead responsibility in the federal government for coordinating the protection of infrastructure owned by others (while providing as many specifics as possible)
- Providing assistance to owners in the state / local / private sector in their security efforts.

In short, the strategy identifies major issues (thereby giving them priority); and works through ISACs to share information, encourage solutions, and promote “enabling initiatives.”

The requirement for resources is not highlighted in this strategy, nor is the enemy. As strategist Colin Gray has observed, “Strategy is so difficult to design and do well that considerations of an intelligent and self-willed foe is frequently a complication too far.”⁵

That would appear to be the case with Critical Infrastructure Protection.

⁵ Gray, Colin, *Modern Strategy*, “Chapter 1: The Dimensions of Strategy,” Oxford University Press: NY, 1999, P. 42.

In Summary

In responding to a survival challenge we have never faced before, the Bush administration has attempted to do something never done before: lay out a family of nested strategies to provide explanation, direction, and continuity to its international and domestic policies. In doing so, the administration opens itself to critics who might take issue with one element or another. Continuing in the face of such criticism – essentially taking a chance on being embarrassed in public – shows a high degree of confidence on the part of the administration, and an admirable determination to get these issues under control.

I have provided an analysis of each strategy individually. I intend to evaluate the effort as a set. I do not undertake this evaluation lightly. Shaping and implementing multiple strategies while waging a Global War On Terror is a bit like changing the tire on a moving car. My hat is off to the leaders and staffers who conceived and recorded them.

Nonetheless, I do take issue on some points.

Strategy Evaluation: Bush Administration Family of Strategies

1) Does the family of strategies establish a clear end?

Taken together, the strategies do point to a new end state, where the threat of major terrorist attacks is diminished, and the US continues to dominate the international system. The strategies seek to manage the world, not reform it, and to negate the actions of the enemy, not the ideology that spawned him. On this last point the strategy appears to me to be too narrow and too optimistic. No one on any side of this fight – neither Republican nor Democrat, neither conservative nor liberal - has rushed to grasp the nettle at the center of this conflict: the role of Islamic thought in producing and sustaining the fanatics at war with us. This deficiency must be addressed.

2) Does the family of strategies establish a clear and compelling cause and effect relationship as a forcing function?

Yes, but on a somewhat irregular basis, and sometimes the underlying concept must be deduced from actions directed.

This is the single most important improvement I would recommend.

The discipline of writing the cause-and-effect concepts will focus the efforts of leaders.

The clarity of such concepts will explain to government employees and others why they are taking the actions directed.

The connectivity of concepts between strategies would provide a narrative for the American public and the international audience.

No single action in the war on terrorism is more important than improving this focus.

3) Are appropriate programs and resources provided for implementation?

The identification of specific programs for execution is a strong point of this family of strategies. In fact, the documents lend themselves to use as checklists in evaluating action and progress.

But the issue of resources is not adequately addressed in these strategies.

Obviously, doing so would be difficult and risky. Political opponents will be tempted to take any figure as a target, arguing that it is either too high or too low.

However, NSC-68 did not lay out specific spending targets – it just determined that the US would spend whatever was necessary to contain and thereby destroy an ideology hostile to its survival.

The Bush family of strategies suggests a war to the death with “Terrorists with Global Reach.”

But it has capped homeland security spending at about the current level for the federal government and is resisting additional spending on the military

The goal is clear and admirable: win the war, secure America, manage the world to reduce dangers, all at minimum cost, so capital can remain available for investment to spur prosperity. This will require us to prioritize. And the American people must understand that our goal is to secure the nation, not every citizen in that nation. Perfect security is impossible: some civilian casualties will occur in this war. This statement is missing from the current family of strategies.

4) Is the enemy considered? Is there a way established to periodically review whether we are being strengthened and the enemy weakened? Is the strategy periodically adjusted as a result?

It is probably too early to complete this analysis at this time. The new organizations required by the new strategies are still being formed. New budgets are not complete. New programs are still in development. We will probably have to wait until the end of the budget cycle after the current election year to really evaluate the impact of the strategies on the bureaucracy at all levels.

There has been an effort to encourage flexibility, “red teaming,” and periodic review in several areas. In others (cyber strategy comes immediately to mind), the enemy is almost wholly disregarded, on the theory that “whatever malicious can be done, some malicious person will do.” This does not help in setting priorities.

What the strategies probably need at this point is a strong reminder of the importance of this point – and perhaps a bit of assistance from Congress in making this an area of review and oversight. Ad always, simply highlighting the point will help those trying to turn theory into reality.

5) And finally, is the strategy designed to work over time?

The answer to this question is a resounding “Yes.”

In fact, every strategy takes into account the danger of changing the basic nature of America in order to save it – and makes it a point to warn practitioners on this point.

Like NSC-68, this family of strategies, and the concepts they represent, are intended to outlive any specific administration, and guide US efforts for the foreseeable future – or until the new threat to our survival is diminished or destroyed.

It is almost impossible to reduce the evaluation of so many strategies responding to such a complex situation to a simple “thumbs up or thumbs down.” The whole point of this evaluation has been to provide a framework to recognize the subtle nuances that can mean the difference between victory and defeat in a clash with a thinking enemy.

But since an overall analysis and overall evaluation calls for an overall conclusion, I give my overall endorsement to the family of strategies described herein, and the process that produced them -- subject to the revisions and additions noted above.

Strategic Outcomes: Possible Futures

If we employ this family of plans, properly resourcing them, and evaluating and adjusting from time to time, what will the future look like? Frankly, we can't know. I can see one of four possible outcomes:

- 1) The family of strategies works completely. The US leads the Global War On Terror; gains global support; Federal agencies learn to lead by information sharing, as well as incentives, standards and selective evaluations; state and local agencies carry their load, training their people, minimizing their appetite for federal funds and making good use of the limited money they receive; the private sector leans forward to cooperate, bearing its share of costs and responsibilities. Attacks are limited and unsuccessful. We make significant progress and improve the world, improving our protection at a sustainable cost while discouraging

terrorism, which falls into a long decline. The enemy abandons his beliefs, and embraces ours. We determine our own destiny. This is our ideal solution, but it is at odds with the nature of humans and bureaucracies. Only exceptional leadership, oversight and transparency can get us to this end state.

- 2) The family of strategies works only incompletely. Some agencies and jurisdictions cooperate, but others do not, taking advantage of the system, or simply ignoring the problem and expecting others to take the initiative. Accomplishing the strategy becomes less important than muddling through. Events (and hence the enemy) drive the train. We surrender our destiny, not to hard work, but to chance.
- 3) The strategies prove unable to constrain the rush for money. The federal bureaucracy is slow to accept its role as leader, counselor and mediator, and exercises power instead. Congress promotes the rush for homeland security money in each district, hence undermining the national strategy and priorities. The family of strategies collapses. At every level – federal, state, local, private, and individual -- a national version of “every man for himself” takes over.
- 4) Lack of Congressional, state, local, and private cooperation dooms federalism. Dangers demand action. Federal bureaucracy takes control of many aspects of our lives. A Homeland Security Industrial Complex arises, much as Eisenhower feared. And we become an easy mark for outside enemies seeking to weaken our government, our economy, and our nation.

The most certain thing we can do to help the administration achieve outcome #1, and avoid the others, is to publicize the strategies, hold those pursuing the strategies accountable, and support the administration in accomplishing the strategies . . . while avoiding constant intervention, and meddling on minor points. Congress has a key role here. Let the administration lead, but provide continuing oversight – as this committee has done. Adopt a congressional strategy to help the family of strategies work.

Policy makers are sometimes contemptuous of strategy, and lawmakers are sometimes too anxious to intervene in policy at the expense of strategy. Both groups should take a deep breath. Strategy determines not only how well we address the enemy in the short term, but how well we remain who we are in the long term. This family of strategies provides a good start. Give it a chance. And continue to watch it closely.

End